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BEFORE THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
Laurel Kulm, 
Claimant, 
VS. 
Mercy Medical Center, 
Employer, 
and 
I.C. No. 06-012770 
AFFIDAVIT OF ANDREW C. MARSH 
IN SUPPORT OF 
MOTION TO RECONSIDER 
DENIAL OF 
ATTORNEY FEES 
Industrial Claims Management, 
Surety, 
Defendants. 
STATE OF IDAHO ) 
)ss 
County of Ada ) 
Andrew C. Marsh, being first duly sworn, deposes and says as follows: 
1. I am an associate attorney of the firm Seiniger Law Offices, P.A., and attorney of record 
for the Claimant in the above-entitled matter. I make this Affidavit based on personal 
knowledge. 
2. An attorney fee hearing was held in the above-entitled matter on Nov. 23, 2009. 
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3. On May 20,2010, the Commission issued its FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW RELATING TO COUNSEL'S REQUEST FOR APPROVAL 
OF ATTORNEY'S FEES (hereinafter "KULM DECISION"). 
4. The KULM DECISION contains Footnote 1 on page 34 that reads as follows: 
Interestingly, in a companion case, treating a similar demand for approval 
of a requested fee, Counsel offered a Form 1022 that contained language 
identical to that quoted above. At hearing on the motion to approve the 
requested fee in that case, Counsel acknowledged that the quoted 
paragraph is "boilerplate" and goes into all of his Form 1022 recitations 
even where, in a particular case, surety had not denied or disputed 
Claimant's entitled [sic] to a PPI rating prior to Counsel's retention. This 
may explain why staff was unable to obtain a satisfactory explanation for 
the averments made in the quoted paragraph. (emphasis in original) 
5. The Footnote does not cite or identify the alleged "companion case." However, upon 
information and belief, I assume that the Commission is referring to the case of Drotzman 
v. Molson Coors Brewing Company and Zurich American Insurance Company, I.e. No. 
06-006711. A hearing on Counsel's request for attorney fees was held in Drotzman on 
Feb. 3,2010. True copies of pages 42, 49, and 50 of the Drotzman Transcript are attached 
hereto as Exhibit A. 
6. On February 10,2010, Counsel hand-delivered a Letter to the Commissioners in follow-
up to the Drotzman hearing that read as follows: 
I wanted to provide some additional information on an issue raised by the 
Commission at the hearing on February 3,2010, in regard to Par. 10 of the 
Form 1022 that I filed on May 8, 2009. In preparing for the hearing, I did 
not anticipate that my statements in Par. 10 would be one of the topics, 
and I regret that my responses to the Commissioners' questions indicated 
an incomplete present recollection of past events. 
Accordingly, I have gone back and re-reviewed my file. The language in 
the paragraph comes from a form that we use whenever we need to 
generate a Form 1022. Our intention each time is to edit the form to match 
the specific circumstances of the particular case. Having reviewed the file, 
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I believe I can shed some light on why, in filling out Form 1022 nearly a 
year ago, I believed that at the commencement of Cody's case there were 
issues in controversy or benefits that were "denied, discontinued, or 
disputed." 
1. The first time I was contacted regarding this case was by Cody's 
mother on September 29,2006. My notes in our database read as follows: 
"mother Diane called for her 25 yr old son Cody (father is Jim). Driver for 
Coors for 7 yrs, injured while using a handtruck, weeks later when pain 
became excruciating he went to Dr, had surgery for herniation ofL4-5 on 
9/26106. Claim has been accepted. His mother is concerned about perm 
impairment and need for retraining. Son is concerned because he doesn't 
want to sue Coors, mom thinks he doesn't understand how work comp 
works." 
"Referred by Greg F. at the Hospital. He is a driver for Coors 
Distribution. May 6th backed over a two wheeler so he had a smaller one, 
on the stairs, fell and herniated L4-5. Reported weeks later..injections, 
MRI .. Had Surgery(Montalbano), sent home from hospital. Will be 
terminated 12/05/06 by Coors .. Still being paid by Coors. IC wants to 
Evaluate him at home 10104/06." 
I interpret these notes as meaning that there was some controversy 
regarding permanent impairment, and regarding a threat from Coors to 
terminate Cody. (At this point, Cody had not yet engaged our services.) 
2. There was a meeting at our office on October 16, 2006 with Cody 
and his parents. My notes read as follows: 
"met with Cody and parents, WBS and ACM. 
he should get permanent restrictions from Montelbano at MMI, in writing, 
then call WBS back to discuss next step, such as go to voc expert and get 
disability rating. 
IfICRD claims they have right to be there for Dr opinions, ask for a ltr 
stating her authority." 
I interpret these notes as meaning that, again, there was some ongoing 
controversy regarding permanent impairment. (At this point, Cody had not 
yet engaged our services.) 
3. Cody's mother called on November 16,2006, and spoke to Breck. 
The notes read as follows: 
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"Telephone conference with potential client--mom called and said 
Montebano told him to return to work. has not got impairment rating. 
breck told her to send him to Radnovich. would need to invest $1000 to 
get Radnovich. b told her to call back asap to come in and see us if she 
wants to retain us." 
I interpret these notes as meaning that Cody's doctor released him to work 
without giving him an impairment rating, and that Cody's mom 
considered this to be a dispute. (At this point, Cody had not yet engaged 
our services.) 
4. Cody and his parents came in to the office on November 21,2006, 
and asked us to represent them (they returned the signed fee agreement the 
next day). They showed me a letter from Coors dated November 16, 2006 
(copy attached) that read in pertinent part: "Therefore, your disability is 
denied beginning 11-7-06." They also showed me an earlier letter from 
Coors dated September 26, 2006 (copy attached) that read in pertinent 
part: "Therefore, your medical restrictions/disability are denied beginning 
9-18-06." 
In filling out the Form 1022, I no doubt would have interpreted these notes 
as meaning that there was at least some aspect of Cody's case that was 
"denied" prior to the time he signed the fee agreement. 
In addition, my notes from that same meeting with Cody read as follows: 
"meet w/ client and parents to sign fee agmt. 
Coors policy is that you must be recovered in 180 days to keep your job. 
last day of work 9/25/06, surgery 9/26/06, then rec'd WC pmts 
file complaint, send init ltr to surety, lIC, client, send ltr to radnovich re 
issues and our questionaire and med rec to follow, send ltr to surety re 
what med rec do they have re MMI that justifies cutting off TTDs? 
he will call us after see Dr Maldonado [ sic] tomorrow, after which we will 
notify [surety] of our representation." 
I interpret these notes as meaning that at the time we were retained, there 
was an active dispute over whether the surety had a basis for "cutting off' 
Cody's TTDs. 
So although at the hearing I did not have a present recollection, it appears 
that at the time I filled out the Form 1022 last year, I had a good faith basis 
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for considering that there were issues in dispute prior to the time we were 
retained. 
The Letter was signed by your affiant. A copy is attached hereto as Exhibit B and is 
incorporated herein by reference. 
7. The Letter of February 10,2010, makes it clear that although, at the time of the 
Drotzman hearing, :Mr. Marsh did not have a present recollection of the facts underlying 
the representations made in his Form 1022, said representations were indeed supported 
by the facts, as set forth in the follow-up Letter. 
8. The Drotzman Transcript and Letter make it clear that the following allegation made in 
Kulm Footnote 1 is inaccurate and misleading: 
At hearing on the motion to approve the requested fee in that case, 
Counsel acknowledged that the quoted paragraph is "boilerplate" and goes 
into all of his Form 1022 recitations even where, in a particular case, 
surety had not denied or disputed Claimant's entitled to a PPI rating prior 
to Counsel's retention. 
9. At no time during the Drotzman hearing did Counsel state or imply that he uses the 
"quoted paragraph" even where it is inapplicable. Any implication in Footnote 1 to the 
contrary mischaracterizes Counsel's statements and the follow-up Letter. 
10. As set forth above in the follow-up Letter, Counsel uses a legal form as a starting point 
from which to generate a Form 1022: "The language in the paragraph comes from a form 
that we use whenever we need to generate a Form 1022. Our intention each time is to edit 
the form to match the specific circumstances of the particular case." As proof that 
Counsel edits the form "to match the specific circumstances of the particular case," 
Counsel has attached (Exhibit C) a sample of excerpts from fifteen Form 1022's filed by 
this firm in actual workers' compensation cases between 2003-2010 in which language 
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that is not "identical to the quoted paragraph" is used, based on the circumstances of the 
particular case. 
FURTHER SA YETH YOUR AFFIANT NAUGHT. 
Dated June 8, 2010. 
AndF~w arsh { 
A~mey for Claimant 
SUBSCRI ..BED AND SWORN to~ before me on June 8, 20~ 
~ ;;'.~ ~C: 'n U~, / 
.... > I Notary Public for Idaho . 
i (J Residing at: NA-MPA \ (}:::2A-+-f--0 I fA My Commission expires: q I z-~ /20 I Z. 
;A 
., 
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942 W. Myrtle Street 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
(208) 345-1000 
AFFIDAVIT OF ANDREW C. MARSH 
IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO RECONSIDER 
DENIAL OF ATTORNEY FEES 
PAGE60F6 
271-
PAGE 42 
1 MR. MARSH: Okay. With your permission Mr. Seiniger 
2 will address that. 
3 COMMISSIONER BASKIN: Certainly. Mr. Seiniger. 
4 MR. SEINIGER: Thanks. If I may, just for purposes 
5 of the record, Commissioner Baskin, first of all, with 
6 respect to the other issues, which I -- I understand that 
7 we raised in the Kulm matter and we'd like to confine our 
8 discussion to the -- to the issue of the one rule on 
9 primarily and substantially. May we, for purposes of the 
10 record, agree that those -- that those issues that have 
11 been raised have been argued? 
12 COMMISSIONER BASKIN: Certainly. 
13 MR. SEINIGER: So, that I haven't waived any. 
14 COMMISSIONER BASKIN: Yeah. 
15 MR. SEINIGER: And, secondly, with respect to the 
16 questions that you had about Mr. Marsh's affidavit or 
17 declaration, I didn't prepare that, but I can tell you 
18 that I'm responsible, essentially, for the boilerplate 
19 language about things being disputed and it sounds to me 
20 like either that was just completely incorrect or there 
21 was a misunderstanding on Mr. Marsh's part. With respect 
22 to the TTD benefits that you asked about, there was, as I 
23 understand it, a dispute and -- with respect to the IME 
24 consultation --
25 COMMISSIONER BASKIN: Let me stop you for a second. 
EXHIBIT 
I A. 
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1 unclear if one doesn't take a simplistic view. It's sort 
2 of like when Boise State wins a football game, towards the 
3 end of the game there is a great pass. Did the great pass 
4 and the great catch primarily and substantially account 
5 for that victory? Well, without much analysis you would 
6 say, yes, of course. Nobody else on the team could take 
7 any credit for that, because the final points that won the 
8 game were done by two people in the last 40 seconds. I 
9 can only say this: If by primarily and substantially you 
10 mean did we, essentially, put a gun to the surety's head 
11 and say we are pulling this trigger unless this guy gets 
12 his impairment rating, then, in this case, certainly, 
13 that's not what happened. Okay. If by primarily and 
14 substantially you mean considering everything that was 
15 done, it would not - it would not be - the plaintiff 
16 excuse me. Not the plaintiff. But counsel are faced with 
17 almost an impossible task, because they have to prove a 
18 negative. They really have to prove what would have 
19 happened if they weren't there representing somebody all 
20 of the way along. And that's the problem that we have and 
21 I think that -- I take responsibility for this one thing 
22 that you picked up on, Commissioner Baskin, this thing 
23 about how benefits were denied or disputed. I asked Mr. 
24 Marsh about that and he said, well, they had admitted them 
25 and that -- that's the way he understood. But if I'm 
37% 
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1 incorrect, it's boilerplate, there wasn't any attempt to 
2 pull the wool over anybody's eyes and I think I owe you an 
3 apology for that. But I think, nevertheless, you see 
4 you see my point. The question is how deeply is one 
5 willing to probe to try and figure out what the primarily 
6 and substantially language means and our position is that 
7 when -- I guess if a person says, hey, I never could have 
8 gotten there by myself, that's probably the best evidence 
9 that you can possibly have, absent the case where it's 
10 very clear that a gun was held to the defendant's head and 
11 why they paid. And even in that case the defendants can 
12 always say, well, we would have paid anyway. Yeah, it's 
13 true we got this letter from him and it was a couple of 
14 weeks late, but that was an administrative issue, so 
15 that's my argument. 
16 COMMISSIONER BASKIN: And that is the difficulty, 
17 because, you know, it's occurred to us from time to time 
18 that -- when we are kicking these around, well, let's call 
19 up the surety and find out what they will say. Well, what 
20 surety is going to admitted to taking the position, yeah, 
21 we probably wouldn't have written this check absent the 
22 claimant retaining the attorney? No surety is going to 
23 admit that. 
24 MR. SEINIGER: That's a point we wanted to make, but 
25 we -- and we actually tried to get some evidence on that, 
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Idaho, Indiana, and the District of Columbia 
February 10,2010 
VIA HAND DELIVERY 
ANDREW C. MARsH 
Idaho, Indiana, and MisSOliri 
R.D. Maynard, Chairman 
Idaho Industrial Commission 
700 S Clearwater Lane 
Boise, ID 83720-0041 
Thomas Limbaugh, Commissioner 
Idaho Industrial Commission 
700 S Clearwater Lane 
Thomas Baskin, Commissioner 
Idaho Industrial Commission 
700 S Clearwater Lane 
Boise,ID 83720-0041 Boise, ID 83720-0041 
RE: Cody Drotzman v. Coors Brewing Co; llC Case No. : 06-006711 
Follow-up Information 
Dear Commissioners: 
I wanted to provide some additional information on an issue raised by the Commission at 
the hearing on February 3, 2010, in regard to Par. 10 of the Form 1022 that I filed on May 
8, 2009. In preparing for the hearing, I did not anticipate that my statements in Par. 10 
would be one of the topics, and I regret that my responses to the Commissioners' 
questions indicated an incomplete present recollection of past events. 
Accordingly, I have gone back and re-reviewed my file. The language in the paragraph 
comes from a form that we use whenever we need to generate a Form 1022. Our intention 
each time is to edit the form to match the specific circumstances of the particular case. 
Having reviewed the file, I believe I can shed some light on why, in filling out Form 
1022 nearly a year ago, I believed that at the commencement of Cody's case there were 
issues in controversy or benefits that were "denied, discontinued, or disputed." 
1. The first time I was contacted regarding this case was by Cody's mother on 
September 29,2006. My notes in our database read as follows: 
"mother Diane called for her 25 yr old son Cody (father is Jim). Driver 
for Coors for 7 yrs, injured while using a handtruck, weeks later when 
pain became excruciating he went to Dr, had surgery for herniation of 
L4-5 on 9126/06. Claim has been accepted. His mother is concerned 
about perm impairment and need for retraining. Son is concerned 
because he doesn't want to sue Coors, mom thinks he doesn't 
understand how work comp works." I 
942 W. MYRTLE STREET 
BOISE, IDAHO 83702 
(208) 345-1000 
Fax: (208) 345-4700 
Andrew@SeinigerLaw.com 
www.SeinigerLaw.com 
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"Referred by Greg F. at the Hospital. He is a driver for Coors 
Distribution. May 6th backed over a two wheeler so he had a smaller 
one, on the stairs, fell and herniated L4-5. Reported weeks 
later..injections, MRI .. Had Surgery(Montalbano), sent home from 
hospital. Will be terminated 12/05106 by Coors .. Still being paid by 
Coors. IC wants to Evaluate him at home 10/04/06." 
I interpret these notes as meaning that there was some controversy regarding 
permanent impairment, and regarding a threat from Coors to terminate Cody. (At this 
point, Cody had not yet engaged our services.) 
2. There was a meeting at our office on October 16, 2006 with Cody and his parents. 
My notes read as follows: 
"met with Cody and parents, WBS and ACM. 
he should get permanent restrictions from Montelbano at MMI, in 
writing, then call WBS back to discuss next step, such as go to voc 
expert and get disability rating. 
If ICRD claims they have right to be there for Dr opinions, ask for a ltr 
stating her authority." 
I interpret these notes as meaning that, again, there was some ongoing controversy 
regarding permanent impairment. (At this point, Cody had not yet engaged our 
services.) 
3. Cody's mother called on November 16,2006, and spoke to Breck. The notes read 
as follows: 
"Telephone conference with potential client--mom called and said 
Montebano told him to return to work. has not got impairment rating. 
breck told her to send him to Radnovich. would need to invest $1000 
to get Radnovich. b told her to call back asap to come in and see us if 
she wants to retain us." 
I interpret these notes as meaning that Cody's doctor released him to work without 
giving him an impairment rating, and that Cody's mom considered this to be a 
dispute. (At this point, Cody had not yet engaged our services.) 
4. Cody and his parents came in to the office on November 21,2006, and asked us to 
represent them (they returned the signed fee agreement the next day). They 
showed me a letter from Coors dated November 16, 2006 (copy attached) that 
read in pertinent part: "Therefore, your disability is denied beginning 11-7-06." 
They also showed me an earlier letter from Coors dated September 26, 2006 
942 W. MYRTLE STREET (208) 345-1000 Andrew@SeinigerLaw.com 
BOISE, IDAHO 83702 Fax: (208) 345-4700 www.SeinigerLaw.com 
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(copy attached) that read in pertinent part: "Therefore, your medical 
restrictions/disability are denied beginning 9-18-06." 
In filling out the Form 1022, I no doubt would have interpreted these notes as 
meaning that there was at least some aspect of Cody's case that was "denied" prior to 
the time he signed the fee agreement. 
In addition, my notes from that same meeting with Cody read as follows: 
"meet w/ client and parents to sign fee agmt. 
Coors policy is that you must be recovered in 180 days to keep your 
job. 
last day of work 9/25/06, surgery 9/26/06, then rec'd WC pmts 
file complaint, send init ltr to surety, lIC, client, send ltr to radnovich 
re issues and our questionaire and med rec to follow, send hr to surety 
re what med rec do they have re MMI that justifies cutting offTTDs? 
he will call us after see Dr Maldonado [sic] tomorrow, after which we 
will notify [surety] of our representation." 
I interpret these notes as meaning that at the time we were retained, there was an 
active dispute over whether the surety had a basis for "cutting off' Cody's TTDs. 
So although at the hearing I did not have a present recollection, it appears that at the time 
I filled out the Form 1022 last year, I had a good faith basis for considering that there 
were issues in dispute prior to the time we were retained. 
Please let me know if! can provide any further information that would be of help to the 
Commission. Thank you. 
Sincerely, 
~'I<-v;."r- / <t./I.:IA.Ac'-{'l. 
Andrew Marsh 
Attachments: As Stated 
cc: Cody Drotzman 
942 W. MYRTLE STREET 
BOISE, IDAHO 83702 
(208) 345-1000 
Fax: (208) 345-4700 
Andrew@SeinigerLaw.com 
www.SeinigerLaw.com 
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Wm. Breck Seiniger, Jr. (ISB # 2387) 
Andrew C. Marsh (ISB # 6588) 
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Christopher Gamble, 
Claim'Dt, 
VI. 
. Dlinois Tool Works, Inc. (Wynns USA), 
Employer, 
aDd 
Zurich Ameriean Insurance Comp8.DY, 
Surety, 
Defendants. 
I.C. No. 09003177 
FORM lOll, REPORT OF EXPENSES 
aDd 
STATEMENT OF 
CLAIMANT'S COUNSEL 
COMES NOW C1aimant'sCounsel and reports his expenses and submits the following in 
support ofhis claim of attorney's fees and costs in the amount set forth below from the proceeds 
of the settlement of the above cap1ioned case. 
REPORT OF LITIGATION EXPENSES 
In accordance with the requirements of § 72-528, Idaho Code.. this form shall be filled out 
and returned to the Industrial Commission within 30 days following the time of entry of a final 
award by the Industrial Commission in the above case, or, in the event of an appeal to a final 
court, within 30 days following a final ruling by the Court. If there is an appeal, the totals 
specified below shall include the expenses, costs, or fees incurred in the appeal. 
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4. Counsel advised Claimant as to the disclosures required by the Idaho Industrial 
Commission. 
S. Counsel created a database file for Claimant in which pertinent information was 
recorded for use in the handling of the claim. 
6. During, or shortly after, the initial meeting with Claimant, Counsel drafted the 
following documents for the benefit of Claimant: a fee agreement and disclaimer statement 
meeting the requirements of the Idaho Industrial Commission; medical releases; employment 
release; a letter of representation and inquiry to the surety; a letter of representation to the Idaho 
Industrial Commission requestiIig copies of Claimant's file; a letter to the treating medical 
providers requesting complete copies of Claimant's medical and billing records; and a client 
intake questionnaire for the initial gathering of relevant information concerning the client's 
employment, educational, medical and health, military, vocational, and accident history. 
7. Co~l reviewed all medical records. employment records, and other requested 
documents as they were received, and consulted with Cbtimant about the status of the case on a 
periodic basis. 
8. Counsel advised Claimant concerning the need to keep medical appointments, 
aspects of medical treatment which might potentially affect CJaimant's impairment rating. and 
strategic issues relating to medical care which can impact the result of a worker's compensation 
case. 
9. Counsel conducted legal research concerning aspects of Claimant's case and 
injuries. 
10. During the case, Defendants discontinued or disputed Claimant's right to 
additional medical benefits and treatment, time loss benefits, and attomey fees. E.g., "Notice of 
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Claim Status" from surety dated 9/1/09, discontinuing all benefits (including medical and ITO) 
effective 8/31/09 based on an alle~on that Claimant refUsed medical examination. As a result 
of Counsel's efforts disputing the allegation, including phone calls,letters, and filing a 
Complaint, Claimant received additional medical treatment and time loss benefits (e.g. 
reinstatement letter from surety received by Counsel on 9/18/09 and TID benefit check received 
on 10/7109) and (eventually) impairment compensation. 
11. During the case, Counsel investigated and determined that Defendants refused to 
authorize medical treatment recommended by Claimant's primary treating physician, and 
Defendants refused to pay time loss benefits in full or in a timely fashion 
12. Counsel made written demand upon Defendants for to authorize medical 
treatment recommended by Claimant's primary treating physician, and to pay time loss bene~ts 
in full and in a timely fashion 
13. In response to Counsel's actions, Defendant Surety retained legal counseL 
14. Counsel prepared and sent a written referral of Claimant to the Idaho Industrial 
Commission Rehabilitation Division, and advised Claimant on working with the ICRD counselor 
on education, training, job seeking, and other re-employment efforts. 
15. Counsel prepared a complaint and notice of service, filed originals with the Idaho 
Industrial Commission, and served copies on Defendants. Defendants answered with a denial of 
Claimant's entitlement to the benefits being sought Counsel reviewed and analyzed the defenses. 
16. An emergency telephone conference was requested by Claimant's Counsel, and 
was held on 10120/09. 
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Wm. Breck Seiniger, Ir. (lSB:# 2387) 
Andrew C. Marsh (ISB :# 6588) 
SEINIGER LAW OFFICES, P.A. 
942 W. Myrtle Street 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
Phone: (208) 345"1000 
Fax: (208) 3454700 
Attorneys for Claimant 
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Charles Travis, 
Claimant, 
VI. 
Wal-Mart, Ine., 
Employer, 
and 
LC. No. 09-032710 
FORM 1022, REPORT OF EXPENSES 
and 
STATEMENT OF 
CLAIMANT'S COUNSEL 
Sedgwick Claims Management Services, 
Inc., 
Surety, 
Defendants. 
COMES NOW CJajmant's Counsel and reports his expenses and submits the following in 
support of his claim of attorney's fees and costs in the amount set forth below from the proceeds 
of the settlement of the above captioned case. 
REPORT OF LITIGATION EXPENSES 
In accordance with the requirements of § 72"528, Idaho Code. this form shall be :filled out 
and retumed to the Industrial Commjssion within 30 days following the time of entry of a final 
award by the Industrial Commission in the above case, or, in the event of an appeal to a final 
court, within 30 days following a :final ruling by the Court. If there is an appeal, the totals 
specified below shall include the expenses. costs, or fees incurred in the appeal. 
SElNIGER lAWa:FiCeS. P.A. 
942 W. My!te Shet 
BdIe. Idaho 837Q2 
(208) 346-1000 
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for cooperation with treating physicians, the Idaho Industrial Commission Rehabilitation 
Division, and Seinig~ Law Offices, P .A. 
4. Counsel advised Claimant as to the disclosures required by the Idaho Industrial 
Commission. 
S. Counsel created a database file for Claimant in which pertinent information was 
recorded for use in the bandling of the claim. 
6. During, or shortly after, the initial meeting with Claiman~ Counsel drafted the 
following documents for the benefit of Claimant: a fee agreement and disclaimer statement 
meeting the requirements of the Idaho Industrial Commission; medical releases; employment 
release; a letter of representation and inquiry to the surety; a letter of representation to the Idaho 
Industrial Commission requesting copies of Claimant's file; a letter to the treating medical 
providers requesting complete copies of Claimant's medical and billing records; and a client 
intake questionnaire for the initial gathering of relevant information concerning the client's 
employment, educational, medical and health, military, vocational, and accident history. 
7. Counsel reviewed all medical records, employment records, and other requested 
documents as they were received, and consulted with Cwmant about the status of the case on a 
periodic basis. 
8. Counsel advised Claimant concerning the need to keep medical appointments, 
aspects of medical treatment which might potentially affect CJairnant's impamnent rating, and 
strategic issues relating to medical care which can impact the result of a worker's compensation 
case. 
9. Before Counsel was retained on 118/10, Defendants cancelled Claimant's medical 
treatment appointment for that very afternoon, which Claimant considered a denial, 
SEINIGER LAW a=FICES. P.A. 942 W. _ SfAIet 
BoIae,Idaho 83702 
(208) 345-1000 
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discontinuance, or dispute of Claimant's right to additional medical benefits and treatment (see 
Affidavit of Charles Travis, attached hereto) Subsequent to retaining Counsel, Claimant received 
additional medical treatment, and also received time loss benefits. 
10. After being retained by Claimant, Counsel investigated and determined that 
Defendants cancelled a medical appointment recommended by Claimant's primary treating 
physician, and later Defendants refused to honor a referral from Claimant's primary treating 
physician (Dr. Welch to Dr. Radnovich). 
11. Counsel made written demand upon Defendants to authorize medical treatment 
recommended by Claimant's primary treating physician, to honor a referral from Claimant's 
primary treating physician, and to pay time loss benefits in :full and in a timely fashion. 
12. Counsel made written demand upon Defendants for workers compensation 
benefits that Counsel believed were due. 
13. In response to Counsel's action, Defendant Surety retained legal counsel. 
Ultimately, Defendants agreed to pay ITDs. 
14. Counsel prepared and sent a written referral of Claimant to the Idaho Indus1rial 
Commission Rehabilitation Division, and advised Claimant on working with the ICRD counselor 
on education, training,job seeking, and other re-employment efforts. 
15. Upon receiving a demand from Defendants for Claimant to submit to an 
independent medical evaluation by a medical provider chosen by Defendants, Counsel advised 
Claimant in advance of the procedure, which was cancelled when the case was settled. 
16. Counsel prepared a complaint and notice of service, filed originals with the Idaho 
Industrial Commission, and served copies on Defendants. Defendants answered with a denial of 
SEINIGERLAW OFFICES, P.A.. 
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Wm. Breck Seiniger, Jr. (ISB # 2387) 
Andrew C. Marsh (ISB # 6588) 
SBINIGER. LAW OFFICES. P .A. 
942 W. Myrtle Street 
Boise. Idaho 83702 
Phone: (208) 345-1000 
Fax: (208) 345-4700 
Attomeys for Claimant 
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INDUSTRIAL COMMjSS/OH 
BEFORE THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
Benjamin Gonzalez, 
Claimant, 
VI. 
Precision Craft, Inc., 
Employer, 
and 
Liberty Northwest, 
Surety, 
DefeDdaDtI. 
LC. No. 08-826319 
FORM 1022, REPORT OF EXPENSES 
and 
STATEMENT OF 
CLAIMANT'S COUNSEL 
COMES NOW Claimant's Counsel and reports his expenses and submits the following in 
support of his claim of attorney's fees and costs in the amount set forth below from the proceeds 
of the settlement of the above captioned case. 
REPORT OF LmGATION EXPENSES 
In accordance with the requirements of § 72-528. ldAAo Code. this form shall be filled out 
and returned to the Industrial Commission within 30 days following the time of entry of a final 
award by the Industrial Commission in the above case, or, in the event of an appeal to a final 
court, within 30 days following a final ruling by the Court. If there is an appeal. the totals 
specified below shall include the expenses, costs, or fees incurred in the appeal. 
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10. Counsel prepared and sent a written referral of Claimant to the Idaho Indus1ria1 
Commission Rehabilitation Division, and advised Claimant on working with the ICRD counselor 
on education, training, job seeking, and other re-employment efforts. 
11. Counsel advised Claimant to undergo a new and separate vocational evaluation by 
a vocational evaluation expert ofClaimanfs choosing; advised Claimant of the meaning and 
import of the vocational report; and advised Claimant on the effect of the expert's report on the 
need for retraining, the claim for benefits, and lump sum settlement. 
12. Counsel prepared a complaint and notice of service, filed originals with the Idaho 
Industrial Commission, and served copies on Defendants. Defendants answered with a denial of 
Claimanfs entitlement to the benefits being sought. Counsel reviewed and analyzed the defenses. 
13. Counsel prepared discovery and a notice of service, filed the notice with the Idaho 
Industrial Commission, and served the discovery on Defendants. 
14. Counsel prepared a request for mediation and notice of service, filed originals 
with the Idaho Industrial Commission, and served copies on Defendants. 
15. At the time Counsel became involved. all issues were disputed or disputable 
because by law all defenses remain open to Defendants in a worker's compensation case as a 
matter of law unless waived or determined to have no merit by the Commission. The amount of 
all compensation paid or admitted as owed by Employer immediately prior to Counsel's 
involvement was equal to the amount actually paid to that date, less any claims for overpayment 
that Defendants might subsequently make. All issues that arose subsequent to the date Counsel 
was hired were disputed or disputable, including rights to medical benefits and treatment, time 
loss benefits, impairment compensation, disability beyond impairment, retraining, and attorney 
fees. For the period prior to lump sum settlement, Counsel's itemization of litigation costs is set 
SEINIGER LAW a:FICES. F> A. 
942 W. Myrta SIreet 
BoIM.IdIIho 837Q2 
(208) 345-1000 
FORM 1022, REPORT OF EXPENSES AND 
STATEMENT OF CLAIMANT'S COUNSEL 
PAGE 4 OF 7 
.:<O/) 
· ·~COpy 
Wm. Breck Seiniger. Jr. (ISB # 2387) 
Andrew C. Marsh (ISB # 6588) 
SEINIGRIl LAw OFFICES, P.A. 
942 W. Myrtle Street 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
Phone: (208) 345-1000 
Fax: (208) 345-4700 
Attorneys for Claimant 
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RyanLewiJ, 
Claimant, 
VI. 
Mel's Trim & Cabmets, LLC, 
Employer, 
and 
Idaho State IDl1IftJlee Fund, 
Sarety, 
Defendants. 
I.C. No.lOO8-021714 
FORM 10l2, REPORT OF EXPENSES 
and 
STATEMENT OF 
CLAIMANT'S COUNSEL 
COMES NOW Claimant's Counsel and reports his expenses and submits the following in 
support ofbis claim of attorney's fees and costs in the amount set forth below from the proceeds 
of the settlement of the above captioned case. 
REPORT OF LITIGATION EXPENSES 
In accordance with the requirements of § 72-528, Idaho Code. this foan sbaU be filled out 
and returned to the Industrial Commission within 30 dayS following the time of entry of a final 
award. by the Industrial Commission in the above case, or, in the event of an appeal to a :final 
court, within 30 days following a final ruling by the Court. If there is an appeal, the totals 
specified below shall include the expenses, costs, or fees incurred in the appeal. 
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6. During, or shortly after, the initial meeting with Claimant, Counsel drafted the 
following documents for the benefit of Claimant: a fee agreement and disclaimer statement 
meeting the requirements of the Idaho Industrial Commission; medical releases; employmem 
release; a letter of representation and inquiry to the surety; a letter to the treating medical 
providers requesting complete copies of Claimant's medical and billing records; and a client 
intake questionnaire for the initial gathering of relevant information concerning the client's 
employments educational, medical and health, military, vocational, and accident history. 
7. Counsel reviewed all medical records and other requested documents as they were 
recdved, and consulted with Claimant about the status of the case on a periodic basis. 
8. Counsel advised Claimant concerning the need to keep medical appointments, 
aspects of medical treatment which might potentially affect Claimant's impairment rating, and 
strategic issues rela1ing to medical care which can impact the result of a wo!ker's compensation 
case. 
9. Counsel advised Claimant to 1.Dldergo a new and separate independent medical 
evaluation by a medical expert of Claimant's choosing; advised Claimant of the meaning and 
import of the !ME report; and advised Claimant on the effect of the expert's report on the need 
for present and future mediCal treatment, the claim for benefits, and lump sum settlement. 
10. Counsel advised' Clabnant to undergo a new and separate vocational evaluation by 
a vocational evaluation expert of Claimant's choosing; advised Claimant of the J])eaning and 
import of the vocational report; and advised Claimant on the effect of the expert's report on the 
need for re1raining, the claim for benefits, and lump sum settlement. 
11. At the time Counsel became involved, all issues were disputed or disputable 
because by law all defenses remain open to Dcfcndan1s in a worker's compensation case as a 
FORM 1022, REPORT OF EXPENSES AND 
STATEMENT OF CLAIMANTS COUNSEL 
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matter of law unless waived or determined to have no merit by the Commission. The amount of 
all compensation paid or admitted u owed by Employer immediately prior to Counsel's 
involvement was equal to the amount actually paid to that date, less any claims for overpayment 
that DefendanVJ might subsequently make. All issues that arose subsequent to the date Counsel 
was hired were disputed or disputable, including impairment compensation, disability beyond 
impairment, retraining, and attorney fees. For the period prior to lump sum settlement, C?>unsel 
received no costs or attorney fees. For the lump sum settlement, Counsel's itemization of 
compensation that constitutes available funds, itemim;;on of costs, and calculation of attorney 
fees is set forth above. 
12. There are compensation benefits, u set forth above, available for distribution on 
equitable principles. The services of CoUDSel operated primarily or substantially to secure the 
fund out of which the attorney seeks to be paid, due to Counsel's efforts on behalf of Claimant 
and due to Counsel's reputation as a plaintifrs lawyer in the practice of worker's compensation 
law. It was agreed that counsel anticipated payment from compensation funds rather than from 
the client, as set forth in the Attorney Fee Agreement attached hereto. The claim is limited to 
costs, fees, or other disbursements incurred in the case through which the fund was raised. There 
~ equitable considerations that necessitate the recognition and application of the charging lien, 
including as follows: Claimant sought the services of Counsel as counselor and advocate; 
Claimant contracted with Counsel to pay Counsel for said services; Counsel provided services as 
counselor and advocate; Counsel has. a constitutionally-protected property right to be paid as 
agreed; and Claimant has a constitutionally-protected right to have Claimant's contract with 
Counsel honored. All terms used in this and the ~ing paragraph are used by Counsel in the 
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Wm. Breck Seiniger, Jr. (ISB # 2387) 
Andrew C. Marsh (ISB # 6588) 
SEINIGER. LAw OFFICES, P.A. 
942 W. Myrtle Street 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
Phone: (208) 345-1000 
Fax: (208) 345-4700 
Attorneys for Claimant 
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BEFORE THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF THE STATE O~.u@ 
Tim StleJunetz, 
Claimant, 
VI. 
G1B Co. lac., 
Employer, 
ad 
Idaho State wunmce Fund, 
Surety, 
Detendots. 
:z: 
LC. No. 2008-002191 
FORM 1012, REPORT OF EXPENSES 
. ad 
STATEMENT OF 
CLAIMANT'S COUNSEL 
COMES NOW Claimant's Counsel and reports his expenses and submits the following in 
support of his claim of attorney's fees and costs in the amount set forth below from the proceeds 
of the settlement of the above captioned case. 
REPORT OF UTIGATION EXPENSES 
In accordance with the requirements of § 72-528, Jdaho Code. this form sball be filled out 
and returned to th~ Industrial Commission within 30 days following the time of entry of a final 
award by the Industrial Commission in the above case, or, in the event of an appeal to a final 
court, within 30 days following a final ruling by the Court. If there is an appeal, the totals 
specified below shall include the expenses, costs, or fees incurred in the appeal. 
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scheduled ajob site evaluation. Counsel advised Claimant of tile meaniDg and import of the JSB 
report. 
11. Counsel made written demand dated 6/3/08 upon Dr. Montalbano for a PPI rating 
and permanent work restrictions. 
12. Upon receiving information that Claimant was to be seen for an independent 
medical evaluation by a medical provider not chosen by Claimant, Counsel advised Claimant in 
advance of the procedure, and subsequently advised Claimant of the meaning and import of the 
!ME report, and the effect of the expert's report on the need for present and future ~edical 
treatment, the claim for benefits, and lump sum settlement. 
13. Counsel advised Claimant to undergo a new and separate independent medical' 
evaluation by a medical expert of Claimant's choosing; advised Claimant of the meaning and 
import of the !ME report; and advised Claimant on the effect of the expert's report on the need 
for present and future mediea11reatmeDt, the claim for benefits, and lump sum settlement. 
14. At the time Counsel became involved. all issues were disputed or disputable 
because by law all defenses remain open to Defendants in a worker's compensation case as a 
matter of law unless waived or determ.i.ned to have no merit by the Commission. The amount of 
all compensation paid or admitted as owed by Employer immediately prior to Counsel's 
involvement was equal to the amount actually paid to that date, less any clabns for overpayment 
that Defendants ri:rlght subsequently make. All issues that arose subsequent to the date Counsei 
was hired were disputed or disputable, including rights to medical benefits and treatment, time 
loss benefits, impairment compensation, disability beyond impairment, retraining, and attorney 
fees. For the period prior to lump sum settlement, Counsel's itemj7Jlti~ of compensation that 
constituted available ftmds, itemization of costs, and calculation of attorney fees is set forth 
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Wm. Breck Seiniger, Jr. (ISB # 2387) 
Andrew C. Marsh (ISB # 6588) 
SEINIOER LAW OFFICES, P.A 
942 W. Myrtle Street 
Boise. Idaho 83702 
Phone: (208) 345·1000 
Fax: (208) 345-4700 
Attomeys for Claimant 
BEFORE THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF TBESTATE OF IDAHO 
Jose Antonio Renteria, 
Claimant, 
VI. 
Rick Carley Construetion LLC, 
Employer, 
and 
Liberty Northwest, 
Surety, 
Defendants. 
I.C. No. 06-507603 
FORM 1022, REPORT OF EXPENSES 
and 
STATEMENT OF 
CLAIMANT'S COUNSEL 
COMES NOW Claimant's Counsel and reports his expenses and submits the following in 
support ofhis claim of attomey's fees and costs in the amount set forth below from the proceeds 
of the settlement of the above" captioned case. 
REPORT OF LITJGATION EXPENSES 
In accordance with the .requirements of § 72-528, Idaho Code. this form. shall be filled out 
and returned to the Industrial Commission within 30 days following the time of entry of a final 
award by the Industrial Commission in the above case, or, in the event of an appeal to a final 
court, within 30 days following a final ruling by the Court. If there is an appeal, the totals 
specified below shall include the expenses, costs, or fees incurred in the appeal. 
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10. At the time Counsel was retained by Claimant, the only benefits that defendants 
legally conceded were the medical benefits already incurred and certain TIDs that had been paid 
but previously discontinued. All benefits received thereafter, including medical treatment and 
time loss benefits and impairment compensation and disability beyond impairment 
compensation. were as the results of Counsel's reputation, efforts, demands. and negotiations. 
11. CoUDSel's paralegal spent many hours translating important documents or 
correspondence from English into Spanish for the benefit of Claimant; whose native language is 
Spanish. 
12. On or about 8127/07, Counsel wrote Surety confirming that there should be 
authorization for the referral by primary treating physician, Dr. Leo Barf, to eye stttgeon 
specialist Dr. Mark Boerner on the issue of possible removal of the injured eye. No objection 
was received from Surety. After examining Claimant, on 9/13/07 Dr. Boehner scheduled 
evisceration surgery for 10/18107. On 10/17/07. Claimant was informed by Dr. Boerner's office 
that Surety had not authorized the next day's surgery and it would have to be cancelled. Counsel 
immediately contacted Surety by phone and fax and insisted that the stttgery must be authorized 
to proceed as scheduled. Counsel expressed that Claimant's physicians had determined there was 
an urgent medical need for the surgery, and that it might take another month to get the surgery on 
Dr. Boerner's schedule as it had the first time. It was also· Counsel's position that workers 
compensation law required the Employer/Surety to pay for treatment of a workplace injmy as 
prescribed by Claimant's treating physicians. In response, Surety ultimately agreed to authorize 
the surgery and it was performed as scheduled the next day on 10/18107. 
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Wm. Breck Seiniacr, Jr. (lSB # 2387) 
Andrew C. Marsh (ISB 1# 6588) 
SEINIOBR. LAw OFPICES, P.A. 
942 W. Myrtle Street 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
Phone: (208) 345-1000 
Fax: (208) 345-4700 
Attorneys for Claimant 
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BEFORE THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
Debra A. Dalrymple, 
Claimant, 
VI. 
Die Smoke LLC, 
Employer, 
and 
State Iuuranee Fund, 
Surety, 
DefeadaDts. 
I.C. No. 08-006605 
FORM 1022, REPORT OF EXPENSES 
and 
STATEMENT OF 
CLAIMANT'S COUNSEL 
COMES NOW Claimant's Counsel and. reports his expenses and submits the followiDg in 
support ofbia claim of attorneYs fees and costs in the amount set forth below from the proceeds 
of the sett1cm.cnt of the above captioned case. 
REPORT OF UTIGATION EXPENSES 
In aecordancc with the requirements of § 72-528, Idaho Code. this form shall be filled out 
and returned to the Industrial Commission within 30 days following the time of entry of a final 
award by the Industrial Commission in the above case, or, in the event of an appeal to a final 
court, within 30 days following a final ruling by the Court. If there is an appeal, the totals 
specified below shall include the expenses, costs. or fees incurred in the appeal. 
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10. Before Counsel was retained, Defendants denied. discontinued, or disputed 
Claimant's right to additional medieal and other benefits. Subsequent to retaining Counsel. 
Claimant received additional medical treatment and benefits aDd impairment compensation. 
11. Ai\:cr being retained by Claimant, Counsel investigated and determined that 
Defendants refused to authorize medical treatment recommended by Claimant's primary treating 
physician. 
12. Counsel made written demand upon Defendants for to authorize medical 
treatment recommended by Claimant's primary treating physician. 
13. Counsel made written demand upon Defendants for workers compensation 
benefits that Counsel beHeved were due, including underpaid ITDs in the sum of $3060.66 
which were then paid by surety. 
14. Counsel advised Claimant on working with the IeRD counselor on education, 
training, job seeking, and other re-employment efforts. 
15. Upon receiving a demand from Defendants for Claimant to submit to an 
independent medical evaluation by a medical provider chosen by Defendants, Counsel advised 
Claimant in advance of the procedure, and subsequently advised Claimant of the meaning and 
import of the 1MB repoIt and the effect of the expert's report on the need for present and future 
medical treatment, the claim for benefits. and lump sum settlement. 
16. Counsel reviewed the file in preparation for settlement. Counsel enpaed in 
extensive negotiations with Defendants. Counsel had extensive communications with CJaimant 
concerning the status of the case, and the strategic and tactical decisions that bad to be made with 
respect to settlement discussions and preparation for bearing. 
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Wm. Breck Seiniger, Jr. (ISB 1# 2387) 
Andrew C. Marsh (ISB # 6588) 
SElNlGBR LAw OFFICES, P .A. 
942 W. Myrtle Street 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
J>hone:(208) 345-1000 
Fax: (208) 345-4700 
Attorneys for Claimant 
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BEFORE THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
Carla M. Alley, 
Claimant, 
va. 
Sawtooth Lodge, Inc., 
Employer, 
and 
State Insurance Fud, 
Surety, 
Defendants. 
I.C. No. 06-010629 
FORM 1m, REPORT OF EXPENSES 
and 
STATEMENT OF 
CLAIMANT'S COUNSEL 
COMES NOW Claimant's Counsel and reports his expenses and submits the following in 
support of his claim of attorney's fees and costs in the amount set forth below from the pl.'OCeeCls 
of the settlement of the above captioned case. 
REPORT OF LITIGATION EXPENSES 
In accordance with the requirements of § 72-528, Idaho Code. this form shall be filled out 
and returned to the Industrial Commission within 30 days following the time of entry of a final 
award by the Industrial Commission in the above case, or, in the event of an appeal to a final 
court, within 30 days following a final ruling by the Court. If there is an appeal, the totals 
specified below shall include the expenses, costs, or fees incurred in the appeal. 
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4. Counsel advised Claimant as to the disclosures required by the Idaho Industrial 
Commission. 
S. Counsel created a database file for Claimant in which pertinent information was 
recorded for use in the handling of the claim. 
6. During, or shortly after, the initial meeting with Claimant, Counsel drafted the 
following documents for the benefit of Claimant: a fee agreement and disclaimer statement 
meeting the .requirements of the Idaho Industrial Commission; medical releases; employment 
release; a letter of representation and inquiry to the employer; a letter of representation to the 
Idaho Industrial Commission requesting copies of Claimant's file; a letter to the treating medical 
providers requesting complete copies of Claimant's medical and billing records; and a client 
intake questionnaire for the initial gathering of relevant information concerning the client's 
employment, educational, medical and health, military. vocational, and accident history. 
7. Counsel reviewed all medical records, employment records, and other requested 
documents as they were received, and consulted with Claimant about the status of the case on a 
periodic basis. 
8. Counsel advised Claimant concerning the need to keep medical appoin1ments, 
aspects of medical treatment which might potentially affect Claimant's impairment rating, and 
strategic issues relating to medical care which can impact the result of a worker'S compensation 
case. 
9. Counsel conducted legal research concerning aspects of Claimant's case and 
injuries. 
10. The entirety of this claim was established through the efforts of Counsel. Before 
Counsel was retained, Defendant-Employer did not have workers' compensation insurance in 
SEINIGER LAW OFFICES, PA. 
942 W. MyrIt 81rIIt 
EIoIIt.IdIIIlo 13702 
(208) 345-1(0) 
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STATEMENT OF CLAIMANT'S COUNSEL 
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place for the d.ate of iIijury, and effectively denied or disputed Claimant's right to any and all 
benefits in connection with the claimed accident, including medical benefits and treatment, time 
loss benefits, impairment compensation, and attorney fees. After Counsel became involved, 
Defendant-Surety agreed to "back-accept" the claim as to the hip injury, and in response to 
Counsel's demands, Claimant received medical ~ent, time loss benefits and impairment 
compensation. 
11. In response to Counsel's actions. Defendants through their legal counsel, Max 
Sheils, agreed to pay attorney fees mcurred by Claimant as a result of Defendant-Employer not 
having a policy of workers' compensation insurance in place for the date of injury. The attorney 
fees were calculated as "25% of the amount of medical bills due as of December 1 S. 2006, the 
date upon which the claim was accepted." (Letter from Breck Seiniger to Sheils, 512107, attached 
as Exhibit C.) See also, Letter from Sheils to Seiniger, SIIO/07, attached as ExhibitD. 
12. Counsel advised Claimant on working with the ICRD counselor on education, 
training, job seeking. and other re-employment issues. 
13. Counsel advised Claimant to undergo a new and separate independent medical 
evaluation by a medical expert of Claimant's choosing; advised Claimant of the meaning and 
import of the !ME report; and advised Claimant on the effect of the expert's report on the need 
for present and future medical treatment, the claim for benefits, and lump sum settlement. 
14. Counsel prepared discovety and a notice of service, filed the notice with the Idaho 
Industrial Commission, and served the discovery on Defendants. Counsel reviewed and analyzed 
the Defendant's responses when received. 
15. Upon receipt of Defendant's discovery requests, Counselor his legal assistant met 
with Claimant and prepared responses. Counsel reviewed these responses, made revisions. 
SEINIGCR LAW a:FICES. P.A. 
M2W._snet 
BollI, Idaho 83702 
(208)345-1000 
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~ COpy, 
Wm. Breck Seiniger, Jr. (ISB # 2387) 
Andrew C. Marsh (ISB #- 6588) 
SEINIGBR LAW OmCBS, P.A. 
942 W. Myrtle S1reet 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
Phone: (208) 345·1000 
Fax: (208) 345-4700 
Attorneys for Claimant 
lU11Q HAR ,q i P 3: 52 
RECE\YfO lh·.~;U:;l i{IAL !:;,;;-1M1SSION 
BEFORE THE INDUSTRIAL COMMIsSION OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
KImberly Reek, 
CJlima:at, 
VI. 
Merry Maidst 
_ Employer, 
and -
-Crawford Claims Management Services, 
Surety, 
Defendants. 
Le. No. 07-016185 
FORM lOll, REPORT OF EXPENSES 
and 
STATEMENT OF 
CLAIMANT'S COUNSEL 
COMES NOW Claimant's Counsel and reports his expenses and submits the following in 
support ofhis claim of attorney's fees and costs in the amount set forth below from the proceeds 
of the settlement of the above captioned case. 
REPORT OF LITIGATION ExPENSES 
In accordance with the requirements of § 72-528, Idaho Code. this form shall be filled out 
and returned to the Industrial Commission within 30 days following the time of en1ry of a final 
award by the Industrial Commission in the above case, or, in the event of an appeal to a final 
- court, within 30 days following a final ruling by the Court. If there is an appeal, the totals 
- -
specified below shall include the expenses, costs, or fees incurred in the appeal. 
- -
FORM 1022, REPORT OF EXPENSES AND 
STATEMENT OF CLAIMANrS COUNSEL 
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5. Counsel created a database file for Claimant in which pertinent information was 
recorded for use in the handling of the claim. 
6. During, or .shortly after, the initial meeting with Claimant, Counsel drafted the 
. . 
following documents for the benefit of Claimant: a fee agreement and disclaimer statement 
meeting the requirements of the Idaho Indus1rial Com:cnission; medical releases; employment 
release; a letter of representation and inquiIy to the surety; a letter of representation to the Idaho 
Industrial Commission requesting copies of Claimant's file; a letter to the treating medical 
providers requesting complete copies ofC~t's medical and billing records; a letter to the 
primary treating physician requesting a detailed report of the etiology of Claimant's condition, 
treatment to date, impairment rating, and temporary and permanent restrictions; and a client 
intake questionnaire for the initial gathering of relevant information concerning. the client's 
employment, educational, medical andhealtb, military, vocational, and accident history. 
7. Counsel reviewed aU medical records, employment records, am other req~ 
documents as they were received, and consulted ~ Claimant about the status of the case on a 
periodic basis. 
8. Counsel advised Claimant concerniIlg the need to keep medical appointments, 
aspects of medical treatment which might potentially affect Claimant's impairment rating, and 
strategic issues relating to medical care whicli cali impact the result of a worker's compeilsation 
case. 
9. Counsel conducted legal research concerning aspects of Claimant's case and 
injuries. 
10. . Before Counsel was retained; Defendants denied, discontinue<t or disputed 
. . 
Claimant's right to anyand all benefits in connection, with the claimed accident, including 
FORM 1022, REPORT OF EXPENSES AND 
STATEMENT OF CLAIMANT'S COUNSEL 
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niedica1 benefits and treatment. time loss benefits, ~t comPensation. disability beyond . 
impairment, retraining, and attorney f~. These facts, and Counser$ demand for benefits, were 
contained in a letter t() employer Merry'Maids dated 5/15/07 t which stated in pertinent part: 
My client reports that she Was ·told by phone yesterday by your xepresentatives 
that she was "tenniDlltNl" and that she would no longer be receiving work comp 
benefits. for her existing workPlace irguries. If this is true, you are in violation of 
Idaho law. and we demand that my client receive the full medical and wage-loss 
benefits to which she is entitled. ' . 
Subsequently. and as a result of Counsers actions, Claimant received additional medical 
, , 
treatment (for which Counsel is entitled to but is not seeking attorney fees) and time loss benefits 
.' 
and impairment compensation (for which Counsel received the attorney fees listed above). 
11. After being retained by Claim~ Counsel inve.sti.gated and determined that 
Defendants refused to pay time loss benefits in full and iD. a timely fashion. and that DefendantS 
discharged Claimant from employment in apparent retaliation for the making of a 'worker's 
compensation claim. 
12. Counsel made demand upon Defendantq for to authorize medical trea1ment, to pay 
, time loss benefits in full and in a timely fashion. and to remedy the apparent 'WrOngful 'discharge 
of Claimant from employment 
13. Co'lJ1l.le1. tuade vm.tten demaDd upon Defondmts r()t w~ke1:s oompensation 
benefits that Co~l believed were due. 
,14. Counsel prepared and a referral of Claimant to the Idaho Industrial Cozrnnission 
Rehabilitation Division. and advised Claimant on working with the ICRD counselor on 
education. training,job seeking. and other re-employment efforts. 
15. Counsel advised CIalmant to undergo anew and separate independent medical 
evaluation by amedical exp=rt of Claimant's choosing; advised Claimant of the meaning and 
selNlGER v.w OFFICES, P.A. 
942 W._ShIt 
BoIIe.1dIho 83702 
(208) 346-1000 
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Wm. Breck Seiniger, Jr. (ISB #2387) 
Andrew Marsh (ISB # 6588) 
SBINIGER LAW OFFICES, P.A. 
942 Myrtle Street 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
Voice: (208) 345-1000 
Fax: (208) 345-4700 
Attorney for the Claimant 
IN THE .INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION FOR THE STATE OF IDAHO 
ANNA GALLIGAR, 
Claimant, 
VI. 
JOHN & WAYNE'S STEAK 
HOUSE, 
Employer, 
8Dd 
TRAVELERS INDEMNITY 
COMPANY, 
Surety, 
Defendants. 
Claim No. 07..(}Z3895 
FORM 1022, REPORT OF 
EXPENSES AND STATEMENT OF 
CLAIMANT'S COUNSEL 
Comes now Claimanfs counsel and reports his expenses and submits the 
following in support of his claim of attorney's fees and costs in the amount set forth 
below from the proceeds of the settlement of the above captioned case: 
REPORT OF LITIGATION EXPENSES 
In accordance with the requirements of § 72-528. Idaho Code. this form shall be 
filled out and returned to the Industrial Commission within 30 days following the time of 
entry of a final award by the Industrial Commission in the above case, or. in the event of 
_____________________________________ ~OG 
treating medical providers requesting complete copies of Claimant's medical and billing 
records; a letter to the primary treating doctor requesting an detailed report regarding the 
etiology of Clmmantts condition, treatment to date, impairment rating. and permanent 
restrictions; a client intake questionnaire for the ini1ial gathering of relevant information 
conceming the client's employment, educational. medical and heal~ militaty, 
vocational, and accident history; and various litigation documents including motions. 
notices. requests. and discovery. 
8. Counsel reviewed all medical records. employment records, and other doclments, 
which were requested as they were received, and consulted with Claimant about the 
status of the ease on a periodic basis. 
9. Counsel advised Claimant concerning the need to keep medical appointments, 
aspects of medical treatment which might potentially affect Claimant's impairment 
rating, and strategic issues relating to medical care which can impact the result of a 
Workers Compensation Case. 
10. Counsel conducted legal research concerning aspects of Claimant's case and 
injuries, including He medical fee calculation procedures. 
11. Defendants denied Claimant's entitlement to the benefits that she sought as 
appears of record. 
12. Counsel conducted extensive discovery, including the taking of depositions. 
13. Colll1Sel engaged in extensive negotiations 'With representatives of the defendants. 
Counsel had extensive communications with Claimant concerning the status of the case, 
and the strategic and tactical decisions that had to be made 'With respect to settlement 
discussions and preparation for hearing. 
I • , 
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~ COpy 
Wm. Breck Seiniger. Jr. (ISB #2387) 
Z Andrew Marsh (ISB #6588) ..... a ii SEINIGER LAW OFFICES. P. A. c (j') 
942 Myrtle Street ..... :&: ?O-o ::< 
Boise. Idaho 83702 ~M ,-C") 
Telephone: (208) 345-1000 ' rI"I Q"" ("')- .~ 0< 
Facsimile: (208) 345-4700 ::trl"l 1J :to 
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BEFORE THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
TERESA MANINI, 
Claimant, 
'. VS. 
COMMUNICARE, INC., 
Employer, 
and 
STATE INSURANCE FUND~ 
Surety, 
Defendants. 
I.C. No. 04-521649 
FORM 1022, REPORT OF EXPENSES 
AND STATEMENT OF CLAIMANT'S 
COUNSEL 
Comes now Claimant's counsel and reports his ex~ses and submits the following in 
support of his claim of attomey's fees .and costs in the amount set forth below from the proceeAis 
of the settlement of the above captioned case: 
REPORT OF Ln'lGATION EXPENSES 
In accordance with the requirements of § 72-528, Idaho Code, this fonn shall be filled out 
and returned to the Industrial Commission within 30 days following the time of entry of a final 
award by the Industrial Commission. in the above case, or, in the event of an appeal to a final 
NOTE ADDED TO THIS EXHIBIT 6/2/10: there are no additional pages for this case because there is no 
language whatsoever relating to the alleged boilerplate. 
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Wm. Breck Seiniger, Jr. (ISB #2387) 
Heather M. McCarthy (ISB #6404) 
SEINIOER LAW OFFICES, P. A. 
942 Myrtle Street 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
TelePhone: (208) 345·1000 
Facsimile: (208) 345-4700 
Attorneys for the Claimant 
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_FORE THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF THE STATE oFt>AB§ 
EMMA F. BALL, 
Claimaut, 
VB. 
EVANGELICAL LUTHERAN GOOD 
SAMARITAN, 
Employer, 
and 
SENTRY INSURANCE, 
Surety, 
DefendauCl. 
% 
I.C. No. 0S-006871 
FORM 1022, :REPORT OF EXPENSES 
AND STATEMENT OF CLAIMANT'S 
COUNSEL 
Comes now Claimant's counsel and reports her expenses and submits the following in 
support of her claim of attorney's fees and costs in the amount set forth below from the proceeds 
of the settlement of the above captioned case. 
REPORT OF LITIGATION EXPENSES 
In accordance with the requirements of § 72-528, Idaho Code. this form shall be filled out 
and returned to the Industrial Commission within 30 days following the time of entry of a final 
award by the Industrial Commission in the above case, or, in the event of an appeal to a final 
• 
3. Counsel advised Claimant as to the procedures involved in processing a claim for 
benefits under the Idaho Workers Compensation Act. Counsel advised Claimant as to the need 
for cooperation with treating physicians, the Idaho Industrial Commission rehabilitation 
department, and Seiniger Law Offices, P.A. 
4. Counsel advised Claimant as to the disclosures required by the Idaho Industrial 
Commission. 
S. Prior to retaining Counsel, Claimants entitlement to additional medical treatment, as well 
as time loss benefits associated therewith, were disputed. Subsequent to retaining Counsel, a 
lump sum settlement was negotiated on Claimant's behalf. 
6. Counsel created a database file for Claimant in which pertinent information was recorded 
for later use in the band ling of the claim. 
7. During, or shortly after, the initial meeting with Claimant, Counsel drafted the following 
documents for the benefit of Claimant: a fee agreement and disclaimer 'statement meeting the 
requirements of the Idaho Industrial Commission; medical releases; employment releases; a 
letter of representation and inquiry to the surety; a letter of representation to the Idaho Industrial 
Commission requesting copies of Claimant's file; a letter to the treating medical providers 
requesting complete copies of Claimant's medical and billing records; a letter to the primary 
treating doctor requesting an detailed report regarding the etiology of Claimant's condition, 
treatment to date, impairment rating, and permanent restrictions; a client intake questionnaire for 
the initial gathering of relevant information concerning the client's employment, educational, 
medical and health, military, vocational, and accident history, a draft of a complaint and 
discovery. 
0r) 
Wm. Breck Seiniger, Ir. (ISB #2387) 
Andrew C. Marsh (ISB #6588) 
SEINIGER LAW OFFICES, P. A. 
942 Myrtle Street 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
Telephone: (208) 345-1000 
Facsimile: (208) 345-4700 
Attorneys for the Claimant 
FI~E' 
BEFORE THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
JAMES J. NUNLEY, 
Claimant, 
VI. 
DON YOUNG CONSTRUCITON AND 
SUPPLY, INC., 
Employer, 
and 
COVERTECH, INC., 
Employer, 
and 
STATE INSURANCE FUND, 
Surety, 
Defendants. 
I.C. No. 95-926334 
04-527810 
FORM 1022, REPORT OF EXPENSES 
AND STATEMENT OF CLAIMANT'S 
COUNSEL 
Comes now Claimant's counsel and reports his expenses and submits the following in 
support of his claim. of attorney's fees and costs in the amount set forth below from the proceeds 
of the settlement of the above captioned case: 
FORM 1022, REPORT OF EXPENSES AND STATEMENT OF CLAIMANT'S 
~nTl1\TQ""T 1 
STATEMENT OF CLAIMANT'S COUNSEL 
f. Seiniger Law Offices, P.A. ("Counsel") was retained by James Nunley ("Claimant") on 
or about January S. 2006. 
2. Counsel initiated this case by interviewing Claimant concerning the facts and 
circumstances of employment. the facts and circumstances of the injury, the status of benefits, 
the status of medical treatment. and the background to Claimant as it related to potential 
disability in addition to impairment. etc. 
3. Counsel advised Claimant as to the procedures involved in processing a claim for 
benefits under the Idaho Workers Compensation Act. Counsel advised Claimant as to the need 
for cooperation with treating physicians, the Idaho Industrial Commission rehabilitation 
department, and Seiniger Law Offices. P .A. 
4. Counsel advised Claimant as to the disclosures required by the Idaho Industrial 
Commission. 
5. Prior to retaining Counsel, Claimants entitlement to additional permanent partial 
impairment was disputed. Subsequent to retaining Counsel. Claimant received additional 
permanent partial impairment. In addition. a lump sum settlement was negotiated on Claimant's 
behalf. 
6. Counsel created a database file for Claimant in which pertinent infonnation was recorded 
for later use in the handling of the claim. 
7. During, or shortly after, the initial meeting with Claimant, Counsel drafted the following 
documents for the benefit of Claimant: a fee agreement and disclaimer statement meeting the 
requirements of the Idaho Industrial Commission; medical releases; employment releases; a 
letter of representation and inquiry to the surety; a letter of representation to the Idaho Industrial 
FORM 1022, REPORT OF EXPENSES AND STATEMENT OF CLAIMANT'S 
Wm. Breck Seiniger, Jr. (lSB #2387) 
Andrew C. Marsh (ISB #6588) 
SEINIGERLAW OFFICES, P. A. 
942 Myrtle Street 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
Teleph()ne~ (20%) 34S-l000 
Facsimile: (208) 345-4700 
Attorneys for the Claimant 
BEFORE THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
JOHN AMLANE~ 
Claimant, 
vs. 
MAVERICK STORES, 
Employer, 
and 
PINNACLE RISK MANAGEMENT, 
Surety, 
Defendants. 
I.e. No. 04-011249 
FORM 1022, REPORT OF EXPENSES 
AND STATEMENT OF CLAIMANT'S 
COUNSEL 
Comes now Claimant's counsel and reports his expenses and submits the following in 
support of his claim of attorney's fees and costs in the amount set forth below from the proceeds 
of the settlement of the above captioned case. 
REPORT OF LITIGATION EXPENSES 
In accordance with the requirements of § 72-528, Idaho Code, this form shall be filled out 
and returned to the Industrial Commission within 30 days following the time of entry of a final 
award by the Industrial Commission in the above case, or, in the event of an appeal to a final 
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3. Counsel advised Claimant as to the procedures involved in processing a claim for 
benefits under the Idaho Workers Compensation Act. Counsel advised Claimant as to the need 
for cooperation with treating physicians, the Idaho Industrial Commission rehabilitation 
department, and Seiniger Law Offices, P .A. 
4. Counsel advised Claimant as to the disclosures required by the Idaho Industrial 
Commission. 
5. Prior to retaining Counsel, Claimants entitlement to additional medical benefits, as well 
as time loss benefits associated therewith, were disputed. Subsequent to retaining Counsel, a 
lump sum settlement was negotiated on Claimant's behalf. 
6. Counsel created a database file for Claimant in which pertinent information was recorded 
for later use in the handling of the clainl. 
7. During, or shortly after, the initial meeting with Claimant, Counsel drafted the following 
documents for the benefit of Claimant: a fee agreement and disclaimer statement meeting the 
requirements · of the Idaho Industrial Commission; medical releases; employment releases; a 
letter of representation and inquiry to the surety; a letter of representation to the Idaho Industrial 
Commission requesting copies of Claimant's file; a letter to the treating medical providers 
requesting complete copies of Claimant's medical and billing records; a letter to the primary 
treating doctor requesting an detailed report regarding the etiology of Claimant's condition, 
treatment to date, impairment rating, and permanent restrictions; a client intake questionnaire for 
the initial gathering of relevant information concerning the client's employment, educational, 
medical and health, military, vocational, and accident history; a draft of a complaint and 
discovery. 
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Wm. Breck Seiniger, Jr. (ISB #2387) 
Rachael M. O'Bar (ISB #5823)' 
SEINIGER LAW OFFICES, P. A. 
942 Myrtle Street 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
Telephone: (208) 345-1000 
Facsimile: (208) 345-4700 
Attorneys for the Claimant 
BEFORE THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
PAUL HOLUSON, .. 
Claimant. 
v. 
MOUNTAIN VIEW EQUIPMENT CO., 
Employer, 
and 
LffiERTY NORTHWEST INSURANCE 
CORPORATION, 
Surety, 
Defendants. 
Case No. 02·523210 
FORM 1022, REPORT OF 
EXPENSES AND STATEMENT OF 
CLAIMANT'S COUNSEL 
Comes now Claimant's counsel and reports her expenses and submits the 
following in support of her claim of attorney's fees and costs in the amount set forth 
below from the proceeds of the settlement of the above captioned case: 
REPORT OF LmGATION EXPENSES 
In accordance with the requirements of § 72-528, Idaho Code. this form shall be 
filled out and returned to the Industrial Commission within 30 days following the time of 
FORM 1022 REORT OF EXPENSES AND STATEMENTOF 
CLAIMANT'S COUNSEL Page 1 
SE1NIGER LAW OFFICES. P.A 
942 Myrtle Street 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
~-------------------------------------------------------
Lf-/~ 
STATE.MENT OF CLAIMANT'S COUNSEL 
1. Seiniger Law Offices, P.A. ("Counsel") was retained by Paul Hollison 
("Claimant") on or about May 20, 2003. 
2. Counsel initiated this case by interviewing Claimant concerning the facts and 
circumstances of employment, the facts and circumstances of the injury, tbe status of 
benefits, the status of medical treatment, and the background to Claimant as it related to 
potential disability in addition to impairment, etc. 
3. Counsel advised Claimant as to the procedures involved in processing a claim. for 
benefits under tbe Idaho Workers Compensation Act. Counsel advised Claimant as to the 
need for cooperation with treating physicians, the Idaho Industrial Commission 
rehabilitation department, and Seiniger Law Offices, P.A. 
4. Counsel advised Claimant as to the disclosures required by the Idaho Industrial 
Commission. 
5. Prior to retaining Counsel, Defendants disputed the nature and extent of 
impairment/disability and entitlement to retraining. Counsel was retained to 
negotiate and effect settlement. Subsequent to retaining Counsel, lump sum 
settlement was negotiated on Claimant's behalf. 
6. Counsel created a database fIle for Claimant in which pertinent information was 
recorded for later use in the handling of the claim. 
7. During, or shortly after, the initial meeting with Claimant, Counsel drafted the 
following documents for the benefit of Claimant: a fee agreement and disclaimer 
FORM 1022 RBORT OF EXPENSES AND STATBMENTOF 
CLAlMANT'S COUNSEL Page 3 
SBINIGBR LAW OFFICES. P.A. 
942 Myrtle Street 
Boise. Idaho 83702 
0(;/15/2010 15: 23 2083454700 SEINIGER LAW OFFICES PAGE 02/12 
,,' 
Wm. Breck Seiniger, Jr. (ISB # 2387) 
Andrew C. Marsh (lSB # 6588) 
SElNIOER LAW OFFICES, P.A. 
942 W. Myrtle Street 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
Phone: (208) 345-1000 
Fax: (208) 345-4700 
Attorneys for Claimant 
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BEFORE THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
Laurel Kulm, 
Claimant, 
VS. 
Mercy Medical Center, 
Employer, 
And 
Industrial Claims Management, 
Surety, 
Defendants. 
I.e. No. 06-012770 
SUPPLEMENTAL MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT 
OF MOTION To REcoNsmER OlmER 
DENYlNG ATTORNEY FEES AND To ISSUE A 
SUBSTITUTE OPINION 
COMES NOW Claimant's Counsel, SElNIGER LAW OFFICES, P.A., and files this MOTION 
To RECONSIDER the Commission's FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW RELATING To 
COUNSEL'S REQUEST FOR APPRO V AL OF ATTORNEY'S FEES (hereinafter referred to as the "Kulm 
DeCiSion"), filed May 20, 2010. 
INACCURATE FOOTNOTE 
As the Commission 'Nill recall the footnote that is of concern to Claimant's Counsel reads 
as follows: 
Interestingly ~ in' a companion case, treating a similar demand for approval of a 
requested fee, Counsel offered a Form 1022 that contained language identical to 
that quoted above. At hearing on the motion to approve the requested fee in that 
942 W. Myrtf$ S\I'oot 
Boige. Idaho 63702 
(208) 345-1DOO 
SUPPLEMENTAL MEMORA.NDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION 
TO RECONSIDER ORDER DENYING ATTORNEY FEES ANn 
TO ISSUE A SUBSTITUTE OPINION 
PAGE 1 OF 11 
4/7 
~~Received Fax: t ' ~ Jun 152010 5: OPM~~ Fax St 
06/15/20Hl 15: 23 2083454700 SEINIGER LAW OFFICES 
case, Counsel acknowledged that the quoted paragraph is "boilerplate" and goes 
into all of his Ponn 1022 recitations even where, in a particular case, surety had 
not denied or disputed Claimant's entitled [ sic] to a PPI rating prior to Counsel's 
retention. This may explain why staffwas unable to obtain a satisfactory 
explanation for the averments made in the quoted paragraph. (Emphasis in 
original.) 
In the Conunission's ORDER ON ATTORNEY'S FEES in Drotzman V. Coors Brewing 
Company and Zurich American Insurance Company, LC. No. 2006-006711 the Commission 
states in Finding of Fact ,23: 
At hearing, Counsel acknowledged that the quoted paragraph is "boilerplate" and goes 
into all of his Form 1022 recitations even where, in a particular case) surety had not 
denied or disputed Claimant':) entitlement to a PPI rating prior to Counsel's retention. 
The Decision states in Finding of Fact ,26: 
PAGE 03/12 
"Counsel explaining that he frequently uses boilerplate to create his Fonn 1022 report, 
and stated that there was "some controversy'l between the parties concerning Claimant's 
entitlement to permanent partial impainnent benefits, temporary total disability benefits, 
and permanent partial disability (PPD) benefits." (Emphasis supplied.) 
The Decision states in the portion of the decision entitled "ApPUCATlON OF THE PROVISIONS OF 
IDAPA 17.02.08.033 To THE FACTS OF THIS Case": 
"As well, at hearing Counsel candidly acknowledged that his Fonn 1022 avennents about 
the existence of a denial or a dispute over PPI benefits may have been inadvertently 
included as boilerplate. 
lIMr. Seiniger: And, secondly, with respect to the questions that you had about 
Mr. Marsh's affidavit Or declaration, I didn't prepare that, but I can tell you that 
I'm responsible, essentially, for the boilerplate language about things being 
disputed and it sounds to me like either that was just completelY incorrect or there 
was a roistmderstanding on Mr. Marsh's part. II (Emphasis supplied.) 
Hr. Tr., p. 42, 1 L 15-21. 
Claimant's Counsel does not qualTel with the characterization of his argument at hearing 
contained in Finding of Fact ,26 or the quoted portion of the Order's "APPLICATION Or nIE 
PROVISIONS OF IDAPA 17.02.08.033 To THE FACTS OF THIS Case'~. Howevet, insofar as 
SEIN1GER LAW OF'FICES, PA 
942 W. Myl1le Street 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
(206) 345-1000 
SUPPLEMENTAL MEMORANDlJM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION 
TO RECONSIDER ORDER DENYING ATTORNEY FEES AND 
TO lSSlJE A SUBSTITUTE OPINION 
PAGE20F11 
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Finding of Fact ~23 is concerned, it is in error. At no time did Claimant's Counsel " ... 
acknowledge[dJ that the quoted paragraph is "boilerplate" and goes into all of his Fonn 1022 
recitations even where, in a particular case, sUJ:elty had not denied or 'disputed Claimant's 
entitlement to a PPI rating prior to Counsel's retention." Claimant's Counsel did not state or 
imply that the boilerplate language went into every Fonn 122, and it does not. There is a world 
of difference between "frequentli' or "inadvertently" inserting language from a template, and 
always inserting such language. It is the difference between making a mistake and lying. 
In over thirty years of piactice Claimant's Counsel wm Breck Seiniger, Jr. has never been 
accused oflying about anything. Despite the fact that the Fonn 1022's submitted in Workers 
Compensation cases have been submitted by his associates and not by bim (foJ: many years, until 
recently, Claimant's Counsel WID Breck Seiniger, Jr. was actively involved in only a very few of 
the flrm's Workers Compensation Cases), the inference is that he routinely and intentionally 
misrepresents the facts to the Commission. Nothing could be further from the truth. 
Indeed, the Commission's o\vu "Order On Attorneys Fees" in Drotzman V. Coors 
Brewing Company And Zurich American Insurance Company (filed June 8, 2010) makes it clear 
that Finding of Fact ~23 is erroneous, because it conflicts with Finding of Fact 1.26 and its 
recognition that Claimant's Counsel stated that the questioned "boilerplate" paragraph may have 
inadvertently been left in the document. 
Surely, the Commission, one of whose members has had a long and distinguished career 
as a defense counsel in Worker's Compensation cases, recognizes that templates including 
"boilerplate" language that are adjusted as appropriate are used in the drafting of Lump Sum 
Agreements, and that mistakes in drafting are sometimes made. TIlls is not to say that such 
mistakes are insignificant, or even necessarily excusable, but it is a far cry from that to the 
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conclusion that an inaccurate representation of fact bas been intentionally made in every fonn 
1022 submitted by Seiniger Law Offices, P A. 
THE KULM DECISIOJVIGNORES FACTS IN THE RECORD ESTA.:BLISB1NG THAT CLAIMANT'S 
COUNSEL'S ACTIONS PRlMAlULY AND SU:BSTANrlALLY CREATED THE AVAILABLE FUNDS IN 
QUESTION 
As noted in the Kulm Decision, Claimant's Counsel conceded for purposes of these 
proceedings that "his services were not "primarily 0)." substantially" responsible for securing the 
PPI award from which he previously took a fee. .. ." However, the Commission addressed that 
issue nonetheless: "Even though Counsel has chosen, for putposes of the instant proceeding, to 
concede that his services were neither primarily nor substantially responsible for securing the 
PPI award from which he has taken his fee, the Commission feels constrained to address this 
issue, inasmuch as it is the Commission's interpretation of those regulations which informed its 
decision to deny the fees in question." (See, Kulm Decision at 10.) 
The Commission having chosen to address this issue, Claimant's Counsel is constrained 
to address that issue in his motion to reconsider. In the Kubn Decision the Commission refers to 
the case of Mancilla v. Greg, 13 ~ lda.ho 685, 963 P.2d 368 (1998) with x:egard to Claimant's 
Counsel burden of proof with respect to charging liens: 
"Therefore, Pena was unable to prove that his efforts were primarily or substantially 
responsible for securing the PPI award simply by speculating that surety might not have 
been inclined to pay the award absent his appearance as counsel in the matter. 
Recognizing that it is Counsel who bears the burden of proving, by a preponderance of 
the evidence, the assertion of a charging lien, there is nothing untoward about the 
Commission's rejection of such speculation." 
Kulm Decision at 22. 
The Kulm Decision goes on to defme "primarily or substantially:!! 
"In summary. in order to meet his burden of proving that his efforts were "primarily or 
SEINIGER LAW OFFICES, P.A. 
942 W. Myr1!e Street 
Boi56. Idaho 83702 
(208) 345-1000 
SUPPLEMENTAL MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION 
TO RECONSIDER ORDER DENYING ATTORNEY FEES AND 
TO lSSUE A SU8STlTUTE OPINION 
PAGE 4 OF 11 
{j. )() 
-. . 
" " 
Fax Stat'o : 
05/15/2010 15:23 2083454700 SEINIGER LAW OFFICES PAGE 05/12 
substantially" responsible for securing the fund from which he hopes to be paid, Counsel 
bears the burden of proving, by a preponderance of the evidence, that he originally, or 
initially, took action that secured the fund, that his efforts essentially. or in the main were 
responSible for securing the fund, i.e. that his efforts were such that a reasonable person 
would conclude that he was responsible for securing the fund from which he hopes to be 
paid." (Emphasis supplied.) 
The Kulm Decision is of grave concern to Claimant's Counsel, because Claimant's 
Counsel's essential argument was not that his finn had primarily or substantially created the 
available funds resulting from Ms. Klum' s PPI rating, but that considering all of the services 
provided to Ms. Kuhn (from June 7, 2007 up through the e~ecution .of the Lump Sum Agreement 
settling her case submitted to the Commission on or about May 5, 2009 - See, Finding of Fact 
No. 23) Seiniger Law Offices, P.A. was entitled to be paid for its efforts. At hearing and in post-
hearing briefmg Claimant's Counsel argued that if the "available funds" resulting from the PPI 
rating and the negotiated compensation for PPD were the only source of funds from which 
Claimant's Counsel could be paid, justice, constitutional principles, and practical considerations 
involving the ability of Claimants to obtain legal services required that Seiniger Law Offices, 
P.A. be pennitted to take a fee from the "available funds" attributable to Ms- Kulm's pennanent 
impairment ;rating. Claimant's Counsel reasoned that at the time that he was retained by Ms. 
Kulm any potential disputes from which "available funds" (as defined by the Commission's 
regulations) might be generated lay nascent within the womb of time. This, Claimant's Counsel 
submits, requires that his fee agreement with Ms. Kulm be honored, since otherwise there might 
not be any fimds out ofwruch the finn could be paid anything for its services. Consequently, not 
being able to predict what benefits a surety might dispute, or what delay might occur as to the 
payment of benefits, or what had in fact prompted the surety to pay benefits without speculating 
(speculation having been held insufficient to meet an attorney's burden of proof with respect to 
SEINIGER LAW OFFICe:S, P.i'\. 
942 W. Myrtia Street 
Boise. Idaho 83702 
(208) 345·1000 
SUPPLEMENTAL MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION 
TO RECONSll>ER OJIDER DENYING ATTORNEY FEES AND 
'f0 lsstTE A. SU.BSTITUTE OPINION 
PAGE 5 OF 11 
f/2 ( 
06/15/2010 15:23 2083454700 SEINIGER~LAW OFFICES PAGE 07/12 
the creation of "available funds" - see Kuhn Decision at 22), few attorneys if any could afford to 
venture their resources - in some cases, as here> for years - without being able to make even an 
educated guess as to whether or not a dispute might arise, much less a victory and thus a 
permissible contingent fee under the present regulations. Moreover, this problem creates a 
systemic problem peculiar to Workers Compensation Practice. The ~ttomey' s Oath contains the 
following affumation: "I will contribute time and resources to public service, and will never 
reject, for any consideration personal to myself, the cause of the defenseless or oppressed." 
Arguably, this affmnation under oath prohibits all counset for declining to counsel and represent 
claimants whom present themselves to counsel's office seeking advice. Of course> as is 
universally recognized, this commitment is "more honored in the breach than in the observance". 
Nonetheless, it is one thing for an attorney to fail to live up to what may be in reality an ideal 
than a binding commitment. It is quite another thing to enforce regulations, however well 
initially intended, which. systemically make 'the violation of the Attorney's Oath an economic 
necessity. 1 
As Claimant's Counsel reads the Kulm Decision that point is not made, and therefore it 
appears that Claimant's Counsel essentially wants something for nothing. However, putting that 
matter aside, if the issue of whether or not the impairment rating and the available funds 
resulting from it were primarily or substantially procured by Claimant's Counsel, Claimant's 
Counsel respectfully submits that he has met his burden of proof as a manet of law, and that he 
I Parenthetically. Claimant's Counsel has always been in a quandary as to whether or not the Industrial Commission 
would l'ennit an attorney representing a claimant to charge the claimant an hourly fee for services rendered whioh 
the Claimant could defer paying until any monetary benefits were received. As a practical matter, in over 30 years 
of experience) Claimant's Counsel has never met a claimant who could afford to pay for ms services 0;11 an hourly 
basis. Consequently, under the regulation in question, as currently enforced, it is generally impossible for a claimant 
tQ obtain any services from an attomey other than advocacy as to disputed mattel'S if an hourly fee arrangement is 
not permissible. Since it would appear-that a claimant has a constitutional right to counsel ifth" claimant is willing 
to pay for an attorney's services as a counselor and as his legal representative, Cla.iInant's Cou.nsel is puzzled as to 
whether or not an hourly fee based a&eemem with a Claimant is pertnissib)e. 
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has produced uncontradicted proof of that fact and that he does not base his claim on speculation. 
Nowhere in the Kulm Decision is any mention made of the testimony of defense counsel 
Alan Hull: 
12: 17 Until Dr. Radnovich's 
12:18 rating came aboard there was no effort to get a rating by 
12:19 the surety and as you know from practice, oftentimes 
12:20 that's the case. Claimant's Cotmsel will force the surety 
12:21 to get them a rating. 
12:22 Having done that! it seems me that big fund of 
12:23 money that came about, at least partially and probably 
12:24 significantly because of the result of Claimant's Counsel. 
12:25 1 mean a lot of times the adjuster will not get a rating 
13:1 until they are forced into doing that and, certainly, it 
13:2 would appear that that was the Case here. 
Given the negative inference raised by the Kulm Decision to the effect that Claimant's 
Counsel is attempting to get something for nothing (and in truth Claimant's Counsel argued that 
Seiniger Law Offices, P.A. was entitled to a percentage of the impairment rating as 
compensation for nearly two years of attorney services prior to the payment of impainnent 
benefits) it is respectfully submitted that fairness would require that Mr. Hull's testimony be 
mentioned in the opinion, even if it is rejected. However, it appears to counsel that Mr. Hall's 
testimony carries the day. "Prima facie proof' refers to proof sufficient to justify a rIDding of the 
matter in question by the uier of fact in the absence of proof to the contrary. When prima facie 
proof has been introduced, the opponent must meet it with countervailing proof or suffer 
whatever judgment the prima facie proof will support. Miller v. Bdknap, 75 Idaho 46, 266 P.2d 
662 (1954). The term IIprima facie proof" or "prima facie evidence" is an alternative label for a 
rebuttable preS1lll1ption. See, e.g., State v. Hebner, 108 Idaho 196, 697 P.2d 1210 (Ct. App. 
1985). 
The testimony of Alan Hull makes the case for Claimant's Counsel, in that it creates a 
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presumption that Claimant's Counsel's efforts primarily and substantially created the available 
funds in dispute. 
This presumption is buttressed by long-standing Idaho law applicable to Mr. Hull's 
testimony. Uncontradicted testimony of a credible v.ritness, unless his testimony is inherently 
improbable or rendered so by facts and circumstances disclosed at the hearing or trial, cannot 
arbitrarily be disregarded. The rule was fIrst announced in a case before the Idaho Industrial 
Accident Board: 
The rule applicable to all witnesses, whether parties or interested in the event of an 
action, is, that either a board, court, or jury must accept as true the positive, 
uncontradicted testimony of a credible \vitness, unless his testimony is inherently 
improbable, or rendered so by f~cts and circumstances disclosed at the hearing or trial. 
Pierstorffv. Gray's Auto Shop 74 P.2d 171, 175 (Idaho 1937). Since the rule's first enunciation 
by.the Idaho Supreme Court, the "Pierstor/f Rule" has become iron clad law in Idaho: 
That in tum begs the question: Is the Judge, who is the personification of the 
Court, at liberty to reject expert testimony cq:rning from the mouths of " .. itnesses, whom 
he has adjudged to be "up front" and "very honest with us"? There is in Idaho an 
ingrained rule which applies to the circumstances under discussion. Called the Pierstorf! 
rule or Pier-stor.!! doctrine, it is as stated by the Chief Justice in Systems Associates, Inc. v. 
Motorola Communications & Electronics, Inc., 116 Idaho 615; 621, 778 P.2d 737, 743 
(1989): "An adjudicatory body may not 'arbitrarily or capriciously disregard the 
testimony ofa witness unimpeached by any of the modes known to the law, ifsuch 
testimony does not exceed probability.' Pierstorjfv. Gray's Auto Body Shop. 58 Idaho 
438,447·48, 74 P.2d 171, 175 (1937)." The Chief Justice in Systems Associates went on 
to add, as is equally so here, "Here the trial court, as the finder off~ct, accepted the truth 
of the l.mrefuted statements by Dahmer and defendants .... Swanson v. State, 114 Idaho 
607, 759 P.2d 898 (1988); PierstorjJv. Gray's Auto Body Shop, 58 Idaho 438, 74 P.2d 
17l (1937)." 116 Idaho at 621, 778 P.2d at 743 
The principle of law announced fust in Pierstor.fjl:Jas been cited to and applied for 
over half a century. No valid reaSOn can be advanced why the Pierstorffrule is not 
applicable here to the testimony of expert wimesses who were not only unimpeached, but 
whose credibility was vouched for by the Court itself. Our case law precedent upholding 
the pierstorjJ rule is voluminous. Equally so are the reported cases where the Court has 
held the trial court in eI;tor for not recognizing the PierstorfJruk Here we can do no less, 
and that error provides an additional ground for reversing the sentence imposed. Again I 
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The legal conclusion which is ultimately and necessarily diawn is that the Judge 
was not at liberty to disregard the credible, unimpeached, and unrefuted testimony of the 
psychologists and psychiatrists that Jeremy Broadhead would be no more of a future 
threat to society than any other person. While the Judge could have said, "We don't know 
that," he could not ignore it when it was the only evidence presented on that issue. 
State v. Broadhead 120 Idaho 141, 163,814 P.2d 401,423 (ldaho,1991). 
It is respectfully submitted that, though the issue of the source of the "available funds" 
(stemming from the pennanent impainnent rating) is academic given Claimant's Counsel's 
position that he was not seeking a percentage of the impairment rating available funds under the 
regulation relied upon by the Commission, if that issue is to be disposed of by the opinion, its 
analysis is faulty. Because the decision in this case has now been published? and because of the 
conunents that Claimant's Counsel has receive,d regarding the decision, convincing him that his 
reputation has been tarnished by the decision, Claimant's Counsel respectfully requests that the 
Commission reconsider its decision, correct the subject footnote, and address the PierstorffRule. 
As was acknowledged at hearing, t1ns case is not about a relatively small amount of 
money; it is about principles of constitutional interpretation. But given the opiuion that. has been 
issued, it has become about more than that; it has become about Claimant's Counsel's 
professional reputation. As Daniel Webster famously argued to the United States Supreme Court 
in what has become known as the "Dartmouth College Case": "It is, Sir, as I have said, a small 
college. And yet there are those who love it!" Claimant's Counsel is no less concerned for his 
reputation. 
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CONCLUSION 
As to the construction and constitutionality ofIDAP A 17.02.08.033 Claimant's Counsel,. 
while respectfully disagreeing with the Commission's conclusions, recognizes that any relief to 
which he may be entitled is a matter for appeal. However; as to the Kulm Decision's erroneous 
footnote (with respect to which Claimant's Counsel does not imply that the COl)UUission in 
anyway intended to disparage) it is respectfully requested that the Conunission review the record 
in Dtottman and correct the opinion_ Furthennore, if-the issue of whether or not Claimant's 
Counsel is entitled to a contingent fee on theimpainnent rating received by Ms. Kulm under the 
''primarily or substantially standard", the testimony of Defeuse Counsel Alan Hull must be 
considered. 
Claimant's Counsel also respectfully requests that a substitute opinion be issued that 
makes plain the basis of Claimant's Counsel's contention that he is entitled.to fees, not simply 
due to the questioned constitutionality ofIDAPA 17.02.08.033, but because of the voluminous 
work done by his finn over a number of years, and the record before the Commission evidencing 
those services. Claimant's Counsel also respectfully requests that the Commission address the 
PietstorffRule. 
Dated June 15; 2010. 
~ ......... '~ .. /. . . . . . . . . 
wm Breck Seiniger, Jr. 
SEINIGER LAW OFFICES, P .A. 
SEINIGER LAW OFfiCES. P.A. 
942 W. Myrtle Street SUPl'LEMENTAL MEMORANDUM IN' SUPPORT OF MOTION PAGE 10 OF 11 
Boise, Idaho 83702 TO RECONSIDER ORDER DENYlNG ,AUORNEY FEES AND 
(2ee) 345-1000 TO ISSUE A SUBSTITUTE OPINION 
: e'ceived Fax ~' Jun 15 2 
05/15/2010 16:23 2083454701) SEINIGER LA\') OFFICES PAGE 12/12 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I CERTIFY that on June 14) 2010, I caused a true and correct copy of the foregoing document to 
be served as follows: 
Alan Hull 
ANDERSON JULIAN & HULL 
250 South 5th, Ste. 700 
PO Box 7426 
Boise ID 83707-7426 
VL4 Fax: (208) 344-5510 
SEINIGER LAW OFFICES, P.A. 
Wm. Breck Seiniger, Jr. 
Attorneys for Claimant 
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BEFORE THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
LAUREL KULM, 
Claimant, 
v. 
MERCY MEDICAL CENTER, 
Employer, 
and 
INDUSTRIAL CLAIMS MANAGEMENT, 
Surety, 
Defendants. 
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IC 2006-012770 
ORDER ON CLAIMANT'S 
MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION 
I LE 
26 2010 
INDUSTRIAL COMM!SSIO~1 
On May 20,2010, the Industrial Commission issued its Findings of Fact and Conclusions 
of Law relating to Counsel's Request for Approval of Attorney's Fees. Counsel filed a timely 
Motion for Reconsideration pursuant to Idaho Code § 72-718. Counsel's motion is supported by 
the Affidavit of Andrew C. Marsh and Counsel's Supplemental Memorandum in Support of 
Motion to Reconsider, filed June 16, 2010. 
I. 
Counsel first takes issue with the statement made by the Commission in footnote 1 at 
page 34 ofthe opinion which reads as follows: 
"Interestingly, in a companion case, treating a similar demand for approval of a 
requested fee, Counsel offered a Form 1022 that contained language identical to 
that quoted above. At hearing on the motion to approve the requested fee in that 
case, Counsel acknowledged that the quoted paragraph is "boilerplate" and goes 
into all of his Form 1022 recitations even where, in a particular case, surety had 
not denied or disputed Claimant's entitled to a PPI rating prior to Counsel's 
retention. This may explain why staff was unable to obtain a satisfactory 
explanation for the averments made in the quoted paragraph." 
Counsel argues that the footnote contains an incorrect statement of fact which demands a 
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correction, inasmuch as it denigrates his reputation in the community. As Counsel has noted, the 
companion case referenced in the footnote is the case of Drotzman v. Coors Brewing Company 
and Zurich American Insurance Company, I.C. 2006-006711, a case involving a similar request 
for approval of a claimed attorney's fee. In that case, Counsel testified: 
"And, secondly, with respect to the questions that you had about Mr. Marsh's 
affidavit or declaration, I didn't prepare that, but I can tell you that I'm 
responsible, essentially, for the boilerplate language about things being disputed 
and it sounds to me like either that was just completely incorrect or there was a 
misunderstanding on Mr. Marsh's part. With respect to the TTD benefits that you 
asked about, there was, as I understand it, a dispute and - - with respect to the 
IME consultation - - ." 
Although it is arguably permissible to conclude that if certain language is considered 
"boilerplate", it is included in all documents of the type at issue, Counsel's point is well taken. 
, 
Counsel has explained that although the language in question is boilerplate in his template, it is 
his practice to revise his template to meet the circumstances of a particular case. Counsel asserts 
that the fact that the language at issue is contained in the subject contingent agreement is simply 
the result of excusable error, and not any conscious intent to rnischaracterize the nature of what 
was and was not in dispute at the time ofthe contingent fee agreement. We are aware of no facts 
that would controvert Counsel's explanation and accept the same, although it is worth noting that 
in each of three separate cases that have recently come before the Commission on the issue of 
Counsel's entitlement to an attorney's fee, the attorney fee memoranda have contained 
representations almost identical to those at issue in the instant mater. As well, there is a lack of 
evidence in these cases supporting the proposition that at the time of Counsel's retention, the 
surety had denied or disputed the injured worker's entitlement to PPI benefits. See, Kulm v. 
Mercy Medical Center, Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law Relating to Counsel's Request 
for Approval of Attorney's Fees, I.e. 2006-012770 (filed May 20, 2010); Drotzman v. Coors 
Brewing Company and Zurich American Insurance Company, Order on Attorney's Fees, I.C. 
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2006-006711 (filed June 8, 2010); Gomez v. Nampa Lodging Investors Inc., Order on Attorney's 
Fees, LC. 2005-510285 (filed July 22,2010). 
II. 
As noted in the original opinion, the Commission found it important to address the 
applicability of the provisions of the relevant IDAP A regulations to the claim for attorney's fees 
notwithstanding that Counsel stipulated that his efforts were neither primarily nor substantially 
responsible for securing the fund from which he hopes to be paid. Following the Commission's 
determination, Counsel now raises a number of arguments in support of his position that even if 
the regulation is applicable, his efforts were clearly either primarily or substantially responsible 
for securing the fund from which he expects to be paid. 
First, Counsel argues that even if his efforts were not responsible for securing the PPI 
award at issue, he provided other valuable services to Claimant that did not result in the creation 
of any fund from which Counsel might otherwise expect to be paid. To compensate him for 
these services, Counsel should be entitled to assert a claim against the PPI award, a fund which 
the Commission has concluded was not secured as a result of Counsel's efforts. Again, we are 
guided by the provisions of the applicable regulation, which unambiguously states that among 
the things counsel must demonstrate before a fund of money can be considered "available 
funds", is that his efforts were either primarily or substantially responsible for securing that fund. 
By its specific language, the provisions of the applicable regulation do not admit Counsel's 
argument. Having said this, we recognize that in this, and many other cases, attorneys may 
provide valuable services to injured workers which do not result in the creation of any fund from 
which they might expect to be paid. In such cases, why not allow an attorney to charge a fee 
against an undisputed PPI award? Regardless of whether or not the regulation could be 
beneficially refined by allowing such a practice, the simple answer is that the current regulation 
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does not anticipate a PPI award which was not secured through counsel's efforts can fund an 
attorney's fee on other services, which, though valuable, result in the creation of no fund of 
money. 
Finally, Counsel argues that there is, in fact, undisputed competent evidence of record 
which requires the Commission to rule that Counsel's efforts were primarily or substantially 
responsible for securing the PPI award. In this regard, Counsel draws upon the testimony of 
Alan Hull, defense counsel for Surety. In his Supplemental Memorandum in Support of Motion 
for Reconsideration, Counsel states: 
Nowhere in the Kulm Decision is any mention made of the testimony of defense 
counsel, Alan Hull: 
"Until Dr. Radnovich's rating came aboard there was no effort to get a rating by 
the surety and as you know from practice, oftentimes that's the case. Claimant's 
Counsel will force the surety to get them a rating. 
Having done that, it seems me that big fund of money that came about, at least 
partially and probably significantly because of the result of Claimant's Counsel. I 
mean a lot of times the adjuster will not get a rating until they are forced into 
doing that and, certainly, it would appear that that was the case here." 
Supplemental Memorandum in Support of Motion for Reconsideration, p. 7. 
From the foregoing, it would appear that Counsel's efforts were, indeed, important to 
obtaining the eventual 6% PPI award given by Dr. Rogers. As quoted by Counsel, Mr. Hull's 
testimony would reasonably lead one to conclude that the only reason Surety obtained an 
impairment rating from Dr. Rogers is because it knew it had to deal with the 12% PPI rating 
previously awarded by Dr. Radnovich. If Mr. Hull's testimony is competent on this point, it 
would support a conclusion that Counsel's efforts were either primarily or substantially 
responsible for securing the award. However, it is important to understand the full context in 
which Mr. Hull made these comments, a context that is ignored by Mr. Seiniger in advancing his 
argument. In full, Mr. Hull stated: 
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As I told the Commission in our telephone conference, we were hired only to 
draft this and, unfortunately, the adjuster is no longer in the country, so I don't 
know what their all thought process is, but let me suggest to you the following: 
Until Dr. Radnovich's rating came aboard there was no effort to get a rating by 
the surety and as you know from practice, oftentimes that's the case. Claimant's 
counsel will force the surety to get them a rating. 
Having done that, it seems [to] me that big fund of money that came about, at 
least partially and probably significantly because of the result of claimant's 
counsel. I mean a lot of times the adjuster will not get a rating until they are 
forced into doing that and, certainly, it would appear that that was the case here. 
Kulm Hrg. Tr., pp. 12/13-13/2. 
Mr. Hull's comments are entirely speculative. He has no knowledge why Surety did 
what it did, when it did. Again, as in Mancilla v. Greg, 131 Idaho 685, 963 P.2d 368 (1998), to 
rely on Mr. Hull's testimony to support the claim for attorney's fees would require the 
Commission to engage in speculation of the type that was found objectionable in that case. In 
short, Mr. Hull's speculations have no evidentiary value, and lend no support to the proposition 
for which they are offered by Mr. Seiniger. 
Except as specifically corrected herein, the Commission stands by its original Findings of 
Fact and Conclusions of Law Relating to Counsel's Request for Approval of Attorney's Fees, 
I.e. 2006-012770 (filed May 20,2010). 
J./~ DATED this ~ fa day of July, 2010. 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION 
ORDER ON CLAIMANT'S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION - 5 
ATTEST: 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
, z:;L 
I hereby certify that on the ~ day of July, 2010, a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing Order on Claimant's Motion for Reconsideration was served by regular 
United States Mail upon each of the following: 
ANDREW MARSH 
942 W MYRTLE ST 
BOISE ID 8370 
ALAN HULL 
PO BOX 7426 
BOISE ID 83707-7426 
csmlcjh 
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Wm. Breck Seiniger, Jr. (ISB # 2387) 
Andrew C. Marsh (ISB # 6588) 
SEINIGER LAW OFFICES, P.A. 
942 W. Myrtle Street 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
Phone: (208) 345-1000 
Fax: (208) 345-4700 
Attorneys for Claimant 
'., '-) 
BEFORE THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF THE STATE OF:IDAIlO 
Tim Stienmetz, 
Claimant, 
vs. 
G2B Co. Inc., 
Employer, 
and 
Idaho State Insurance Fund, 
Surety, 
Defendants. 
I.C. No. 2008-002191 
FORM 1022, REPORT OF EXPENSES 
and 
STATEMENT OF 
CLAIMANT'S COUNSEL 
COMES NOW Claimant's Counsel and reports his expenses and submits the following in 
support of his claim of attorney's fees and costs in the amount set forth below from the proceeds 
of the settlement of the above captioned case. 
REPORT OF LITIGATION EXPENSES 
In accordance with the requirements of § 72-528, Idaho Code, this form shall be filled out 
and returned to the Industrial Commission within 30 days following the time of entry of a final 
award by the Industrial Commission in the above case, or, in the event of an appeal to a final 
court, within 30 days following a final ruling by the Court. If there is an appeal, the totals 
specified below shall include the expenses, costs, or fees incurred in the appeal. 
SEINIGER LAW OFFICES, P.A. 
942 W. Myrtle Street 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
(208) 345·1000 
FORM 1022, REPORT OF EXPENSES AND 
STATEMENT OF CLAIMANT'S COUNSEL 
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PRIOR TO LUMP SUM SETTLEMENT PPI 
BENEFITS, paid prior to LSS, subjected to atty fees $20,394.00 
ATTORNEY FEES, paid prior to LSS, on the above $5,098.53 
COSTS, incurred prior to LSS and paid directly to $550.00 
Claimant's IME (Radnovich) 
LUMP SUM SETTLEMENT 
BENEFITS, subject to atty fees 
ATTORNEY FEE, on the above 
COSTS, reimbursable to atty . 
PPD Fut Med Consid. 
TOTAL ATTY FEE & COSTS, from LSS 
MEDICAL BILLS, to be paid from LSS 
NET LUMP SUM AMT TO CLAIMANT 
$25,492.50 $2407.50 $1000.00 
TOTAL 
$28,900.00 
$9,633.33 
$23.37 
$9,656.70 
$0.00 
$19,243.30 
Attachments: Statement of Costs incurred in litigation, reimbursable to attorney 
Contingency Fee Agreement In a Worker's Compensation Case including 
Disclosure Statement 
STATEMENT OF CLAIMANT'S COUNSEL 
1. Seiniger Law Offices, P .A. ("Counsel") was retained by Tim Stienmetz 
("Claimant") on or about 4/10/2008. 
2. Counsel initiated this case by interviewing Claimant concerning the facts and 
circumstances of employment, the facts and circumstances of the injury, the status of benefits, 
the status of medical treatment, and the background of Claimant as it relates to potential 
disability beyond impairment, etc. 
3. Counsel advised Claimant as to the procedures involved in processing a claim for 
benefits under the Idaho Workers Compensation Act. Counsel advised Claimant as to the need 
for cooperation with treating physicians, the Idaho Industrial Commission Rehabilitation 
Division, and Seiniger Law Offices, P.A. 
SEINIGER LAW OFFICES, PA 
942 W. Myrtle Street 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
(208) 345-1000 
FORM 1022, REPORT OF EXPENSES AND 
STATEMENT OF CLAIMANT'S COUNSEL 
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4. Counsel advised Claimant as to the disclosures required by the Idaho Industrial 
Commission. 
5. Counsel created a database file for Claimant in which pertinent information was 
recorded for use in the handling of the claim. 
6. During, or shortly after, the initial meeting with Claimant, Counsel drafted the 
following documents for the benefit of Claimant: a fee agreement and disclaimer statement 
meeting the requirements of the Idaho Industrial Commission; medical releases; employment 
release; a letter of representation and inquiry to the surety; a letter of representation to the Idaho 
Industrial Commission requesting copies of Claimant's file; a letter to the treating medical 
providers requesting complete copies of Claimant's medical and billing records; and a client 
intake questionnaire for the initial gathering of relevant information concerning the client's 
employment, educational, medical and health, military, vocational, and accident history. 
7. Counsel reviewed all medical records, employment records, and other requested 
documents as they were received, and consulted with Claimant about the status of the case on a 
periodic basis. 
8. Counsel advised Claimant concerning the need to keep medical appointments, 
aspects of medical treatment which might potentially affect Claimant's impairment rating, and 
strategic issues relating to medical care which can impact the result of a worker's compensation 
case. 
9. Counsel requested additional medical treatment for Claimant on 4/17/08. 
10. Counsel prepared and sent a written referral of Claimant to the Idaho Industrial 
Commission Rehabilitation Division, and advised Claimant on working with the ICRD counselor 
on education, training, job seeking, and other re-employment efforts. In response, the ICRD 
SEINIGER LAW OFFICES, P.A. 
942 W. Myrtle Street 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
(208) 345-1000 
FORM 1022, REPORT OF EXPENSES AND 
STATEMENT OF CLAIMANT'S COUNSEL 
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scheduled ajob site evaluation. Counsel advised Claimant of the meaning and import of the JSE 
report. 
11. Counsel made written demand dated 6/3/08 upon Dr. Montalbano for a PPI rating 
and permanent work restrictions. 
12. Upon receiving information that Claimant was to be seen for an independent 
medical evaluation by a medical provider not chosen by Claimant, Counsel advised Claimant in 
advance ofthe procedure, and subsequently advised Claimant of the meaning and import of the 
IME report, and the effect of the expert's report on the need for present and future medical 
treatment, the claim for benefits, and lump sum settlement. 
13. Counsel advised Claimant to undergo a new and separate independent medical 
evaluation by a medical expert of Claimant's choosing; advised Claimant of the meaning and 
import of the IMB report; and advised Claimant on the effect of the expert's report on the need 
for present and future medical treatment, the claim for benefits, and lump sum settlement. 
14. At the time Counsel became involved, all issues were disputed or disputable 
because by law all defenses remain open to Defendants in a worker's compensation case as a 
matter of law unless waived or determined to have no merit by the Commission. The amount of 
all compensation paid or admitted as owed by Employer immediately prior to Counsel's 
involvement was equal to the amount actually paid to that date, less any claims for overpayment 
that Defendants might subsequently make. All issues that arose subsequent to the date Counsel 
was hired were disputed or disputable, including rights to medical benefits and treatment, time 
loss benefits, impairment compensation, disability beyond impairment, retraining, and attorney 
fees. For the period prior to lump sum settlement, Counsel's itemization of compensation that 
constituted available funds, itemization of costs, and calculation of attorney fees is set forth 
SEINIGER LAW OFFICES, P.A. 
942 W. Myrtle Street 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
(208) 345-1000 
FORM 1022, REPORT OF EXPENSES AND 
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above. For the lump sum settlement, Counsel's itemization of compensation that constitutes 
available funds, itemization of costs, and calculation of attorney fees is set forth above. 
15. There are compensation benefits, as set forth above, available for distribution on 
equitable principles. The services of Counsel operated primarily or substantially to secure the 
fund out of which the attorney seeks to be paid, due to Counsel's efforts on behalf of Claimant 
and due to Counsel's reputation as a plaintiff's lawyer in the practice of worker's compensation 
law. It was agreed that counsel anticipated payment from compensation funds rather than from 
the client, as set forth in the Attorney Fee Agreement attached hereto. The claim is limited to 
costs, fees, or other disbursements incurred in the case through which the fund was raised. There 
are equitable considerations that necessitate the recognition and application of the charging lien, 
including as follows: Claimant sought the services of Counsel as counselor and advocate; 
Claimant contracted with Counsel to pay Counsel for said services; Counsel provided services as 
counselor and advocate; Counsel has a constitutionally-protected property right to be paid as 
agreed; and Claimant has a constitutionally-protected right to have Claimant's contract with 
Counsel honored. All terms used in this and the preceding paragraph are used by Counsel in the 
context of their fair and reasonable meaning pursuant to, and as limited by, statutory and 
Constitutional law. 
16. Counsel reviewed the file in preparation for settlement. Counsel engaged in 
extensive negotiations with Defendants. Counsel had extensive communications with Claimant 
concerning the status of the case, and the strategic and tactical decisions that had to be made with 
respect to settlement discussions and preparation for hearing. 
17. Counsel advised Claimant of the risks of going to hearing and the costs that would 
be incurred in connection with obtaining sworn testimony from Claimant's medical providers. 
SEINIGER LAW OFFICES, P.A. 
942 W. Myrtle Street 
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Counsel further advised Claimant of the delay that would be involved in submitting this case for 
resolution to the Commission. 
18. Counsel obtained a compromise settlement with representatives of the defendants 
resulting in the payment of benefits over and above those which were conceded at the time that 
Claimant initiated the attorney/client relationship. 
19. Claimant elected to settle the case based upon Claimant's best judgment and 
personal situation, and on the basis set forth in the lump sum agreement which has been 
submitted to the Commission for its approval. 
20. Counsel reviewed and analyzed the lump sum settlement agreement, completed 
portions of the agreement, and reviewed the lump sum agreement with Claimant. 
21. Counsel reviewed and analyzed the file; reviewed and analyzed time and billing 
program entries; reviewed and analyzed books of account to ascertain client costs advanced and 
other financial data required by the Idaho Industrial Commission; and prepared Idaho Industrial 
Commission Form 1022. 
22. As part of the consideration supporting the contract entered into between 
Claimant and Counsel, Counsel provided legal services to Claimant from approximately 
411 0/2008 until the present time. During that time, Counsel limited his practice by declining 
certain cases because of the size of his caseload, which included Claimant's case. Counsel 
maintained an office and staff, including the services of a full-time legal assistant, to be able to 
handle whatever needs Claimant had in connection with this case, as well as the needs of his 
other clients. 
23. Claimant is presently unemployed. 
SEINIGER LAW OFFICES, PA 
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Dated this December 22, 2009. 
SEINIGER LAW OFFICES, P.A. 
Andrew Marsh 
Attorney for Claimant 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I CERTIFY that on December 22,2009, I caused a true and correct copy of the foregoing 
document to be served as follows: 
Ronald D. Coston 
Idaho State Insurance Fund 
1215 W. State Street 
Boise ID 83720 
[RJ Hand Delivery 
SEINIGERLAW OFFICES, P.A. 
Andrew Marsh 
Attorney for Claimant 
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SEINIGER LAW OFFICES, P.A. 
942 W. MYRTLE STREET 
BOISE, IDAHO 83702 
(208) 345-1000 
Andrew@ldahoRights.com 
CLIENT NAME 
Timothy Stienmetz 
DATE DESCRIPTION 
03/31108 Balance forward 
04111/08 Copies -lIC req for file (med recs) 
04/11/08 Postage 
10/24/08 Copies - Fwd PPI ck to client 
10/24/08 Postage 
12/24/08 Copies - Fwd PPI check 
12/24/08 Postage 
03/23109 Copies - Ltr & CD to Radnovich 
03/23/09 Postage 
03/23/09 compact disc 
04/29/09 Copies - Fwd PPI ck to Client 
04/29/09 Postage 
05/27/09 Copies - Fwd PPI check to client 
05/27/09 Postage 
10/09/09 Copies - Ltr to Client pIs contact re ck 
10/09/09 Postage 
10/09/09 VOID: Copies - Client Copy - Ltr to Pappas re case status on issues 
12/02/09 File Closing 
Statement of Costs 
I DATE I 
12/22/09 
ATTORNEY OUR FILE NO. 
AMOUNT BALANCE 
0.00 
3.75 3.75 
0.41 4.16 
0.30 4.46 
0.42 4.88 
0.30 5.18 
0.42 5.60 
0.15 5.75 
0.59 6.34 
5.00 11.34 
0.30 11.64 
0.42 12.06 
0.30 12.36 
0.42 12.78 
0.15 12.93 
0.44 13.37 
0.00 13.37 
10.00 23.37 
I BALANCE DUE II $23.37 
Thank you for allowing us to represent you. As of this date we have concluded our work on your case and have closed your file. If 
you would like to have a copy of the file within the next 30 days you may do so at $.20 per page. If you choose to obtain your file 
at a later date there will be a $30.00 retrieval fee in addition to copying charges of $.20 per page. Your file will be destroyed two (2) 
years from the above date. 
CONTINGENCY FEE AGREEMENT 
IN A WORKER'S COMPENSATION CASE 
This is an agreement for representation and consultation in a worker's 
compensation claim before the Idaho Industrial Commission. This agreement is 
between SEINIGER LAW OFFICES, P.A., 942 Myrtle Street, Boise, Idaho 
83702, (hereafter referred to as "Attorney") and Timothy Stienmetz, (hereafter 
referred to as "Client"). 
ATTORNEY AND CLIENT AGREE AS FOLLOWS: 
1) Attorney will represent Client in the following action: Stienmetz v. G2B & SIF 
with respect to worker's compensation claim for date of injury of 
1/07/2008 only. 
2) For their representation of Client, Attorneys will be paid a fee which will be in 
lien upon the cause of action and will be equal to a portion of all amounts 
recovered by way of settlement, or award including attorney fees, and 
including sums recovered in satisfaction thereof from any third party. That 
portion will be as follows: 
i) Twenty-five percent (25%) of all amounts obtained for Client after 
execution of this agreement if the case is settled before a hearing. If 
Client is receiving temporary disability benefits at the time of the 
execution of this agreement, Attorney will not take a percentage of that 
benefit until such time as the surety discontinues or threatens to 
discontinue payment of said benefit; if Client has received an 
impairment rating which has been admitted and is being paid, Attorney 
will not take a percentage of the balance of the impairment rating unless 
it is later disputed. 
ii) Thirty percent (30%) of such amounts after a hearing and the claim is 
resolved without the filing of an appeal by either party; 
iii) Forty percent (40%) of such amounts if the claim is resolved after an 
appeal has been filed by either party; 
In the event that there are attorney fees awarded against the defendant(s) by the 
commission, or otherwise paid by defendant( s), Attorney shall be entitled to be 
paid those attorney fees or the percentage calculated above, whichever is greater. 
3) Client will not be required to pay attorney fees to Attorney if nothing is 
recovered by way of settlement or award unless Attorney withdraws due to 
----.--.--.. - ... 
lack of cooperation by Client. In the event that Attorney is required to 
withdraw due to lack of cooperation in presenting and prosecuting Client's 
claim, he will be compensated as set forth in paragraph 7 below. 
4) Actual costs required to prepare and prosecute Client's claim by Attorney, 
or to achieve a settlement, are to be paid by Client; if advanced by 
Attorney, these costs will be repaid from Client's portion of amounts 
recovered, as defmed in Section 2, above; if a settlement is not reached in your 
case, you will be responsible to make payments on these costs until they are 
paid in full. These costs include fees for investigators if hired by Attorney: 
filing fees, fees for court reporters, travel expenses, costs of service of process, 
costs for medical records and reports, costs for expert witnesses and 
physicians, long distance telephone and fax charges, postage and related 
mailing costs, and all other costs associated with the prosecution of Client's 
claim. Attorney is authorized, but not obligated, to pay all medical bills 
outstanding at the time of settlement of Client's claim out of any funds received 
by Attorney to the health care provider or their designated agent. 
5) Client agrees that he will not make settlement except with Attorney's prior 
approval, which approval shall not be reasonably withheld. Should Client do 
so in violation of this Agreement, Client agrees to pay Attorney the sum and 
share indicated in Paragraph 2(ii), above; upon settlement Attorney is 
authorized to pay any outstanding medical bills of Client directly to the 
provider. Attorney shall not settle the case without Client's prior approval. 
6) Attorney makes no representations' concerning the likelihood of a successful 
resolution of Client's case, and does not guarantee to obtain sufficient funds to 
reimburse Client for the costs or expenses incurred in the prosecution of the 
case; it is expressly agreed that all statements of Attorney on these matters are 
good faith statements of opinion only; 
7) Attorney may be discharged by Client at any time. If Attorney is discharged 
Attorney will be compensated for services rendered to the date of discharge, as 
well as for all costs, expenses and disbursements, as follows: 
i) If Attorney is discharged before the case is settled or tried, Attorney 
shall be paid at the rate of $150.00 per hour or a percentage calculated 
in accordance with paragraph 2 (based upon the highest settlement offer, 
if any, made by the defendants at the time of the discharge) whichever is 
greater; Attorney will furnish Client with an itemized statement of such 
serVices. 
ii) If Attorney is discharged after the case is settled or tried, the 
compensation of Attorney shall be computed in accordance with the 
provisions of this agreement just as if the verdict, award, determination 
or judgment had actually been collected in full for Client. 
iii) Attorney has the right to retain possession of Client's documents and 
money until Attorney's bill is paid in full by Client, and Attorney shall 
have a lien on the cause of action. 
8) Client will pay to Attorney an initial retainer as an advanee against the eosts 
referred to in Paragraph 4 abEY/e in the amount of $100. 
9) Client agrees that any interest earned on any of Client's funds held in trust will 
be donated to the Idaho State Bar in connection with its Interest on Lawyer 
Trust Accounts program. 
lO)Both Client and Attorney have read this agreement, have a copy of it, and 
agree to its terms and conditions. There are no other oral or written 
representations between Client and Attorney. Any modifications of this 
contract shall be made in writing. 
11)This Agreement shall be binding upon the heirs, successors, representatives 
and assigns of Client and Attorney. 
12)Client has been advised that Client may pick up a copy of the file in this case 
within 30 days after settlement or after the attorney client relationship is 
terminated by either party to this agreement. After that time, Attorney's file, 
and all documents and things in it from whatever source will be destroyed. 
13)Client has been advised that Attorney may be retained on an hourly basis of 
$150 per hour by depositing a retainer with Attorney of $2,000.00 which shall 
be replenished as Attorney charges against it. In the event that Attorney is 
retained on an hourly basis, Attorney shall not be entitled to any percentage of 
any settlement or benefits recovered by Client. Client has declined to retain 
Attorney on an hourly basis and has chosen to retain Attorney on the 
contingent basis described herein. 
I have read the foregoing and decline to retain the attorney on an hourly 
~daYOf 10 ,200L . 
. 
Cf'imothy . nm~tz, . 
DISCLOSURE STATEMENT 
1. In workers' compensation matters~ attorney's fees normally do not exceed 
twenty-five percent (25%) of the benefits your attorney obtains for you in a case in 
which no hearing on the merits has been completed. In a case in which a hearing 
on the merits has been completed, attorney's fees normally do not exceed thirty 
percent (30%) of the benefits your attorney obtains for you. 
2. Depending upon the circumstances of your case, you and your attorney may 
agree to a higher or lower percentage which would be subject to Commission 
approvaL Further, if you and your attorney have a dispute regarding attorney fees, 
either of you may petition the Industrial Commission to resolve the dispute. 
I certify that I have read and understand this disclosure statement and 
Contingency Fee Agreement, and agree to the terms contained herein. 
DATED this ~day of .#",,/ , 200f!) 
An~4~ 
SEIN1GER LAW OFFICES, P.A. 
Attorney for Client 
Ronald D. Coston, ISB No. 2816 
State Insurance Fund 
1215 W. State 
Statehouse Mail 
Boise, ID 83720 
(208) 332-2100 
\ c 
Attorney for Defendants G2B Company, Inc., and State Insurance Fund 
BEFORE THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
TIMOTHY STIENMETZ, ) IC NO.: 08-002191 
) 
Claimant, ) ) 
vs. ) ) 
SIP NO.: 200801005 
G2B COMPANY, INC., ) ) 
Employer, 
) 
) 
LUMP SUM AGREEMENT 
) 
and ) 
) 
STATE INSURANCE FUND, ) 
) 
Surety, ) 
Defendant ) 
In consideration of the premises, promises and covenants hereinafter set fO,rth an4 subject 
-:-.J 
to the approval of the Agreement by the Industrial Commission, the parties her~to ent6i'into the 
following Lump Sum Agreement and request an order of the Commission discharging the 
Defendants from liability pursuant to Section 72-404, Idaho Code. 
FIRST: The parties shall be designated herein as follows: 
TIMOTHY STIENMETZ is the Claimant herein and during all relevant times was an 
employee of G2B COMPANY, INC., hereinafter referred to as "Employer"; Employer was 
insured for its workers compensation liability by STATE INSURANCE FUND, hereinafter 
referred to as "Surety". The INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION of the State of Idaho, hereinafter 
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referred to as the "Commission", has the exclusive jurisdiction to hear, determine and make the 
appropriate award and order in this matter. 
SECOND: Claimant alleges that, on or about January 7, 2008 while he was employed by 
said Employer, he suffered an injury to his back while in the course and scope of his 
employment. At the time of said injury, Claimant was 22 years of age and single. Claimant 
worked 40 hours a week earning an average weekly wage of $S68.41. Timely notice was given 
to the Employer and Surety and benefits were paid pursuant to the Idaho Workers Compensation 
Act. 
THIRD: As will appear from the medical reports following his accident, Claimant was 
primarily treated by Paul Montalbano, M.D. for right LS-Sl radiculopathy, right LS-Sl herniated 
disk, lateral recess stenosis, lumbar spondylosis, and degenerative disk disease. On March 4, 
2008, Dr. Montalbano performed a right LS-Sl microdiskectomy. On March 31, 2008, Dr. 
Montalbano carried out a right LS-Sl redo microdiskectomy. Claimant was evaluated by Robert 
H. Friedman, M.D. and, on October IS, 2008, Dr. Friedman found that Claimant had sustained a 
12% permanent partial impairment of the whole person as a result of his accident of January 7, 
2008. 
FOURTH: The Employer and Surety have paid Claimant the following medical benefits: 
Doctors 
Paul J. Montalbano, M.D. 
Mountain View Medical Center 
Michael H. McClay, Ph.D. 
Carol Griffith, LCPC 
Idaho Physical Medicine & Rehab 
Hospitals 
Idaho Elks Rehab Hospital 
St. Alphonsus RMC 
St. Lukes RMC 
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$ 13,S73.71 
24,348.94 
L/t/7 
Physical Therapy 
Morris Physical Therapy 
St. Alphonsus Rehab Services 
Miscellaneous 
Claimant Reimbursement 
Anesthesia Associates of Boise 
Gem State Radiology 
Intermountain Medical Imaging 
Paul J. Montalbano, M.D. 
Interpath Laboratory 
Medical Services Company 
MSC Group, Inc. 
Total Medical Paid to Date: 
2,484.10 
9,234.23 
$ 49,640.98 ! 
Claimant agrees to allow Surety to provide to the Commission any medical records reasonably 
necessary to effectuate the terms of this Agreement. 
FIFTH: There are genuine and substantial disputes and differences between the parties as 
to the degree, if any, of Claimant's impairment and disability, the need for retraining benefits and 
the need for future medical benefits. The parties, however, wish to settle their differences on a 
full and final basis advising the Commission that it is in the best interests of the parties to do so. 
Therefore, as provided by Idaho Code Section 72-404, in an effort to settle this disputed matter, 
the Surety tenders to the Claimant and the Claimant accepts the sum of $28,900.00 in full and 
final settlement of any and all claims he has or may have as a result of any of the alleged injuries 
described herein. Further, the parties agree to waive any underpayment of total temporary 
disability benefits and temporary partial disability benefits which may exist for any reason, 
including any underpayments that may exist as a result of the method used to calculate the 
compensation rate(s). 
IT IS FURTHER UNDERSTOOD BETWEEN THE PARTIES THAT THE 
CLAIMANT AGREES TO PAY ALL OUTSTANDING MEDICAL BILLS NOT LISTED IN 
THE FOURTH SECTION OF THIS AGREEMENT AND THE EMPLOYER AND SURETY 
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WILL NOT BE RESPONSIBLE FOR, NOR DO THEY ASSUME LIABILITY FOR, ANY 
OTHER MEDICAL BILLS WHATSOEVER AND THAT SAID LUMP SUM SETTLEMENT 
SHALL BE APPORTIONED AS FOLLOWS: 
LUMP SUM SETTLEMENT 
Total Temporary Disability Benefits 
01l0S/OS through 0911110S 
35 weeks, 3 days at $380.S3 per week 
TOTAL DUE 
Temporary Partial Disability Benefits 
Retraining Benefits 
Permanent Partial Impairment 
12% whole person at 60 
weeks at $339.90 per week 
TOTAL DUE 
Future Medical Benefits 
Unapportioned Disputed 
Impairment and Additional 
Disability Benefits at 15% whole 
person at 75 weeks at $339.90 per week 
In consideration for this Lump 
Sum Agreement pursuant to 
Idaho Code Section 72-404, 
waiver of right of appeaL 
waiver of right of 
reconsideration. waiver 
of right of modification 
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$ 13,492.26 
$ 20,394.00 
$ 2,407.50 
$ 25,492.50 
$ 1,000.00 
$ 13,492.26 
$ 
$ 
-0-
-0-
$ 20,394.00 
$ 28,900.00 
$ 62,786.26) 
I.l'lq 
Less TID previously paid 
Less TPD previously paid 
Less Retraining paid 
Less PPI previously paid 
Less LSS advance paid 
TOTAL AMOUNT DUE CLAIMANT 
CLAIMANT'S ATTORNEY FEES AND COSTS: 
A. Attorney fees taken prior to LSS 
$ 13,492.26 
$ -0-
$ -0-
$ 20,394.00 
$ -0-
B. Costs taken prior to LSS (Claimant f s 1ME, Dr. Radnovich) 
C. Additional attorney fees to be taken from LSS 
D. Additional costs to be taken from LSS 
ITEMIZED LIST OF OUTSTANDING MEDICALS TO 
BE PAID BY CLAIMANT FROM LUMP SUM 
SETTLEMENT BALANCE: (List provider and amounts.) 
(Counsel knows of none.) 
E. Total of Outstanding Medicals 
NET AMOUNT TO CLAIMANT 
(Subtract Lines C & D relating 
to attorney fees, and Line E 
relating to outstanding medicals, 
from the total amount due 
Claimant of this LSS) 
$ -33,886.26 
$ 28,900.00 
$ 5,098.53 
$ 55().()() 
$ 9,633.33 
$ 23.37 
$ -0-
$ 19,243.30(, 
SIXTH: The parties advise the Commission that they believe that it is in their best / 
interests that this disputed matter be settled as herein set forth. 
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The parties acknowledge that the nature and extent of the temporary disability and 
permanent partial disability and medical and related expenses in this matter are uncertain and 
may be continuing or progressive and may substantially exceed those hereinabove set forth, and 
the above shall not limit the scope of this Agreement or the Order of Discharge entered by the 
Commission pursuant hereto, both of which contemplate and include all rights and claims to all 
permanent and temporary disability benefits, all impairment benefits and all medical and related 
benefits whether or not known, herein listed, discoverable or contemplated by the parties. 
The Claimant does agree to indemnify, defend and hold Defendants harmless from and 
against any further claim or loss of any and every kind arising out of or related to the said alleged 
accident, and any resultant losses, damages or injuries, including without limit, any claim 
respecting past or future hospital, medical or like expenses. 
SEVENTH: The Claimant acknowledges and agrees that he has carefully read this 
instrument in its entirety and has been fully advised regarding the contents of this Agreement by 
his counsel, that Claimant understands its contents and has signed same knowing that the 
payment forever concludes, settles and fully disposes of any and all claims of any kind and 
nature and character that he now has or may have individually against Employer and Surety on 
account of the alleged injuries and that these proceedings are concluded and forever discharged 
and that they may be dismissed with prejudice by reason hereof, subject only to the 
Commission's order and approval. 
Pursuant to IDAPA 17.02.08033, a memorandum from Claimant's counsel accompanies 
this Agreement setting forth the required information regarding Claimant's attorney's fees. 
EIGHTH: Upon the Commission's order approving this Agreement and subject to the 
payment of $28,900.00, the balance due Claimant, the Employer and Surety shall be discharged 
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and released of and from any and all liability on account of the above-described accidents and 
injuries. 
DATED this __ IJ_Yl_1_i\_d _ day of 
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/\ 
U-Q/' , 2009 
'.::::. '- , . 
At! 
! I I, 
U State Insurance 
RONALD D. COSTON 
Attorney for G2B Company, Inc., and Surety, State 
Insurance Fund. 
ORDER 
Upon the foregoing and good cause appearing and the Industrial Commission being fully 
advised and having determined that it is for the best interests of the parties that the liability of the 
Employer and Surety be discharged in whole by the payment of the Lump Sum Agreement as 
provided therein, NOW THEREFORE: 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Lump Sum Agreement be and it hereby is approved 
as provided by Section 72-404 Idaho Code, and that the above-entitled proceedings are dismissed 
with prejudice and the Employer, G2B Company, Inc., and the Surety, are discharged and 
released of and from any and all liability on account of the above-entitled injuries. 
DATED: ________________________ ___ 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION 
BY ____________________________ __ 
CHAlRMAN 
BY __________________ _ 
COMMISSIONER 
BY ____________________________ __ 
COMMISSIONER 
ATTEST: 
ASSISTANT SECRETARY 
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Ronald D. Coston, ISB No. 2816 
State Insurance Fund 
1215 W. State 
Statehouse Mail 
Boise, ID 83720 
(208) 332-2100 
Attorney for Defendants G2B Company, Inc., and State Insurance Fund 
BEFORE THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
TIMOTHY STIENMETZ, ) ICNO.: 08-002191 
) 
Claimant, ) SIFNO.: 200801005 
) 
vs. ) 
) STIPULATION & ORDER 
G2B COlviP ANY, INC., ) FOR DISMISSAL 
) WITH PREJUDICE 
Employer, ) 
) 
and ) 
) 
STATE INSURANCE FUND, ) 
) 
Surety, ) 
Defendant 
COMES NOW, the Claimant, TIMOTHY STIENMETZ, by and through his attorney of 
record, Andrew Marsh, and the Defendants, G2B COMPANY, INC., and the STATE 
INSURANCE FUND, by and through their attorney of record, Ronald D. Coston, and stipulate 
and agree that the above-numbered cause has been settled and, subject only to the payment of the 
sums ordered in the Commission's Order of Approval and Discharge, the above-styled and 
numbered cause may be dismissed with prejudice. 
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DATED this ___ ~_;~_,_d _ day of_...;;D;...;t;...,c_\ _____ :, 2009. 
RONALD D. COSTON .I 
Attorney for G2B Company, Inc., and Surety, State 
Insurance Fund 
ORDER 
Pursuant to the above and foregoing Stipulation and good cause appearing therefore; 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the above styled and numbered cause be dismissed with 
prejudice. 
DATED: ________________ _ 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION 
BY ____________________________ __ 
CHAIRMAN 
BY ____________________________ __ 
COMMISSIONER 
BY ____________________________ __ 
c::OMMISSIONER 
ATTEST: 
ASSISTANT SECRETARY 
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IDAHO INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION 
C,L, "BUTCH" OTTER, GOVI1RNOR 
January 13,2010 
Andrew Marsh 
Seiniger Law Offices 
942 W Myrtle Street 
Boise, ID 83702 
POBox 83720 
Boise, ID 83720-0041 
(208) 334-6000 - FAX (208) 334-2321 
1-800-950-2110 
Re: Claimant: Timothy Steinmetz 
IC # 2008-002191 
Proposed settlement with State Insurance Fund 
Dear Mr. Marsh: 
COMMISSIONERS 
R,D. Maynard. Chainnan 
Thomas E, Limbaugh 
Thomas P. Baskin 
Mindy Montgomery, Director 
The Industrial Commission (Commission) is in receipt ofthe proposed settlement agreement 
referenced above. In our review of the proposed settlement, the Commission has also 
considered your letter and attachments of December 23,2009, as well as the documentation 
attached to the Stipulation and Lump Sum Agreement received that same date. The 
Commission staff has made an initial determination that the settlement is in the best interests 
of the parties, except for the portion of the requested fees related to the Permanent Partial 
Impairment (PPI) benefit previously paid, and a portion of the fees requested from the Lump 
Sum Consideration, which have not been found reasonable per IDAPA 17.02.08.033. With 
respect to the fee from the PPI, staff lacks sufficient information to conclude that the 
requested fee is reasonable, and is therefore unable to recommend approval of the same to the 
Commission. With respect to the fees in excess of 25% requested from the Lump Sum 
Consideration of $28,900.00, Commission staff is unable to recommend approval as the fee 
does not appear reasonable either per IDAPA 17.02.08.033, or in conformance with the 
Contingency Fee Agreement. 
Specifically, Counsel is requesting fees from the PPI, as itemized on page 2 of the Statement 
of Claimant's Counsel, but it is unclear from the documentation submitted for consideration 
that Counsel was primarily or substantially responsible for obtaining those benefits. The PPI 
was paid in the amount of $20,394.00, and fees requested and previously taken amounted to 
$5,098,53 (25%). 
Additionally, Counsel requests fees of $9,633.33 from the Lump Sun1 Consideration of 
$28,900, which equates to thirty-three and one-third percent (33.33%). Fees of25%, equaling 
$7,225.00, are found reasonable. The fees in excess of 25%, $2,408.33, are not found 
reasonable. Consequently, the total fees not currently found reasonable are $7,506.86 
($5,098.53 plus $2,408.33). 
700 So. Clearwater Ln., Boise, 10 
Equal Opportunity Employer 
Please be aware that this is an initial determination> and, in accordance with IDAPA 
17.02.08.033.03, you may request a hearing on the matter within fourteen days. Also in 
accordance with this rule, the Commission will shortly be issuing a partial order releasing 
available funds, and fees and costs which have been determined to be reasonable. 
Thank you for your assistance in the review of this proposed settlement. 
Sincerely, 
~ 
Scott McDougall 
Manager, Claims and Benefits 
Cc: Ron Coston, State Insurance Fund 
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IC: 2008-002191 
ORDER APPROVING IN PART 
LUMP SUM AGREEMENT 
FI LE D 
JAN 2 6 2010 
INDUSTRIAl COMMISSION 
This matter came before the Commission on the request of the parties to approve a Lump 
Sum Agreement. The Commission desires to approve the agreement, except for a portion 
relating to attorney fees. Having fully reviewed the proposed settlement and being fully advised, 
the Commission finds that the agreement is in the best interests of the parties. THEREFORE, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED That the Lump Sum Agreement proposed by the parties is 
approved, with the exception of a portion of the claim for attorney fees submitted by Claimant's 
attorney. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED That the Commission approves the request for attorney fees 
of twenty-five percent and costs as those services related to the lump sum consideration. The 
total lump sum consideration amount is $28,900. Fees from that amount at 25% equal 
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$7,225.00, which is reasonable. Fees and costs amount to $7,225.00 and $23.37 respectively, for 
a total of $7,248.37. Attorney has previously withheld $5,098.53 as fees. Thus, the surety shall 
pay to Claimant's attorney the sum of$2,149.84, as the balance of such fees and costs. 
Attorney also claims entitlement to fees in the amount $5,098.53, which is 25% of the 
PPI benefits paid per settlement. Further, Attorney claims entitlement to fees of thirty-three and 
one-third percent from the lump sum consideration of $28,900. As previously noted, fees of 
25% have been found reasonable from this latter amount. The amount of the fees in excess of 
25% equals $2,408.33. The fees from the PPI benefit and the fees from the lump sum 
consideration in excess of 25% have not been substantiated to the Commission as reasonable in 
accordance with IDAPA 17.02.08.033. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED That the Surety release to Attorney the sum of $7,506.86, 
which is the amount of the proceeds of the Lump Sum Agreement requested for unsubstantiated 
attorney fees, to be held in Attorney's trust account pending further order of the Commission. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED That the Surety pay to Claimant the remaining sum of 
$19,243.30. 
Claimant's attorney has previously been advised in writing of this determination and his 
right to request a hearing on the issue of attorney fees. 
1"1>\ 
DATEDthisd6 day of d~~ ,2010. 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION 
T omas"'E. Li\augh, c'b~iss 0 er 
ORDER APPROVING IN PART LUMP SUM AGREEM'ENr---~ 
I~ 
Thomas P. Baskin, Commissioner 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on~(V\.. d.~ ,3 {) I D , a true and correct copy of ORDER 
APPROVING IN PART LUMP S AGREEMENT was served upon the partIes hsted 
below as follows: 
X USMAIL 
--
Andrew Marsh 
Seiniger Law Office 
942 W Myrtle St 
Boise,ID 83702 
State Insurance Fund 
1215 West State Street 
Statehouse Mail 
Boise,ID 83720-0044 
COURIER 
ORDER APPROVING IN PART STIPULATION AND AGREEMENT OF LUMP SUM 
DISCHARGE - 4 
'I(~/ 
lhl £\1 
IVI 1\1-
\Vm. Breck Seiniger, Jr. (ISB # 2387) 
Andrew C. Marsh (ISB # 6588) 
SEINIGER LAW OFFICES, P.A. 
942 W. Myrtle Street 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
Phone: (208) 345-1000 
Fax: (208) 345-4700 
Attorneys for Claimant 
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BEFORE THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
Tim Stienmetz, 
Claimant, 
vs. 
G2B Co. Inc., 
Employer, 
and 
Idaho State Insurance Fund, 
Surety, 
Defendants. 
I.C. No. 2008-002191 
MOTION FOR STATEMENT 
OF REASONS FOR DENIAL 
OF ATTORNEY FEE 
PURSUANT TO 
IDAP A 17.02.08.033.03(a) 
COMES NO\V Claimant's counsel, and hereby files this MOTION FOR STATEMENT 
OF REASONS FOR DENIAL OF ATTORNEY FEE PURSUANT TO IDAPA 
17.02.08.033.03(a). 
The grounds for the Motion are that IDAP A 17.02.08.033.03(a) provides as follows: 
"The Commission staff will notify counsel in writing of the staff s informal determination, which 
shall state the reasons for the determination that the requested fee is not reasonable." However, 
Counsel has received no such statement. Neither the Commission's order dated January 26,2010 
nor the letter from Scott McDougal dated January 13,2010 contain any reasons; they only 
contain the conclusion that the attorney fees requested in the above matter have not been found 
SEINIGER LAW OFFICES, PA 
942 W. Myrtle Street 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
(208) 345-1000 
MOTION FOR STATEMENT OF REASONS FOR DEN IAL 
OF ATTORNEY FEE PURSUANT TO 
IDAPA 17.02.08.033.03(A) 
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to be reasonable. 
The legal dictionary at http://dictionary.lp.findlaw.com defmes "reason" as "an 
underlying ground, justification, purpose, motive, or inducement. Example: required to provide 
reasons for the termination in writing." In other words, a statement of reasons must include 
the underlying grounds, i.e. a factual and legal basis, neither of which has been provided to 
Counsel. 
It would be fundamentally unfair for Counsel to be denied attorney fees or to be forced to 
attend a hearing on attorney fees without receiving the statement of reasons required by the 
IDAPArule. 
The relief sought is compliance with IDAP A 17.02.08.033.03(a), including notification in 
writing to Counsel of the factual and legal reasons for the determination that the requested 
attorney fee is not reasonable. 
Dated February 1,2010. 
SEINIGER LAW OFFICES, P.A. 
Andrew Marsh 
Attorney for Claimant 
SEINIGER LAW OFFICES, PA 
942 W. Myrtle Street 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
(208) 345-1000 
MOTION FOR STATEMENT OF REASONS FOR DENIAL 
OF ATTORNEY FEE PURSUANT TO 
IDAPA 17.02.0B.033.03(A) 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I CERTIFY that on February 1,2010, I caused a true and correct copy of the foregoing document 
to be served as follows: 
Ronald Coston 
State Insurance Fund 
1215 W. State Street 
Boise,ID 83720-0044 
Fax (208) 332-2175 
[RJ Fax 
SEINIGER LAW OFFICES, P.A. 
Andrew Marsh 
Attorney for Claimant 
SEINIGER LAW OFFICES, P.A. 
942 W. Myrtle Street 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
(208) 345·1000 
MOTION FOR STATEMENT OF REASONS FOR DENIAL 
OF ATTORNEY FEE PURSUANT TO 
IDAPA 17.02.0B.033.03(A) 
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BEFORE THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
TIM STIENMETZ, ) 
) 
Claimant, ) 
) 
v. ) IC 2008-002191 
) 
G2B CO. INC., ) 
) 
Employer, ) ORDER DENYING MOTION 
and ) FOR STATEMENT OF REASONS 
) 
STATE INSURANCE FUND, ) 
I L "'~ ) > I:. 
Surety, ) 
) 
Defendants. ) INDUSTRIAL COMMtSSiCl'N 
On January 26, 2010, the Commission issued an Order Approving in Part Lump Sum 
Agreement. In that Order, the Commission declined to approve attorney fees in the amount of 
$7,506.86. On February 11, 2010, Claimant's counsel filed a motion requesting a statement of 
reasons why the requested fees were denied by the Commission. Claimant's counsel contends 
that IDAPA 17.02.08.033.03(a) requires such a statement from Commission staff and that the 
statement has not been provided. 
In a letter dated January 13, 2010, Commission staff informed Claimant's counsel that 
staff lacks sufficient information to conclude that the requested fees are reasonable. 
Specifically, Claimant's counsel failed to provide sufficient evidence demonstrating that he acted 
primarily or substantially to secure the PPI fund from which the fees were being requested. In 
order for the fees to be deemed reasonable, such evidence must be provided. Additionally, 
Claimant's counsel requested attorney fees of 33.33% from the lump sum consideration. 
Attorney fees from the consideration in excess of 25% were not found to be reasonable. 
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The January 13, 2010 letter satisfies the requirements of IDAP A 17.02.08.033.03(a). 
Consequently, the motion is DENlED. 
IT IS SO ORDERED. 
DATED this..M day of March, 2010. ) 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION 
1;Jt;Jf.~ 
R.D. MaynaTd,Clla~n 
Thomas P. Baskin, Commissioner 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the ~ of March 2010, a true and correct copy of Order 
Denying Motion For Statement of Reasons was served by regular United States Mail upon 
each of the following persons: 
ANDREW MARSH 
942 W MYRTLE ST 
BOISE ID 83702 
RONALD COSTON 
STATE INSURANCE FUND 
1215 W STATE STREET 
BOISE ID 83720-0044 
sb/cjh 
ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR STATEMENT OF REASONS - 2 
o 
Wm. Breck Seiniger, Jr. (ISB # 2387) 
Andrew C. Marsh (ISB # 6588) 
SEINIGER LAW OFFICES, P.A. 
942 W. Myrtle Street 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
Phone: (208) 345-1000 
Fax: (208) 345-4700 
Attorneys for Claimant 
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Tim Stienmetz, 
Claimant, 
vs. 
G2B Co. Inc., 
Employer, 
And 
Idaho State Insurance Fund, 
Surety, 
Defendants. 
I.C. No. 2008-002191 
CLAIMANT'S COUNSEL'S 
ADMISSIONS FOR 
ATTORNEY FEE HEARING 
COMES NOW Claimant's Counsel and files these ADMISSIONS for purposes of the 
Attorney Fee Hearing (hereinafter "Hearing") now scheduled in this matter for May 10,2010. 
For purposes of these proceedings, Counsel is using the phrase "but-for test" as shorthand 
for a standard of proof that means that in order to prove the element of "primarily or 
substantially" (IDAPA 17.02.08.033.01.c.ii.), Counsel is required to prove the causal link 
between Counsel's representation and the payment of benefits by demonstrating nothing less 
than that without his representation, the benefits would not have been paid. 
Counsel makes the following admissions: 
1. For purposes of these proceedings only, and without waiving the right to raise the 
SEINIGER LAW OFFICES, P.A. 
942 W. Myrtle Street 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
(208) 345-1000 
CLAIMANT'S COUNSEL'S 
ADMISSIONS FOR ATTORNEY FEE HEARING 
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constitutionality of the applicable IDAP A attorney fee rules on appeal, Seiniger 
Law Offices admits that it cannot prove that its attorneys were "primarily or 
substantially" responsible for securing the permanent partial impairment 
(PPI) benefit and the other benefits paid as consideration for lump sum 
settlement (LSS) if the standard of proof is the "but-for test." 
2. For purposes ofthese proceedings only, and without waiving the right to raise the 
constitutionality of the applicable IDAP A attorney fee rules on appeal, Seiniger 
Law Offices admits that it cannot prove that the Defendants "disputed" the 
permanent partial impairment (PPI) benefit and the other benefits paid as 
consideration for lump sum settlement (LSS) before the Defendants paid 
those benefits. 
Dated May 10,2010. 
SEINIGER LAW OFFICES, P.A. 
Andrew Marsh 
Attorney for Claimant 
SEINIGER LAW OFFICES, PA 
942 W. Myrtle Street 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
(208) 345·1000 
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Wm. Breck Seiniger, Jr. (ISB # 2387) 
Andrew C. Marsh (ISB # 6588) 
SEINIGER LAW OFFICES, P.A. 
942 W. Myrtle Street 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
Phone: (208) 345-1000 
Fax: (208) 345-4700 
Attorneys for Claimant 
BEFORE THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
Tim Stienmetz, 
Claimant, 
vs. 
G2B Co. Inc., 
Employer, 
And 
Idaho State Insurance Fund, 
Surety, 
Defendants. 
I.C. No. 2008-002191 
CLAIMANT'S COUNSEL'S 
OPENING BRIEF 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
This matter came before the Idaho Industrial Commission for a Hearing on May 11,2010 
on the issue of the rights of Claimant and Claimant's Counsel's to have their attorney fee 
agreement upheld. Counsel testified via the Affidavit of Andrew Marsh and its Exhibits; 
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Claimant testified; and no party presented any contrary evidence. There are no facts in dispute. l 
Tim Stienrnetz (Claimant) was injured in the workplace and solicited and entered into a 
Fee Agreement2 (Fee Agreement) with Seiniger Law Offices, P.A. (Counsel) under which 
Counsel agreed to provide legal counseling and representation on all matters related to 
Claimant's case in consideration ofthe contingent fee set forth in the Fee Agreement. Counsel 
provided extensive legal services as counselor and advocate from 2008-2009, during which 
Claimant received pennanent partial impainnent (PPI) benefits. Counsel ultimately negotiated a 
Lump Sum Settlement Agreement (LSSA) for Claimant. Counsel sought approval of 
contingency attorney fees on the PPI and LSSA benefits. 
A. THE COMMISSION DENIED ATTORNEY FEES ON PPI 
Claimant and Defendants submitted a "Lump Sum Settlement Agreement" to the 
Commission, which issued its "Order Approving in Part Lump Sum Agreement" (Order) on Jan. 
26,2010.3 The Order denied Counsel's request for approval of an attorney fee of$5098.53 for 
pennanent partial impainnent (pPI) benefits, stating that fees "have not been substantiated to the 
Commission as reasonable." The Commission Staff Letter (Jan. 13,2010) to which the Order 
refers stated that "it is unclear from the documentation submitted for consideration that Counsel 
was primarily or substantially responsible for obtaining those benefits.,,4 
B. THE COMMISSION DENIED COUNSEL'S MOTION FOR 
1 In regard to factual questions raised by the Commission at the Hearing for which Counsel Andrew Marsh did not 
have a present recollection, the second surgery was performed on 3/31/08. Counsel made written demand dated 
6/3/08 upon Dr. Montalbano for a PPI rating and permanent work restrictions. 
2 Affidavit of Andrew Marsh, Exhibit A. 
3 The Commission approved Counsel's request for an attorney fee of25% or $7225.00 for LSSA benefits. Note: The 
Form 1022 filed by Counsel contained a typographical error in a form spreadsheet used for calculating disbursement 
of settlement funds. This error was corrected in a letter to Scott McDougall of the Commission Staff (Jan. 26, 2010). 
4 IDAPA 17.02.08.033.01(c) states that an attorney seeking fees must demonstrate inter alia that "ii. The services of 
the attorney operated primarily or substantially to secure the fund out of which the attorney seeks to be paid." 
SEINIGER LAW OFFICES, P.A. CLAIMANT'S COUNSEL'S PAGE 3 OF 31 
942 W. Myrtle Street 
Boise, Idaho 83702 OPENING BRIEF 
(208) 345-1000 
L/'7f 
STATEMENT OF REASONS 
In response to the Order, Counsel filed a "Motion for Statement of Reasons for Denial of 
Attorney Fee Pursuant To IDAPA 17.02.08.033.03(a)"s on February 11,2010. The Commission 
issued its "Order Denying Motion for Statement of Reasons" on March 3,2010, stating only that 
"counsel failed to provide sufficient evidence demonstrating that he acted primarily or 
substantially to secure the PPI fund from which the fees were being requested." This statement is 
a conclusion;6 it is apparently the Commission's position that the IDAP A rule only requires a 
naked conclusion, and need not be clothed with actual reasons. 7 
Counsel submits that the Commission may not hold an attorney fee hearing pursuant to 
IDAP A 17.02.08.033.03(b) if it has failed to follow its own rule requiring reasons. 
II. ADMISSIONS BY COUNSEL 
A. COUNSEL CANNOT PROVE THAT HE WAS '''PRIMARILY 
OR SUBSTANTIALLY" RESPONSIBLE FOR THE PPI OR 
LSSA BENEFITS IF THE STANDARD IS ··THE BUT-FOR 
TEST" 
At the Hearing, Counsel filed "Claimant's Counsel's Admissions for Attorney Fee 
Hearing." The Admissions read as follows: 
For purposes of these proceedings, Counsel is using the phrase "but-for test" as 
shorthand for a standard of proof that means that in order to prove the element of 
"primarily or substantially" (IDAP A 17.02.08.033.01.c.ii.), Counsel is required to 
prove the causal link between Counsel's representation and the payment of 
benefits by demonstrating nothing less than that without his representation, the 
5 IDAPA 17.02.08.033.03(a) reads in pertinent part: "the Commission will designate staff members to determine 
reasonableness of the fee. The Commission staff will notify counsel in writing ofthe staffs informal determination, 
which shall state the reasons for the determination that the requested fee is not reasonable." 
6 The legal dictionary at http://dictionary.lp.findlaw.com defines "conclusion" as "an opinion or judgment offered 
without supporting evidence; speci!: an allegation made in a pleading that is not based on facts set forth in the 
~leading." 
The same legal dictionary defmes "reason" as "an underlying ground, justification, purpose, motive, or 
inducement. Example: required to provide reasons for the termination in writing." A statement of reasons must 
include the underlying grounds, i.e. a factual and legal basis, neither of which was ever provided to Counsel. 
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benefits would not have been paid. 
Counsel makes the following admissions: 
1. For purposes of these proceedings only, and without waiving the right to 
raise the constitutionality of the applicable IDAP A attorney fee rules on appeal, 
Seiniger Law Offices admits that it cannot prove that its attorneys were 
"primarily or substantially" responsible for securing the permanent partial 
impairment (PPI) benefit and the other benefits paid as consideration for 
lump sum settlement (LSS) if the standard of proof is the "but-for test." 
(emphasis in original) 
B. COUNSEL CANNOT PROVE THAT THE BENEFITS WERE 
--DISPUTED" BY THE DEFENDANTS 
The Admissions continue as follows: 
2. For purposes ofthese proceedings only, and without waiving the right to 
raise the constitutionality of the applicable IDAP A attorney fee rules on appeal, 
Seiniger Law Offices admits that it cannot prove that the Defendants 
"disputed" the permanent partial impairment (PPI) benefit and the other 
benefits paid as consideration for lump sum settlement (LSS) before the 
Defendants paid those benefits. (emphasis in original) 
The Commission appears to be requiring that there be proof of a "dispute" between claimants 
and defendants before it will allow attorney fees. 8 This position is directly contrary to controlling 
case law.9 
III. ISSUES 
Counsel's position includes the following: 
• Counsel is constitutionally and legally entitled to the claimed attorney fees in full. 
8 17.0.08.033.01.a. Note that the defInition of "Available Funds," upon which the Commission appears to rely, does 
not require that there be an affmnative dispute; it merely excludes "compensation ... not disputed to be owed prior 
to claimant's agreement to retain the attorney." Moreover, Counsel received a letter from Scott McDougall dated 
1 0/22/09 in Drotzman v. Coors Brewing, LI.C. No. 06-006711 in which he appears to require "documentation that 
the specifIc benefIt was disputed or delayed." Counsel could fInd no legal authority to support the Commission's 
apparent position that proof of a "dispute" must be in documentary form. Throughout the history of American 
jurisprudence, courts have admitted evidence even if it is in non-written forms, such as testimonial or demonstrative. 
9 The Commission may not limit representation to "disputed matters." Curr v. Curr, 864 P.2d 132 (1993) 
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• The Commission's regulations relating to the definitions of "Available Funds" and the 
associated standard defming them as benefits "primarily and substantially" made 
available as a result of the efforts of Counsel are vague and unconstitutional as written 
and/or as interpreted or applied under controlling case law laid down by the Idaho 
Supreme Court. 
• The Fee Agreement involved was reasonable, especially when viewed at the time into 
which it was entered. 
• Counsel and Claimant are constitutionally entitled to have their Fee Agreement honored 
unless it is patently unreasonable (outside controlling case law or outside any of the 
IDAP A rules that are valid). 
• The services provided by Counsel were lawful, important, valuable, and compensable 
pursuant to controlling case law. 
These, then, are among the central issues. lO The dollar amounts of the attorney fees at issue are 
$5,098.53 on PPI benefits, and $7,225.00 on the Lump Sum Settlement Agreement. 11 
IV. CONTROLLING LEGAL AUTHORITY 
The argument which follows is based upon the premise that the constitutional holdings in 
Curr v. Curr, 124 Idaho 686, 864 P.2d 132 (1993) control the rights of claimants' counsel in 
workers' compensation cases. Curr has not been implicitly overruled or limited by the Idaho 
Supreme Court, and remains good law. It controls the bounds of discretion of the Commission in 
determining the reasonableness of a claim for attorney fees and other aspects of the authority 
granted to the Commission and the exercise of that authority. 
V.CONSTITUTIONALITY 
10 Other issues were raised in Counsel's "Request for Hearing on Order Approving Lump Sum Agreement," on file 
with the Commission and incorporated herein by reference (due to rules limiting brieflength). 
11 The reason that attorney fees on lump sum benefits as well as PPI benefits are at issue is that the Commission may 
not "cherry-pick" which types of benefits are subject to its standards. See discussion irifra. 
SEINIGER LAW OFFICES, P.A. CLAIMANT'S COUNSEL'S PAGE 6 OF 31 
94~ W. Myrtle Street OPENING BRIEF BOise, Idaho 83702 
(208) 345·1000 
A. THE COMMISSION MUST COMPLY WITH 
CONSTITUTIONAL REQUIREMENTS IN ADOPTING, 
INTERPRETING, AND IMPLEMENTING ITS REGULATIONS 
The Commission may not adopt a regulation that clearly flies in the face of the 
constitutional limitations on its authority set forth in Curr and may not apply its "primarily or 
substantially" rule in such a way as to patently violate that authority. Counsel is aware of no 
legal authority to the contrary. 
B. THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF CLAIMANT'S 
COUNSEL AND CLAIMANT ARE GOVERNED BY CURR 
These are the holdings from Curr, set forth in quotes (emphasis added): 
• For an attorney fee agreement, "Reasonableness ... derives from the totality of the 
circumstances from the perspective of the parties at the time that the fee agreement 
was made." Curr, at 690. 
• The "parties to a contract have a property interest in the subject matter of the 
contract that is protectable both under the Contract Clause and the Due Process Clause 
of the United States Constitution." Curr, at 691-692. 
• In Idaho, "the right to follow a recognized and useful occupation is protected by a 
constitutional guarantee ofliberty under the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. 
Constitution and Idaho Const. art. 1, § 13." 
• The Commission must permit the Claimant to "compensate an attorney for acting solely 
as a counselor." 
• The Commission must "recognize [advocacy] efforts that do not generate monetary 
awards such as [sometimes] obtaining permission for medical care or procuring an 
impairment rating." 
• The Commission may not make suspect an attorney's "integrity in the eyes of their 
clients." 
• The Commission may not limit attorney fees to "new money." 
• The Commission may not limit representation to "disputed matters." 
• The Commission "must have clearly articulated evidentiary standards that will be 
used at the hearing. . . and formally publish clear guidelines upon which it will base the 
fee modifications." Curr, at 692. 
• "This Court has recognized that a reasonable contingent fee must be 'sufficiently high 
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to compensate the lawyer not only for the reasonable value of the time he or she 
anticipates devoting to the particular lawsuit, but also for the time devoted to other 
lawsuits undertaken on the same basis but unsuccessful in result.'" Curr, at 693. 
Counsel submits, and the Commission essentially acknowledges in its recent decision in 
Kulm v. Mercy Medical Center, IC No. 06-012770 (May 20,2010), that its interpretation of 
Rhodes and its application of its IDAP A rules are contrary to Curro Counsel believes that Curr 
has not been implicitly overruled by Rhodes V. Indus. Comm., 125 Idaho 139, 868 P.2d 467 
(1993), Mancilla V. Greg, 131 Idaho 685, 963 P.2d 368 (1998), or Johnson V. Boise Cascade 
Corp., 134 Idaho 350, 2 P.3d 735 (2000). None of these cases even mention Curr, much less 
address the constitutional questions that were raised in Curr-although in Kulm the Commission 
curiously omits any mention ofthis important detaiL 
In the Kulm decision (p. 15), the Commission asserts that it has not "determined that Curr 
v. Curr, supra, has been overruled by Rhodes, Mancilla and/or Johnson." Yet, a few paragraphs 
before this, it concludes that Rhodes did overrule the "new money" provision of Curr: "From 
the Rhodes decision, the Industrial Commission can discern nothing in the language of that case 
that would suggest that the former provision limiting an award of attorney's fees to 25% of 'new 
money' did not pass constitutional muster." But in the very next sentence, the Commission 
admits that there is room for doubt about its interpretation of Rhodes: "even if it be assumed that 
the majority in Rhodes only intended to narrowly address the constitutionality of a 25% cap (not 
a 25% cap on 'new money'), it would seem that the constitutional analysis applied to that portion 
ofthe regulation would also apply to the balance of the regulation." (Kulm, p. 14) 
The Commission then launches into an analysis of the rational basis test, and predicts 
how the Supreme Court would rule on the constitutionality of the regulations: "nothing in 
Rhodes seems to suggest that the Court found, or would find, that only certain of the provisions 
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of the former IDAPA 17.01.01.803.d are constitutional." All this occurs despite the fact that it is 
black-letter law that the Commission has no power to interpret constitutionality, and its 
discretion is limited by the bounds of controlling case law on constitutional issues. 
C. THE COMMISSION'S APPLICATION OF ITS RULES 
VIOLATES THE "CLEARLY ARTICULATED EVIDENTIARY 
STANDARDS" REQUIREMENT OF CURR 
As regards the IDAP A phrase "operated primarily or substantially to secure the fund out 
of which the attorney seeks to be paid," the Commission created a defmition in the Kulm 
decision, p. 28. For example, they define "primarily" in this way: "that he originally, or initially, 
took action that secured the fund ... from which he hopes to be paid." In doing so, the 
Commission overtly contradicts itself. First, it states: 
For example, it is possible that an attorney could undertake some action in a 
particular case that might be deemed to be responsible for initiating or originating 
the fund from which he hopes to be paid, without being able to satisfy his burden 
of showing that his efforts were "in the main" responsible for obtaining the fund 
from which he hopes to be paid. 
The clear implication is that as long as the attorney initiates or originates the fund, he doesn't 
have to show that his efforts were responsible for obtaining it. 
But a few paragraphs later, the Commission illustrates their Scenario No.1, in which the 
physician gives claimant an impairment rating because he remembers that earlier in the case he 
got a letter from claimant's attorney requesting it. The Commission states: 
Attorney may be primarily responsible for securing the impairment rating, since it 
was his letter that originated, or initiated the rating. However, it is important to 
note that in order to meet his burden of proof, counsel would need to demonstrate 
that there existed some nexus between his letter to the physician and the 
physician's action. In other words, counsel would need to demonstrate that the 
physician acted because of counsel's letter. 
In Scenario No.1, unlike their previous example, the Commission states that even though the 
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attorney is "primarily responsible for securing the impairment rating," in addition he must 
"demonstrate that the physician acted because of counsel's letter," i.e. he must "satisfy his burden 
of showing that his efforts were responsible for obtaining" the rating. In other words, Scenario 
No. 1 requires a showing of "primarily AND substantially"-even though the actual IDAP A rule 
uses the disjunctive "or," not the conjunctive "and." 
Incredibly, Scenario No.1 is actually even more confusing than this. First, the 
Commission states that the physician gave the rating because a/the attorney's request letter 
("physician remembers counsel's letter, and generates a letter to counsel in which he gives 
claimant her impairment rating"). This certainly sounds like the very definition of a nexus. But 
two sentences later, the Commission concludes that no attorney fee is allowed since there did not 
exist "some nexus between his letter to the physician and the physician'S action." Kulm, p. 29. 
Counsel submits that the Commission's attempted definitions do not meet the "clearly 
articulated evidentiary standards" requirement of Curro 
On a related topic, the Affidavit of Andrew Marsh submitted at the Hearing, Section 3.5.3 
et seq., goes into great detail about the problems with the Commission's use and application of 
the term "disputed." The Affidavit shows that the Curr precedent is not being followed. 
On another related topic, the phrase "clearly articulated evidentiary standards" would 
include a standard for the level of proof required of Counsel, which according to IDAP A 
17.0.08.033.03.d. is a preponderance ofthe evidence. This is defmed by law as "evidence that is 
of greater weight, or is more convincing, than that offered in opposition to it.,,12 In terms of 
12 'A ''preponderance of the evidence" is evidence that, when weighed with that opposed to it, has more convincing 
force and from which results a greater probability of truth.' Harris v. Electrical Wholesale, 141 Idaho 1,3, 105 P.3d 
267,269 (2004). Also, "A preponderance of evidence is evidence that is of greater weight, or is more convincing, 
than that offered in opposition to it. The term does not mean preponderance in amount." 32A c.Js. Evidence § 
1628. Clearly, the "probability of truth" is not just a function of the supporting evidence offered, but also of the 
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Counsel's and Claimant's right to have their Fee Agreement upheld, there was no contrary 
evidence offered at the hearing, nor is there any contrary evidence in the record. It is well-settled 
law that a tribunal may not make a ruling for which there is no factual support, so on that basis 
alone the Commission may not deny the request for attorney fees. 13 
D. COUNSEL'S ATTORNEY FEE REQUEST IS REASONABLE 
AS DEFINED BY CURR 
When an attorney takes a workers' compensation case, the risk of no recovery is great. 
These risks are set forth in detail in the Marsh Affidavit, Section 3 et. seq. 
For example, in trying to decide whether to take a case, an attorney must speculate as to 
whether the injured worker will eventually have a PPI rating; if so, whether the surety will 
dispute it; and if disputed, whether it will be possible to prevail at a hearing so that the claimant 
will actually receive benefits from which the attorney can take a fee. Even an experienced 
physician would be unwilling to attempt such a prediction: "It is impossible for a layman or 
even for a physician to know, or to accurately predict, whether an injured worker will ultimately 
have an impairment rating, or what the percentage of that rating might be, until the injured 
worker has completed his or her medical treatment." (Affidavit of Dr. Richard Radnovich, 
Exhibit 5.) 
Given the risks and the unknowable factors, the Supreme Court recognizes that 
"Reasonableness [of a fee agreement] ... derives from the totality of the circumstances from the 
perspective of the parties at the time that the fee agreement was made." Curr, at 690. For 
weight of the evidence "offered in opposition to it." If there is no evidence offered in opposition, a tribunal may not 
make a ruling contrary to that of the evidence that is offered. Pierstor./f, infra. 
13 Uncontradicted testimony of a credible witness, unless his testimony is inherently improbable or rendered so by 
facts and circumstances disclosed at the hearing, cannot arbitrarily be disregarded. Pierstorffv. Gray's Auto Shop 74 
P.2d 171, 175 (Idaho 1937). Since its first enunciation by the Idaho Supreme Court, the "PierstorffRule" has 
become ironclad law in Idaho. State v. Broadhead, 120 Idaho 141, 163,814 P.2d 401, 423 (Idaho, 1991). 
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example, if at the time of contracting for an attorney the contracting parties had reasonable 
concerns that legal counseling or advocacy might be needed to address existing or potential 
disputes or issues, the benefit of hindsight may not be used for a fmding that it was unreasonable 
to so contract. 
In the instant case, the evidence shows that at the time of contracting, Claimant thought 
he needed help;14 Claimant's Counsel agreed to help him; and Counsel did provide legal services 
to him. That more than meets the reasonableness test of Curro The parties' decision to contract 
for legal service may not lawfully be second-guessed by the Commission under the guise of 
belatedly discovering a basis for the denial of a claim for attorney fees. 
E. THE SUPREME COURT SPECIFICALLY ALLOWS A 
REASONABLE CONTINGENCY FEE 
"This Court has recognized that a reasonable contingent fee must be 'sufficiently high to 
compensate the lawyer not only for the reasonable value of the time he or she anticipates 
devoting to the particular lawsuit, but also for the time devoted to other lawsuits undertaken on 
the same basis but unsuccessful in result.'" Curr, at 693. In other words, Idaho specifically 
allows contingency fees to compensate claimants' attorneys for the risk factors referenced above, 
in addition to the value of their time and expertise. This applies to the instant case. 
VI.ETHICS AND PUBLIC POLICY 
A. THE COMMISSION'S APPROACH CREATES ETHICAL 
PROBLEMS FOR ATTORNEYS 
The Commission's approach creates a myriad of serious ethical questions for both 
claimant's attorneys and defense attorneys. These include: 
14 See Claimant's testimony at Hearing, pages 12-13. 
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• Since the Commission appears to be ignoring the Idaho Supreme Court's unequivocal 
prohibition oflimiting attorney fees to "new money," is it now the Commission's 
position that an attorney can be required to provide legal services without compensation? 
• Since the Commission appears to be ignoring the Idaho Supreme Court's unequivocal 
prohibition of limiting attorney fees to "disputed" matters, is it now the Commission's 
position that an attorney is not allowed to be compensated for services provided as 
counselor and advocate in the absence of a dispute? 
• Although the Idaho Rules of Professional Conduct allow an attorney to limit the scope of 
his representation, is a claimant's attorney ethically permitted to accept responsibility for 
a case and but limit his representation to only matters that become disputed? 
• If an attorney is ethically permitted to so limit his representation, may he decline to 
discuss certain issues with the defendants, and limit his discussions to disputed matters? 
• If an attorney is ethically permitted to so limit his representation, may he give permission 
to opposing counsel to speak directly with the claimant as to undisputed matters? If so, 
would opposing counsel be ethically permitted to do so despite ethical prohibitions 
against contact with a party represented by counsel? 
In addition, the Commission's approach automatically creates a potential conflict of interest 
between claimant's attorney and claimant anytime the Commission declines to approve an 
attorney fee that is otherwise reasonable under controlling case law. This forces an attorney into 
a fee hearing in which attorney and client have conflicting fmancial interests, and contravenes 
the Supreme Court's holding that the Commission may not make suspect the attorneys' 
"integrity in the eyes of their clients." Curr, at 692. The Claimant acknowledged this concern in 
his testimony at the Hearing, p. 13: 
17 Q Do you understand what we're here for today? 
18 A Yeah. I mean, I understand they need to be 
19 paid. And I understand, you know, where you guys are 
20 coming from as well. So, I mean, I'm kind of in an 
. 21 awkward situation. 
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B. THE COMMISSION IS ACTING IN VIOLATION OF 
PUBLIC POLICY 
The Commission has been interpreting or applying IDAP A 17.02.08.033 in such a way 
that it brings about the following results, all of which are against public policy: 
• Claimants are less likely to be able to fInd counsel to take their case. 
• Attorneys are discouraged from taking workers' compensation cases because the 
Commission does not honor their fee agreements with their clients.15 
• The attorney-client relationship is damaged by the Commission's creation of a conflict of 
interest between attorney and client each time the Commission or its Staff fInds the 
requested attorney fee to be unreasonable, and by the implication in each such instance 
that the attorney acted unfairly, unethically, or unreasonably. 
• The confIdence of claimants and attorneys in the legal system is undermined when the 
Commission, via its website and its publications (see discussion infra), strongly 
encourages claimants to seek legal advice, but at the end of the case tells claimants and 
attorneys that it will not honor their fee agreement, and/or tells them that portions of the 
attorneys' services were of no value or not of compensable value. 
• When attorneys discontinue taking workers' compensation cases because the 
Commission does not honor their fee agreements, and when as a result claimants are 
unable to fInd counsel to take their case and as a result do not receive their full benefIts 
under the workers' compensation law, the burden of medical and fInancial care for these 
unassisted claimants shifts from the insurers who collected employers' premiums to 
various public welfare and private charity organizations. 16 
A related set of public policy concerns is whether the Commission should be prohibited from 
15 Making it impossible for an attorney to be able to afford to practice in the plaintiffs side of workers' 
compensation law is a violation of an attorney's right to practice his profession. In Idaho, "the right to follow a 
recognized and useful occupation is protected by a constitutional guarantee ofliberty under the Fourteenth 
Amendment to the U.S. Constitution and Idaho Const. art. 1, § B." Curr, at 692. 
16 Put another way, injured workers who do not receive their full medical and income benefits due to lack of access 
to legal counsel do not just disappear; they still need help, so they surface at emergency rooms for medical care and 
welfare departments for income problems. The net cost to society is same-it is just that the cost of caring for 
injured workers is shifted from insurance companies who are protected from having to pay on policy claims (even 
though they collected premiums) to other governmental and charitable institutions. This shifting of the cost is clearly 
counter to public policy. 
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interpreting or applying IDAP A 17.02.08.033, including especially the "dispute" language of 
.Ol(a), in such a way that one or more ofthe following results: 
• The plaintiffs bar is encouraged to work toward finding ways to foster, or at least to 
demonstrate and document, that there was a "fight, contest, or dispute,,17 between the 
claimant and defendants. 
• The more reputable attorneys are penalized, because they are less likely to have benefits 
disputed by the surety, and therefore, less likely to receive approval from the 
Commission for their attorney fees (and less likely to take on injured workers' cases in 
the future). 
• The surety is essentially put in charge of determining how much a claimant's attorney 
will be paid, because attorney fees are based more on the surety's decisions of what to 
"dispute" than on the parameters of Curr or any of the factors enumerated in Rule 1.5 of 
the Idaho Rules of Professional Conduct regarding the value of the attorney's services. 
The Idaho Supreme Court has recognized that public policy favors ensuring that claimants have 
access to counsel. 18 Counsel submits that the Supreme Court has never intended, nor would 
public policy favor, depriving Idaho's injured workers of their constitutional right to seek the 
advice and advocacy of counsel at every stage of a worker's com1?ensation matter. 
In addition, the Commission's interpretation and application of its IDAP A rules leads to 
results that are contrary to the legislative intent set forth in I.C. 72-201 of "sure and certain relief 
for injured workmen" in enacting the worker's compensation law, and contrary to the delegation 
of power under I.C. 72-508 to "promulgate reasonable rules and regulations for effecting the 
17 The "fight" quote is the Commission's position as set forth in "Order Denying Reconsideration," Sandra Perez v. 
Idaho Fresh Pale, Inc. and Liberty Northwest Insurance Corp., IC No. 2005-530757 (9/18/09) 
18 The Curr Court noted that "two general philosophies for the Commission to consider" are to "encourage claimants 
to pursue rightful legal claims and attorneys to take on such claimants' interests. Hogaboom, 107 Idaho at 17, 684 
P.2d at 994." Curr v. Curr, 124 Idaho 686, 693, 864 P.2d 132, 139 
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purposes of this act.,,19 
C. THE COMMISSION MAY NOT ENCOURAGE CLAIMANTS 
TO SEEK LEGAL ADVICE, WHILE FAILING TO DISCLOSE 
THAT IT WILL NOT ALLOW THEM TO PAY THEIR LEGAL 
ADVISORS 
The Commission openly admits that its current application of it regulations is designed to 
"make it impossible for certain injured workers who desire counsel to fmd someone who is 
\villing to take their case for the small recompense," if any, that the Commission vvill permit. 
Kulm, p. 42. 
This is directly at odds with its own web site and publications (Marsh Affidavit, Section 
6.2.) On almost every page, the Commission officially recommends that claimants seek legal 
advice; warns claimants of the complexity of the law; and officially urges claimants to talk to an 
attorney. The Commission then tells them exactly how to go about getting a lawyer. Moreover, 
the Commission also makes it clear that its Staff cannot give legal advice 
It light of the Kulm decision, it is unclear why the Commission recommends that injured 
workers seek legal counseling, when the Commission knows, and the plaintiff s bar knows, that 
the Commission will no longer permit claimants to pay their attorneys solely for counseling and 
other efforts that do not generate monetary awards. Counsel respectfully submits that in the 
interest of fairness and full disclosure to the public and to injured workers, the Commission 
should disclose in its publications that under their rules, it may be impossible for injured workers 
to fmd someone to take their case. The disclosure should also include a statement that since 
Commission Staff cannot give legal advice, there is no way for certain injured workers to get 
19 "Without clear guidelines nestled in appropriately promulgated regulations, attorneys' actions are plagued by 
doubt, which may have a chilling effect on the underlying purpose of the Workers' Compensation Act that the 
Commission is constrained to promote." Curr at 691-692. 
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legal advice unless they can pay an hourly fee20 or find someone to do the work pro bono. 
In sum, public policy and fundamental fairness prohibit the Commission from 
encouraging claimants to seek legal advice, and then preventing their advisors from getting paid. 
VII. CONSISTENCY IN APPLYING STANDARDS 
A. BECAUSE THERE ARE MANY CIRCUMSTANCES WHERE 
AN ATTORNEY FEE MUST BE APPROVED EVEN WHERE 
THE ELEMENT OF "PRIMARILY OR SUBSTANTIALLY" IS 
ABSENT, THE REQUIREMENT OF THIS ELEMENT CANNOT 
BE SAID TO BE ABSOLUTE 
Is it the Commission's position that the element of "primarily or substantially" must be 
applied even where doing so would lead to an unjust or unintended result? Counsel is aware of 
no authority that would support such an illogical interpretation of the workers' compensation 
statute and controlling case law. It would make no sense to assume that the legislature, in 
granting rule-making authority to the Commission (I.C. 72-508), intended that the rules be 
applicable in such a way that the interests of justice are intentionally not served. 
Let us examine how this issue would come up in practice: John Doe is a math teacher. 
One day at work, his little finger gets pinched in the door of his classroom and severely injured. 
The surety accepts his claim and starts paying medical bills and TTDs. Shortly thereafter, John 
goes to an attorney. The services he seeks are: an explanation of his rights and benefits under the 
law and how the law applies to the facts of his case; an explanation of work comp procedure and 
the statute oflimitations; an explanation of his TTD rights and whether the surety is paying the 
correct amount; and help with some medical bills that have not been paid by the surety, and help 
with the collection agency that is pursuing him thereto. John has no money \vith which to pay an 
20 Suppose that a claimant signs an hourly fee agreement, and later receives PPI benefits. May the claimant pay his 
attorney the hourly fees from the PPI fimds? Under Curr, the answer would be "yes," but based on the 
Commission's recent stance, even this seems to be in question. 
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hourly fee.· The parties sign a contingency fee agreement including a clause allowing the attorney 
to be paid from the PPI award. The attorney provides these services and more: he discovers that 
John does not know about his right to medical mileage reimbursement or prescription co-pay 
reimbursement. Also, although the surety says it hasn't refused the primary treating physician's 
referral to a hand specialist, many weeks have gone by and still no approval has been 
forthcoming. Also, John doesn't know that he might have the right to a prosthesis. The attorney 
also straightens out the problem of the physician prescribing an antidepressant or sleep 
medication based on John's reaction to the injury, but the surety would not pay it because they 
claim there is no proofthat John was not depressed before the accident. The attorney also advises 
John on how to handle himself while attending the surety's IME appointment. He also advises 
him on the law regarding disability beyond impairment. During this time, infection sets in, 
resulting in amputation of John's fmger. After many months of the attorney providing counseling 
and advocacy services, John is found MMI and gets a 7.5% statutory PPI rating for loss of a 
finger. The surety pays it on time. John returns to work as a teacher and has no disability beyond 
impairment and no lump sum settlement agreement because the loss of his finger does not 
prevent him from teaching. 
In retrospect, it is clear that from the very moment of John's accident, he was going to be 
entitled to a statutory PPI benefit of7.5%. Is it the Commission's position that because the 
element of "primarily or substantially" could not be met for the PPI rating, that the attorney is 
not entitled to any compensation for his services? 
Counsel submits that a reasonable person would find such a result to be patently unjust, 
and certainly not what the legislature intended in passing the statute. In that event, it cannot 
possibly be the law in Idaho that the element of "primarily or substantially" is a sine qua non for 
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the approval of an otherwise reasonable attorney fee. 
Therefore, if there are some circumstances where this portion of the ID AP A rules cannot 
be applied, then there can be no requirement that it must always be applied. 
Put another way, if the element of "primarily or substantially" is a requirement in every 
situation, even for the fairly common scenario above, then either the IDAP A rule itself or the 
Commission's application of it must be unconstitutional. 
Is it now the rule in Idaho that regardless of how much work an attorney performs for an 
injured client before the PPI rating is issued, the attorney may not receive any fee from the PPI 
unless the Commission finds that he meets their definition of "primarily or substantially?" 
Counsel respectfully submits that it would be helpful to injured workers and to the plaintiff s bar 
to have this question answered. 
B. THE COMMISSION APPEARS TO TREAT FEES ON 
BENEFITS OTHER THAN PPI INCONSISTENTLY, BECAUSE 
FOR THESE IT DOES NOT REQUIRE PROOF OF THE 
ELEMENT OF "PRIMARILY OR SUBSTANTIALLY" 
If the Commission's approach is that it is not reasonable to take an attorney fee on a PPI 
where it concludes that the element of "primarily or substantially" was not met, then it must 
analyze all other benefit types in the same way, because the IDAP A rules do not distinguish one 
benefit category from another?! So for example, let us assume that an attorney has vigorously 
represented a claimant for a year, at the end of which the surety offers a lump sum settlement of 
21 Curr requires "clearly articulated evidentiary standards ... and clear guidelirles" for determirlirlg the 
reasonableness of attorney fees. Curr at 692. As regards the Commission's irlterpretation of the elements of 
"primarily or substantially" and "disputed," it must apply the same level of proof and the same standards to requests 
for attorney fees based on PPD benefits obtairled as it applies to PPI benefits obtairled. Since on the face of it the 
"primarily and substantially" standard is applicable to all benefit categories, the Commission may not apply the 
standard to certain selected categories of benefits (PPI) to the exclusion of others (PPD) for the purpose of 
disallowing attorney fees. To do so would arbitrarily discrimirlate based on the type of benefit obtained. 
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$5000. Ultimately, the case is settled for $12,000. It could be argued that the attorney can only 
claim an attorney fee on the $7000 difference, because the Commission's "but-for" definition of 
"primarily or substantially" has not been met for the LSSA benefits. But in three decades of 
practice, Counsel knows of no case where the Commission has done that. This shows that the 
Commission inconsistently applies its standard of "primarily or substantially" depending on the 
type of benefit. 
C. THE COMMISSION DECRIES THE USE OF SPECULATION 
IN DECIDING AN ATTORNEY FEE CASE, BUT RELIES ON 
SPECULATION IN RENDERING ITS DECISIONS 
In Kulm, the Commission decries the use of speculation in attorney fee cases: 
That burden is not met by engaging in speculation as to what might have 
happened absent attorney involvement. ... to approve an award on the basis of 
this argument would require the Commission to engage in pure speculation. Kulm 
at p. 31. 
To propose that it was the preparation of Dr. Radnovich's rating that produced the 
Rogers' impairment rating would require the Commission to veer into the realm of 
speculation. Kulm at p. 39. 
There is no way to establish a nexus between Counse1's actions and the creation of 
the PPI award that does not require speculation. Kulm at p. 39. 
But in the Drotzman decision, p. 16, the Commission itself uses speculation, after first decrying 
it again: 
Counsel does not meet this burden by speculating that Surety might not have 
acted appropriately in his absence ... 
As respects the 6% PPI rating, there is a dearth of evidence that Counsel obtained 
for Claimant anything that he was not already going to get absent the retention of 
Counsel's services . 
. In Drotzman, the Commission says that Counsel may not speculate as to what Surety would have 
done in his absence, but then a few sentences later the Commission speculates as to what 
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Claimant "was already going to get" from Surety in Counsel's absence. 
On the same page, the Commission speculates as to what efforts Counsel made to get 
Claimant's PPI paid early: 
Counsel was only responsible for obtaining Surety's agreement to make that 
payment in one, as opposed to many, payments. This was, in all likelihood, 
accomplished by a single phone call, or short letter. 
The Commission then uses this "likelihood" as a basis to deny even a partial attorney fee. These 
inconsistencies make it appear that the use of speculation is arbitrarily allowed when necessary 
to justify a desired conclusion. 
D. THE COMMISSION ALLOWS NON-LEGAL SERVICE 
PROVIDERS TO BE PAID, EVEN IF THEY DID NOT CAUSE 
ANY BENEFIT TO INURE TO CLAIMANTS 
In workers' compensation, the Commission allows all non-legal service providers to be 
paid for their services, regardless of whether there is a nexus between their services and a benefit 
to the claimant: 
• A physical therapist, even if the therapy does not help the claimant. 
• A retraining provider, even if the claimant ultimately is unable to ajob in that field. 
• A doctor, even if surgery fails to cure the claimant-or even if it kills the patient! 
• The defendant's counsel, even ifhe loses the case. 
In the entire field of workers' compensation service providers, it is only the claimant's attorney 
who has to "prove" that his services were "primarily or substantially" responsible for causing a 
benefit to inure to the claimant, in order to be paid. 
VIII. THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL 
A. IT IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL TO ALLOW DEFENDANTS, 
BUT NOT PLAINTIFFS, TO HIRE AND PAY COUNSEL 
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Now let us view this same issue-whether service providers in a workers' compensation 
matter are allowed to be paid-from the standpoint of the litigants. The Commission allows 
defendants--employers and sureties-to hire and pay the attorneys of their choice without any 
limitation whatsoever. It is only the plaintiffs (the claimants) who must worry about whether 
their fee agreement will be upheld and whether there will be attorneys willing to take their case 
(given the Commission's current stance). 
Moreover, the Commission allows employers and sureties to pay their counsel for the 
mere giving of legal advice without proof that the advice saved them money, but will not allow 
claimants to pay their younsel for giving legal advice without proof that the advice gained them 
some money. Counsel is aware of no legal authority for the proposition that constitutional 
guarantees of equal protection and the right to counsel do not prohibit the promulgation of 
separate standards for litigants in regard to the right to hire and pay counsel. 
B. IDAHO RECOGNIZES A RIGHT TO COUNSEL 
The Idaho Supreme Court has said: "This court noted ... that '[t]he elements of the 
constitutional guaranty of due process in its procedural aspect are notice and an opportunity to be 
heard or defend before a competent tribunal in an orderly proceeding adapted to the nature of the 
case'; including, the court stated, 'the right of representation by counsel. '" Frizzell v. 
Swafford, 104 Idaho 823, at 827, 663 P.2d 1125 at 1129 (1983) (internal citations omitted, 
emphasis added) Contrast the Supreme Court's position Vilith that of the Commission: 
[T]he current rule may make it impossible for certain injured workers who 
desire counsel to find someone who is willing to take their case for the small 
recompense that the particular facts of that case may offer. Kulm, p. 42 
If the Commission's holding is allowed to stand, the bedrock right to representation by counsel 
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will have been repealed in Idaho. 
IX. VALUING LEGAL SERVICES 
A. THE COMMISSION MAY NOT ELIMINATE AN ENTIRE 
CLASS OF LEGAL SERVICES AS PER SE UNREASONABLE 
Returning now to our example of John Doe, under the Commission's current approach of 
not allowing attorneys to be paid for services that do not generate monetary awards, poor John 
will be unable to fmd an attorney to take his case. This would have the effect of disenfranchising 
an entire class of injured workers (accidents of the John-Doe type) from the right of an injured 
worker in Idaho to hire and pay the attorney of his choice. 
Assuming, as we must, that the Commission's determination of the reasonableness of a 
requested attorney fee is an exercise of discretion, then the Commission may not hold that certain 
legal services are per se unreasonable. For example, there is no authority for the position that a 
legal service provided to a claimant that does not result in the receipt of a workers' compensation 
benefit is per se unreasonable; such a holding would clearly be outside the Commission's 
discretionary power (and contrary to Curr). 
The Commission may not hold that the class consisting of all of the legal services 
rendered to a claimant prior to the issuance of a PPI rating are of no value or have no 
compensable value. Curr supports this position: the Commission must "recognize efforts that do 
not generate monetary awards such as obtaining permission for medical care" while claimant is 
in the period of recovery and before a PPI rating is issued. 
Perhaps the law allows the Commission to find that a particular legal service as 
performed had no value-but it may not find that a service should never have its value 
considered. 
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B. THE COMMISSION MAY NOT ARBITRARILY FIND THAT 
AN ATTORNEY'S SERVICES ARE OF NO VALUE 
The facts set forth in the Affidavit of Andrew Marsh and its attached Exhibits 
demonstrate that Counsel provided extensive legal services to Claimant. For the Commission to 
choose to dishonor Counsel's contract with Claimant and disallow attorney fees on the PPI 
benefit obtained would be tantamount to a finding that the services of Counsel (rendered before a 
PPI rating) were of absolutely no value to Claimant, and in effect that attorney should not have 
performed these services. It would also be tantamount to a finding that Counsel's exercise of 
professional judgment, in agreeing to accept a case and in providing legal advice and advocacy, 
was erroneous. Counsel knows of no authority to the contrary. 
It would be helpful to the plaintiff's bar if the Commission would publish a list of what 
legal services it considers to be of no compensable value to a claimant. Counsel also respectfully 
asks this question: Is there any amount of work that an attorney could perform prior to a PPI 
rating that would ever be enough to warrant approval of an attorney fee on the PPI benefit, in 
circumstances where the Commission believes that the attorney was not "primarily or 
substantially" responsible for obtaining the PPI? 
C. THE LA W DOES NOT REQUIRE THAT THERE BE A 
DIRECT RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE SERVICES 
PROVIDED AND THE FUNDS FROM WHICH AN ATTORNEY 
FEE MAY BE PAID 
Can an attorney provide a particular legal service to a claimant and get paid for that 
service out of benefits that did not result from the providing of that particular service? The 
answer has to be yes, because to say otherwise would be to say that services that do not lead 
directly to a benefit fund are not compensable-which would be in direct opposition to Curr: 
SEINIGER LAW OFFICES, P.A. 
942 W. Myrtle Street 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
(208) 345-1000 
CLAIMANT'S COUNSEL'S 
OPENING BRIEF 
PAGE 24 OF31 
The Commission must "recognize efforts that do not generate monetary awards." 
In other words, an attorney can be paid for a legal service even ifthere is not a one-to-one 
correlation between that service and the fund out of which the attorney will be paid for that 
service. 
Indeed, there is nothing in Curr that says that reasonableness of an attorney fee is a 
function of the source of the fee. Thus, the fee for services provided can come from any source, 
regardless of the benefit category-TTD, PPI, medical, or lump sum-ofthat source. 
In fact, isn't this what the parties contemplate22 when they enter into a fee agreement? 
The understanding is that the attorney will provide whatever services the claimant needs, 
including services that "do not generate monetary awards," and will be paid out of whatever 
contractually-anticipated funds are received after being retained. And according to Curr, these 
funds cannot be limited to "new money." Clearly, the IDAP A rules may not be interpreted or 
applied in any way that requires a one-to-one correlation between a legal service and the funds 
from which the attorney is paid.23 
X.DE NOVO HEARINGS AND DISCOVERY 
A. THE ATTORNEY FEE HEARING WAS NOT DE NOVO 
The attorney fee hearing held pursuant to 17.02.08.033.03(b) was not a de novo hearing. 
Prior to such hearing, the Commissioners had already received an ex parte presentation of 
evidence and legal reasoning from Commission Staff, and had already decided that they agreed 
22 Remember, Curr defines reasonableness of a fee as function of what the parties contemplated when the fee 
agreement is signed. 
23 Note that there is nothing in the IDAP A rules prohibiting references to "the funds" from being read as applying to 
the aggregate of all types of benefit categories-TTD, PPI, medical, and lump sum. "Funds" should be interpreted 
as "all benefits," not just benefits that have a direct relationship to a particular legal service. Thus, the issue in cases 
like this should not be whether there is a direct, provable primarily-or-substantially relationship between the services 
and the funds. Rather, the issue should be whether the attorney is entitled to a reasonable fee out of the aggregate of 
benefit funds if the fee agreement allows it and the attorney performed the legal services he contracted to perform. 
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with Commission Staff, which is de facto what the "Order Approving in Part Lump Sum 
Agreement" means, even ifthe de jure language is written in an attempt to convey otherwise. So 
the attorney fee hearing is really about whether Counsel can change the Commission's mind. 
B. COUNSEL SHOULD BE PERMITTED TO DISCOVER THE 
FACTS UPON WHICH COMMISSION STAFF RELIED IN 
DETERMINING THAT ATTORNEY FEES SHOULD BE 
DENIED 
Unfortunately for Counsel, he is not privy to the evidence upon which the Commission 
made its original decision reflected in the above-referenced Order. As stated supra, by definition 
this evidence would have to include evidence contrary to Counsel's position in order to support a 
denial of fees. What is this contrary evidence, and what is the source thereof? 
Also, did Commission Staff request or obtain documents from Defendants? Did they 
interview third-party witnesses? Did they take depositions? Are there transcripts or notes of these 
interviews or depositions? If any of this occurred, it was done on a secret basis, since Counsel 
received no notice of any production of, or request for, documents, records, or witness testimony. 
Why all the secrecy? Disclosing the evidence to claimant's counsel could not possibly be 
of any prejudice to claimant.24 Counsel should at least be informed as to what individuals or 
witnesses the Commission Staff spoke to during their investigation, so that Counsel could 
examine these witnesses at the Hearing. Is it now the law in Idaho that the right to cross-examine 
witnesses and inspect the opposition's evidence does not apply in certain workers' compensation 
hearings? 
Moreover, it appears that in regard to the Hearing, the Commission relies at least in part 
24 There also cannot possibly be any harm to the Defendants, since they remain unaffected by the Commission's 
decision on claimant's attorney fees. 
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on evidence that is not in the record: 
3 COMMISSIONER BASKIN: Now, Counsel, let me 
4 stop you just for a second. And, again, I am looking at 
5 staff notes here, which may not be correct. 
6 But the staff notes reflect that the fIrst 
7 surgery was performed on 3-4 of'08; that, as of3-27-08, 
8 Dr. Montalbano noted that Mr. Stienmetz was having 
9 additional problems after having experienced some 
10 postsurgical falls ... (emphasis added) 
If these "staff notes," whose contents are unknown and whose source is unknown, are not in the 
record, then how can the Idaho Supreme Court fairly review the full record upon appeal? 
Counsel is clearly prejudiced by the Commission's apparent reliance on evidence outside the 
record of the hearing. 
Not only that, but Commissioner Baskin openly acknowledges that the evidence he refers 
to "may not be correct." What else in that document may not be correct? Counsel will have no 
way of knowing the complete factual basis for the Commission's eventual ruling in this matter, 
and no way to appeal any factual errors. 
In the recent Kulm matter, Counsel attempted (unsuccessfully) to use discovery 
procedures to fmd out the legal and factual basis for the Commission Staff s denial of attorney 
fees. In the Kulm ruling, the Commission stated that "the Commission considered Counsel's 
request contrary to the long-standing legal principle that documents which disclose deliberations 
of a judicial or quasi-judicial body on a decision are privileged and generally not subject to 
discovery." Kulm, p. 40. 
It is unclear why the Commission believes that in attorney-fee cases it is acting in a 
"quasi-judicial" capacity, because the Idaho Supreme Court has held the exact opposite: 
In effecting the attorney fee modifIcations under the claimed authority of I.C. § 
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72-803 where there is no fee dispute, the Commission is acting in its quasi-
legislative as opposed to its quasi-judicial capacity. The Commission must 
accordingly act within the bounds of its legislatively delegated authority and of 
the omnipresent mantle of the United States Constitution." Curr at 691. 
Accordingly, the Commission's basis for refusing to provide the requested information appears 
to be unfounded. 
Equally puzzling is the Commission's admission that it considers the actions of 
Commission Staff in issuing its denial of fees to be "deliberations of a judicial or quasi-judicial 
body on a decision." But if the attorney fee hearing is truly de novo, as the Commission also 
maintains, then there cannot have been any such "decision." It is illogical to suggest that the 
actions of Commission Staff pursuant to 17.02.08.033.03(a) are a decision for purposes of 
preventing discovery, but are not a decision for purposes of claiming that the attorney fee hearing 
is de novo. 25 
XI.HINDSIGHT AND FORESIGHT 
A. THE COMMISSION MAY NOT SUBSTITUTE ITS 
HINDSIGHT-BASED OPINION FOR THAT OF CLAIMANT 
The Commission appears to be applying its rules in such a way as to substitute its 
hindsight-based opinion for that of the Claimant's opinion, formed at the time he chose to retain 
Counsel, that he needed legal counseling and advocacy. Claimant testified as follows on pages 
12-13 of the Hearing Transcript: 
9 BY COMMISSIONER LIMBAUGH: 
10 Q Mr. Stienmetz, according to our notes, it 
11 appears that you hired Mr. Marsh shortly after your 
12 second surgery? 
13 A Yeah. I believe that was right. 
25 Note that the Commission Staff (the manager of the benefits section and his staff members known as 
compensation consultants) do not perform any judicial, quasi-judicial, or other privileged functions if their official 
job descriptions are to be believed, of which job descriptions the Commission can take judicial notice. 
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14 Q And could you help me understand what your 
15 expectations were at that time and maybe a reason why you 
16 thought you needed legal counsel to help you through 
17 this. 
18 A I wasn't quite sure how to deal with 
19 workmen's comp or my employer at the time. So I saw fit 
20 to seek legal counsel. 
21 Q And were you having difficulties with your 
22 employer --
23 A Yeah. 
24 Q --or surety prior to hiring counsel? 
25 A Yeah. My employer was following me around. 
1 And they told me that I didn't need surgery and I was 
2 wasting time and money. And so I went and found legal 
3 counseL 
4 Q And then everything improved after that? 
5 A Yeah. Everything stopped with work. And 
6 everything seemed to go smoother with the workmen's compo 
7 Q What was your understanding at the time 
8 that you hired legal counsel as far as what you would 
9 have to pay for the services? 
10 A It was 25 percent, I believe, of whatever I 
11 was going to be receiving. 
12 Q And when you signed the agreements, though, 
13 you did agree to --
14 A Yeah, I agreed to the contract. I thought 
15 it was acceptable. 
16 Q And at this point, you still feel that same 
17 way? Do you understand what we're here for today? 
18 A Yeah. I mean, I understand they need to be 
19 paid. 
Clearly, Claimant's testimony is that he needed legal assistance. In terms of evaluating the need 
for an attorney, why is the opinion of the worker who sought help while injured of less value 
than the Commission's opinion rendered two years later? 
Claimant's testimony is also that the legal assistance he received really helped him. If the 
Commission disagrees, their eventual ruling would go something like this: "We hold that 
Claimant was wrong to think he needed legal help on 'how to deal with workmen's comp.' We 
further hold that Claimant was wrong to think that Counsel's efforts helped him. We further hold 
SEINIGER LAW OFFICES, PA 
942 W. Myrtle Street 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
(208) 345-1000 
CLAIMANT'S COUNSEL'S 
OPENING BRIEF 
PAGE 29 OF 31 
that Claimant is wrong to think that Counsel should be paid for those efforts." 
How is a claimant to ever know which of the things on which he asks for help are 
acceptable to the Commission, and which are not? Did the legislature really intend for the 
Commission to decide, in hindsight, that an injured worker was wrong to seek legal help? 
B. THE COMMISSION'S RECENT RULINGS OPEN THE 
DOOR TO EVENTUALLY DISALLOWING ATTORNEY FEES 
ON TTDS AND LUMP SUM AGREEMENTS 
With the Commission's recent decisions, it appears that the door has been opened and it 
is now accepted law that the Commission may: 
• Refuse to uphold the parties' fee agreement.26 
• Turn a deaf ear to a claimant's entreaty that his attorney be paid as agreed.27 
• Ignore the Idaho Supreme Court's holding that "a reasonable contingent fee must be 
'sufficiently high to compensate the lawyer not only for the reasonable value of the time 
he or she anticipates devoting to the particular lawsuit, but also for the time devoted to 
other lawsuits undertaken on the same basis but unsuccessful in result. '" 
• Reject the Idaho Supreme Court's mandate that a claimant must be permitted to 
"compensate an attorney for acting solely as a counselor" and for "efforts that do not 
generate monetary awards." 
Since this is now apparently the state of workers' compensation law today, injured workers and 
the plaintiff's bar should be warned that it would only be a small additional step for the 
Commission to start issuing rulings like this: "We find that Claimant did not need legal help in 
26 In Kulm, the Commission concludes that "the current regulation impinges upon the right of an injured worker, and 
his or her attorney, to make their own agreement as to how counsel should be compensated." Kulm, pA2. 
27 The claimant in Drotzman requested his fee agreement to honored as a matter of personal integrity: 
1 Q Mr. Drotzrnan, do you feel 
2 that you have a moral obligation to see that we are paid 
3 for the work that we did for you? 
4 A I do. (Drotzman Hearing Transcript, p. 31) 
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negotiating a lump sum settlement agreement. Therefore, we hold that Counsel should not be 
paid for any of his lump sum efforts." 
It is Counsel's fear that the Commission is on a slippery slope toward disallowing many 
or most attorney fees in the field of workers' compensation. While some may desire such a result 
for the benefit of insurance companies, it would add insult to injury for Idaho's many workers 
who rely on getting help from their attorneys. 
XII. CONCLUSION 
Counsel is entitled to attorney fees as requested in the instant case. 
Dated July 8, 2010. 
SEINIGER LAW OFFICES, P.A. 
Andrew Marsh 
Attorney for Claimant 
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BEFORE THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
TIM STIENMETZ, 
Claimant, 
v. 
G2B CO, INC., 
Employer, 
and 
IDAHO STATE INSURANCE FUND, 
Surety, 
Defendants. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
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) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
IC 2008-002191 
ORDER ON 
ATTORNEY'S FEES 
FILED 
AUG 3 1 2010 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION 
This matter came before the Commission for hearing at the request of Seiniger Law 
Offices (hereinafter, Counsel) following an informal determination by Commission staff on the 
issue of attorney's fees payable to Counsel from the proceeds of a lump sum settlement. Hearing 
was held on May 11, 2010, at which time the Industrial Commission entertained argument from 
Counsel in support of Counsel's claim for attorney's fees pursuant to IDAPA 17.02.08.033. As 
well, the Commission received and considered the Affidavit of Andrew Marsh in Support of 
Claim for Attorney Fees with Exhibit 1-10 attached, and Claimant's Counsel's Admissions for 
Attorney Fee Hearing. Counsel requested and was granted a briefing schedule. 
I. 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. At all times relevant hereto Claimant, Tim Stienmetz, was an employee of G2B 
Co., Employer herein. 
OlIDER ON ATTORNEY'S FEES - 1 
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2. Employer insured its workers' compensation obligations under a policy issued by 
the State Insurance Fund (hereinafter, Surety). 
3. On or about January 7,2008, Claimant suffered an industrial accident arising out 
of and in the course of his employment with Employer when he lifted a hosed used to pour 
concrete. Surety accepted the claim and began paying benefits. 
4. On January 8,2008, Claimant presented to Dr. Maier at Mountain View Medical. 
Claimant received conservative care without improvement and was then referred to Dr. 
Montalbano. 
5. On March 4, 2008, Dr. Montalbano performed a right L5-S1 microdiskectomy. 
Claimant experienced two falls due to right lower extremity weakness and on March 31, 2008, 
Dr. Montalbano performed a redo microdiskectomy. 
6. On April 10, 2008, Claimant retained the services of Counsel. 
7. Counsel's Form 1022 report of Expenses and Statement of Claimant's Counsel 
states that Counsel made written demand dated 6/3/08 upon Dr. Montalbano for a permanent 
partial impairment (pPJ) rating and permanent work restrictions. 
8. On July 11, 2008, Dr. Montalbano found Claimant stable from a surgical 
standpoint and recommended Claimant participate in the LifeFit work hardening program under 
the direction of Dr. Friedman. Dr. Montalbano did not give Claimant a PPI rating. 
9. On August 28, 2008, Claimant completed the LifeFit program and Dr. Friedman 
opined that Claimant had reached maximum medical improvement with no further treatment or 
therapy recommended. 
10. On October 15, 2008, in response to Surety's request on September 23,2008, Dr. 
Friedman opined Claimant incurred 12% whole person PPI. 
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11. The contingent fee agreement Claimant executed with Seiniger Law Offices, P.A., 
on April 10, 2008, provided, inter alia: 
"2) For their representation of Client, Attorneys will be paid a fee which 
will be in lien upon the cause of action and will be equal to a portion of all 
amounts recovered by way of settlement, or award including attorney fees, 
and including sums recovered in satisfaction thereof from any third party. 
That portion will be as follows: 
i) Twenty-five percent (25%) of all amounts obtained for Client after 
execution of this agreement if the case is settled before a hearing. 
If Client is receiving temporary disability benefits at the time of 
the execution of this agreement, Attorney will not take a 
percentage of that benefit until such time as the surety discontinues 
or threatens to discontinue payment of said benefit; if Client has 
received an impairment rating which has been admitted and is 
being paid, Attorney will not take a percentage of the balance of 
the impairment rating unless it is later disputed. 
ii) Thirty percent (30%) of such amounts after a hearing and the 
claim is resolved without the filing of an appeal by either party; 
iii) Forty percent (40%) of such amounts if the claim is resolved after 
an appeal has been filed by either party;" 
12. At some point pnor to December 23, 2009, the parties agreed to resolve 
remaining extant issues by way of a Lump Sum Settlement Agreement (LSSA). Pursuant to the 
terms of the Agreement filed with the Industrial Commission on December 23, 2009, Claimant 
agreed to resolve all remaining issues for the additional sum of $28,900.00 as consideration. 
Counsel had previously taken attorney's fees of $5,098.53 against a PPI award of $20,394.00 
prior to the Lump Sum Settlement Agreement. Counsel proposed taking an additional $9,633.33 
in attorney's fees and costs of $23.37 from the Lump Sum Settlement Agreement consideration. 
The net amount to Claimant would be $19,24330. 
13. Counsel's Form 1022 Report also contained an itemization of attorney's fees and 
costs, and benefits to Claimant, as follows: 
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Prior to Lump Sum Settlement (PPJ) 
a. Benefits, paid prior to LSS, subjected to atty fees: $20,394.00 
b. Attorney Fees, paid prior to LSS on the above: $5,098.53 
c. Costs, incurred prior to LSS and reimbursed to atty: $550.00 
Lump Sum Settlement 
d. Benefits, subject to atty fees: $25,492.50 (PPD), $2,407.50 ( fut 
med), $1,000.00 (Consid), Total, $28,900.00 
e. Attorney fee, on the above: Total, $9,633.33 1 
f. Costs, reimbursable to atty: $23.37 
g. Total atty fee and costs, from LSS: $9,656.70 
h. Medical bills, to be paid from LSS: $0.00 
1. Net Lump Sum Amt. to Claimant: $19,243.30 
14. On January 13, 2010, Commission staff sent Counsel an initial detennination that 
the proposed Lump Sum Settlement Agreement was in the best interest of the parties, except for 
the portion of the requested fees related to permanent partial impairment (PP!) benefits. 
Commission staff notified Counsel that this was an initial determination, and that Counsel could 
request a hearing on this matter, in accordance with IDAPA 17.02.08.033. 
15. On February 11,2010, Counsel requested a hearing before the Commission. The 
Commission sent out a notice of hearing for May 11,2010. 
II. 
COUNSEL'S CONTENTIONS 
IOn February 9,2010, the Commission received a letter from Counsel explaining that the LSSA and the Form 1022 
contained a typographical error in the calculation of attorney fees from the lump sum settlement. The percentage of 
attorney fees should have been 25% not 33%. Thus, Counsel disbursed $2,408.33 to Claimant and retained the 
amount in controversy, $5,098.53, in his trust account. 
ORDER ON ATTORNEY'S FEES - 4 
Counsel has raised many of the constitutional and policy arguments he made in the 
attorney fee hearing of the case Kulm v. Mercy Medical Center, IC 2006-012770 (filed May 20, 
2010), to support his entitlement to attorney's fees. Ultimately, Counsel argues that the 
Commission's reasoning in Kulm v. Mercy Medical Center, supra, contradicts Curr v. Curr, 124 
Idaho 686, 864 P.2d 132 (1993), and is unconstitutional. Counsel argues that the Commission's 
regulations regarding attorney fees are inappropriate, and create many ethical problems for 
attorneys. 
Counsel acknowledges that he cannot prove that he was "primarily or substantially" 
responsible for obtaining Claimant's PPI rating or the LSSA benefits, if the Commission applies 
a "but-for" test. Further, Counsel presents that he cannot prove that the benefits were "disputed" 
by Defendants. Counsel argues that he has provided important, valuable, and compensable 
serviced to Claimant and that these services were at least instrumental in obtaining the results 
that were achieved for Claimant in terms of PPI benefits and the lump sum benefits. Thus, the 
fee that Counsel requests for his services is reasonable based on the IDAP A and controlling case 
law. 
ID. 
CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGES 
Counsel avers that the Commission ignores the legal significance of Curr v. Curr, or 
considers it overruled by Rhodes v. Industrial Commission, 125 Idaho 139, 868 P.2d 467 (1993). 
The Commission's Curr v. Curr decision that was appealed to the Supreme Court was issued in 
1991, and treats the regulatory scheme, or lack thereof, that was in place at that time. The 
legislative history of the IDAP A regulations indicate the Commission and members of the 
workers' compensation bar were struggling with the issue of attorneys' fees in workers' 
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compensation cases before the Court issued its decision in Curr v. Curro By 1992, the 
Commission had promulgated regulations on attorneys' fees, which the Rhodes Court evaluated. 
Contrary to the assertions made by Counsel, the Commission has not determined that 
Curr v. Curr, supra, has been overruled by Rhodes, Mancilla and/or Johnson. The Commission 
maintains that its adopted regulatory scheme hews to the direction given by the Supreme Court 
in Curr v. Curr, as evidenced by the Court's subsequent approval of those rules in Rhodes. 
While those cases were issued by the Court closely in time, Curr was issued based on the 
absence of duly enacted regulations or standards on attorneys' fees in workers' compensation 
cases, which was the case in 1991, whereas Rhodes involved a review of the regulations adopted 
by the Commission in response to Curro As discussed in Ku/m, the regulations issued after the 
Commission's decision in Curr v. Curr, are the predecessors ofthe current regulations. 
IV. 
APPLICATION OF THE PROVISIONS OF IDAPA 17.02.08.033 
TO THE FACTS OF TillS CASE 
With an effective date of July 1, 1994, the Industrial Commission adopted the current 
IDAP A 17.02.08.033 et seq, pursuant to the provisions of Idaho Code § 72-508. The current 
regulation preserves the notion of a 25% cap on attorney's fees, contained in the former IDAP A 
17.01.01.803.D (1992), but instead of applying that cap to "new money" the current regulation 
allows attorneys to take a 25% fee on "available funds". Per IDAP A 17.02.0S.033(a) "available 
funds" is defined as follows: 
"Available funds" means a sum of money to which a charging lien may attach. It 
shall not include any compensation paid or not disputed to be owed prior to 
claimant's agreement to retain the attorney. 
Therefore, available funds do not include (a) compensation paid to Claimant pnor to the 
retention of Counselor (b) compensation which is not disputed to be owed prior to the retention 
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of Counsel. 
The tenn "charging lien" is defmed at IDAP A l7.02.08.033.01.c as follows: 
"Charging lien" means a lien, against a claimant's right to any compensation 
under the Workers' Compensation laws, which may be asserted by an attorney 
who is able to demonstrate that: 
1. There are compensation benefits available for distribution on 
equitable principles; 
11. The services of the attorney operated primarily or substantially to 
secure the fund out of which the attorney seeks to be paid; 
111. It was agreed that counsel anticipated payment from 
compensation funds rather than from the client; 
IV. The claim is limited to costs, fees, or other disbursements incurred 
in the case through which the fund was raised; and 
v. There are equitable considerations that necessitate the recognition 
and application of the charging lien. 
Although IDAPA l7.02.08.033.01.a, specifies that a charging lien may attach to 
"available funds," it is apparent from a review of the definition of "charging lien" that that tenn 
further constrains the available funds that may be subject to a claim of attorney's fees. 
Importantly, a charging lien can only attach to available funds where it is demonstrated that the 
services of the attorney operated "primarily or substantially" to secure the fund out of which the 
attorney seeks to be paid. (See, IDAP A l7.02.08.033.01.c.ii.) This is but one of five 
requirements that must be satisfied before a charging lien can be said to exist against "available 
funds." As important, is the fact that these requirements are not in the disjunctive. Per the 
language of the regulation, all of these requirements must be satisfied before a charging lien can 
be said to exist. 
As discussed above, an attorney's charging lien can only attach to available funds. 
However, a charging lien can only attach where attorney is able to demonstrate, inter alia, that: 
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"ii. The services of the attorney operated primarily or substantially to secure 
the fund out of which the attorney seeks to be paid;" 
In the recent case of Kulm v. Mercy Medical Center, supra, a case involving a claim for 
attorney's fees brought by the same attorney involved in the instant matter, the Commission had 
occasion to consider what the Legislature intended in adopting the "primarily or substantially" 
language of the regulation. In that case, we concluded that in order to meet his burden of 
proving that his efforts were "primarily or substantially" responsible for securing the fund from 
which he hopes to be paid, Counsel bears the burden of proving, by a preponderance of the 
evidence, that he originally, or initially, took action that secured the fund, or that his efforts 
essentially, or in the main, were responsible for securing the fund, i.e. that his efforts were such 
that a reasonable person would conclude that he was responsible for securing the fund from 
which he hoped to be paid. 
Turning to the facts of the instant matter, while Counsel asserts that he requested a PPI 
rating from Dr. Montalbano, Dr. Montalbano did not give a rating and instead referred Claimant 
on to a work hardening program. Once Claimant completed the work hardening program, Surety 
requested a rating and Dr. Friedman issued the 12% PPI rating. Counsel took fees of $5,098.53 
from the Claimant's 12% PPI rating. 
The Commission has reviewed the infonnation submitted by Claimant and finds that 
Counsel did not initiate the action which created the PPI rating nor did Counsel's efforts 
essentially secure the PPI rating. Counsel's prior letter to Dr. Montalbano did not lead to the 
rating given by Dr. Friedman several months later and after completion of the work hardening 
program. 
The record lacks of evidence that Counsel primarily or substantially secured Claimant's 
PPI rating from Dr. Friedman or how his actions influenced the PPI rating. As such, the 
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Commission is unable to conclude that Counsel primarily or substantially secured the PPI rating, 
and he is not entitled to take fees on the PPI rating. Counsel has not proven his entitlement to 
$5,098.53 in attorney fees from Claimant's PPI rating. 
CONCLUSION OF LAW AND ORDER 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Counsel has not shown that he is entitled to fees taken 
on the PPI benefits paid to Claimant. 
IT IS SO ORDERED. 
DATED this3 J ~y of ~. , 2010. 
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R.D. Maynard, c~an 
Thomas E. Limbaugh, Commissioner 
~~ 
Thomas P. Baskin, Commissioner 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
a:r 
I hereby certify that on the 3t day of----J[...LJoe==q.--=-_:, 2010 a true and correct copy of 
Order on Attorney's Fees was served by regular Unit States Mail upon each of the following 
persons: 
WM BRECK SEINIGER 
942 WMYRTLE STREET 
BOISE ID 83702 
sb/cjh 
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(208) 345-4700 
Wm. Breck Seiniger, Jr. (ISB # 2387) 
Andrew C. Marsh (ISB # 6588) 
SElNIGER LAW OFFICES, P.A. 
942 W. Myrtle Street 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
Phone: (208) 345-1000 
Fax: (208) 345-4700 
Attorneys for Claimant 
·f p 
lSSIOri 
BEFORE THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
Maria Gomez, 
Claimant, 
vs. 
I.C. No. 05-510285 
Nampa Lodging Investors LLC, 
Employer, 
FORM 1022, REPORT OF EXPENSES 
and 
STATEMENT OF 
CLAIMANT'S COUNSEL 
And 
Liberty Northwest, 
Surety, 
Defendants. 
COMES NOW Claimant's Counsel and reports his expenses and submits the following in 
support of his claim of attorney's fees and costs in the amount set forth below from the proceeds 
of the settlement of the above captioned case. 
REPORT OF LITIGATION EXPENSES 
In accordance with the requirements of § 72-528, Idaho Code, this form shall be filled out 
and returned to the Industrial Commission within 30 days following the time of entry of a final 
award by the Industrial Commission in the above case, or, in the event of an appeal to a final 
court, within 30 days following a fmal ruling by the Court. If there is an appeal, the totals 
specified below shall include the expenses, costs, or fees incurred in the appeal. 
SEINIGER LAW OFFICES, P.A. 
942 W. Myrtle Street 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
(208) 345-1000 
FORM 1022, REPORT OF EXPENSES AND 
STATEMENT OF CLAIMANT'S COUNSEL 
PAGE 1 OF7 
PRIOR TO LUMP SUM SETTLEMENT PPI 
BENEFITS, paid prior to LSS, subjected to atty fees $3,733.13 
ATTORNEY FEES, paid prior to LSS, on the above $933.28 
COSTS, incurred prior to LSS and reimbursed to arty $0.00 
LUMP SUM SETTLEMENT Meds LS Consid. incl. PPD TOTAL 
BENEFITS, subject to arty fees $1,236.44 $12,206.13 $13,442.57 
ATTORNEY FEE, on the above Waived $3,051.53 $3,051.53 
COSTS, reimbursable to arty $606.72 
TOTAL ATTY FEE & COSTS, from LSS $3,658.25 
MEDICAL BILLS, to be paid from LSS $1236.44 
NET LUMP SUM AMT TO CLAIMANT $8,547.88 
Attachments: Statement of Costs incurred in litigation, reimbursable to attorney 
Contingency Fee Agreementin a Worker's Compensation Case including 
Disclosure Statement 
STATEMENT OF CLAIMANT'S COUNSEL 
1. Seiniger Law Offices, P .A. ("Counsel") was retained by Maria Gomez 
("Claimant") on or about 10/05/2005. 
2. Counsel initiated this case by interviewing Claimant concerning the facts and 
circumstances of employment, the facts and circumstances of the injury, the status of benefits, 
the status of medical treatment, and the background of Claimant as it relates to potential 
disability beyond impairment, etc. 
3. Counsel advised Claimant as to the procedures involved in processing a claim for 
benefits under the Idaho Workers Compensation Act. Counsel advised Claimant as to the need 
for cooperation with treating physicians and Seiniger Law Offices, P.A. 
4. Counsel advised Claimant as to the disclosures required by the Idaho Industrial 
Commission. 
SEINIGER LAW OFFICES, PA 
942 W. Myrtle Street 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
(208) 345-1000 
FORM 1022, REPORT OF EXPENSES AND 
STATEMENT OF CLAIMANT'S COUNSEL 
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5. Counsel created a database file for Claimant in which pertinent information was 
recorded for use in the handling of the claim. 
6. During, or shortly after, the initial meeting with Claimant, Counsel drafted the 
follovving documents for the benefit of Claimant: a fee agreement and disclaimer statement 
meeting the requirements of the Idaho Industrial Commission; medical releases; employment 
release; a letter of representation and inquiry to the surety; a letter of representation to the Idaho 
Industrial Commission requesting copies of Claimant's file; a letter to the treating medical 
providers requesting complete copies of Claimant's medical and billing records; a letter to the 
primary treating physician requesting a detailed report of the etiology of Claimant's condition, 
treatment to date, impairment rating, and temporary and permanent restrictions; and a client 
intake questionnaire for the initial gathering of relevant information concerning the client's 
employment, educational, medical and health, military, vocational, and accident history. 
7. Counsel reviewed all medical records, employment records, and other requested 
documents as they were received, and consulted with Claimant about the status of the case on a 
periodic basis. 
8. Counsel advised Claimant concerning the need to keep medical appointments, 
aspects of medical treatment which might potentially affect Claimant's impairment rating, and 
strategic issues relating to medical care which can impact the result of a worker's compensation 
case. 
9. Counsel conducted legal research concerning aspects of Claimant's case and 
lllJurWS. 
10. Before Counsel was retained, Defendants denied, discontinued, or disputed 
Claimant's right to additional medical benefits and treatment, time loss benefits, impairment 
SEINIGER LAW OFFICES, PA 
942 W. Myrtle Street 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
(208) 345-1000 
FORM 1022, REPORT OF EXPENSES AND 
STATEMENT OF CLAIMANT'S COUNSEL 
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SI/ 
compensation, and disability beyond impairment. Subsequent to retaining Counsel, Claimant 
received additional medical treatment and other benefits. 
11. Counsel advised Claimant to undergo a new and separate vocational evaluation by 
a vocational evaluation expert of Claimant's choosing; advised Claimant of the meaning and 
import of the vocational report; and advised Claimant on the effect of the expert's report on the 
need for retraining, the claim for benefits, and lump sum settlement. 
12. At the time Counsel became involved, all issues were disputed or disputable 
because all defenses remain open to Defendants in a worker's compensation case as a matter of 
law unless waived or determined to have no merit by the Commission. The amount of all 
compensation paid or admitted as owed by Employer immediately prior to Counsel's 
involvement was equal to the amount actually paid to that date, less any claims for overpayment 
that Defendants might subsequently make. All issues that arose subsequent to the date Counsel 
was hired were disputed or disputable, including rights to medical benefits and treatment, time 
loss benefits, impairment compensation, disability beyond impairment, retraining, and attorney 
fees. For the period prior to lump sum settlement, Counsel's itemization of compensation that 
constituted available funds, itemization of costs, and calculation of attorney fees is set forth 
above. For the lump sum settlement, Counsel's itemization of compensation that constitutes 
available funds, itemization of costs, and calculation of attorney fees is set forth above. 
13. There are compensation benefits, as set forth above, available for distribution on 
equitable principles. The services of Counsel operated primarily or substantially to secure the 
fund out of which the attorney seeks to be paid, due to Counsel's efforts on behalf of Claimant 
and due to Counsel's reputation as a plaintiff s lawyer in the practice of worker's compensation 
law. It was agreed that counsel anticipated payment from compensation funds rather than from 
SEINIGER LAW OFFICES, PA 
942 W. Myrtle Street 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
(208) 345-1000 
FORM 1022, REPORT OF EXPENSES AND 
STATEMENT OF CLAIMANT'S COUNSEL 
PAGE 4 OF? 
the client, as set forth in the Attorney Fee Agreement attached hereto. The claim is limited to 
costs, fees, or other disbursements incurred in the case through which the fund was raised. There 
are equitable considerations that necessitate the recognition and application of the charging lien, 
including as follows: Claimant sought the services of Counsel as counselor and advocate; 
Claimant contracted with Counsel to pay Counsel for said services; Counsel provided services as 
counselor and advocate; Counsel has a constitutionally-protected property right to be paid as 
agreed; and Claimant has a constitutionally-protected right to have Claimant's contract with 
Counsel honored. 
14. Counsel reviewed the file in preparation for settlement. Counsel engaged in 
extensive negotiations with Defendants. Counsel had extensive communications with Claimant 
concerning the status of the case, and the strategic and tactical decisions that had to be made with 
respect to settlement discussions and preparation for hearing. 
15. Counsel advised Claimant of the risks of going to hearing and the costs that would 
be incurred in connection with obtaining sworn testimony from Claimant's medical providers. 
Counsel further advised Claimant of the delay that would be involved in SUbmitting this case for 
resolution to the Commission. 
16. Counsel obtained a compromise settlement with representatives of the defendants 
resulting in the payment of benefits over and above those which were conceded at the time that 
Claimant initiated the attorney/client relationship. 
17. Claimant elected to settle the case based upon Claimant's best judgment and 
personal situation, and on the basis set forth in the lump sum agreement which has been 
submitted to the Commission for its approval. 
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573 
18. Counsel reviewed and analyzed the lump sum settlement agreement, completed 
portions of the agreement, and reviewed the lump sum agreement with Claimant. 
19. Counsel reviewed and analyzed the file; reviewed and analyzed time and billing 
program entries; reviewed and analyzed books of account to ascertain client costs advanced and 
other financial data required by the Idaho Industrial Commission; and prepared Idaho Industrial 
Commission Form 1022. 
20. As part of the consideration supporting the contract entered into between 
Claimant and Counsel, Counsel provided legal services to Claimant from approximately 
10105/2005 until the present time. During that time, Counsel limited his practice by declining 
certain cases because ofthe size of his caseload, which included Claimant's case. Counsel 
maintained an office and staff, including the services of a full-time legal assistant, to be able to 
handle whatever needs Claimant had in connection with this case, as well as the needs of his 
other clients. 
21. Claimant is presently unemployed. 
Dated this September 28, 2009. 
SEINIGER LAW OFFICES, P.A. 
Andrew Marsh 
Attorney for Claimant 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I CERTIFY that on this September 28,2009, I caused a true and correct copy of the foregoing 
document to be served as follows: 
Scott Harmon 
Harmon, Whittier & Day 
6213 N. Cloverdale Road, Suite #150 
P.O. Box 6358 
Boise,ID 83707-6358 
[RJ Hand Delivery 
SEINIGER LAW OFFICES, P.A. 
Andrew Marsh 
Attorney for Claimant 
SEINIGER LAW OFFICES, PA 
942 W. Myrtle Street 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
(208) 345-1000 
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PAGE 7 OF? 
SEINIGER LAW OFFICES, P.A. 
942 W. MYRTLE STREET 
BOISE, IDAHO 83702 
(208) 345-1000 
Andrew@ldahoRights.com 
CLIENT NAME 
Maria Gomez 
3120 Hyde Street 
Caldwell, ID 83605 
DATE 
09/30105 Balance forward 
10/05105 Copies 
10105105 Postage initialltrs 
10118/05 Med Rec requests 
10/18105 med rec requests 
DESCRIPTION 
11118/05 Copies Fwd med bills & recs to SIF 
11118/05 Postage Fwd med bills & recs to SIF 
03/07/06 CopiesExibits 
03/07/06 Postage 
03110106 ClientCopies 
03/10106 Postage 
03/07/08 vocational evaluation 914/07, 2/15108, 3/7/08 
01/20109 File Closing 
02/27/09 Medical Records -
02128/09 Medical Records -
09/14/09 File Closing 
Statement of Costs 
I DATE I 
9/21109 
ATTORNEY OUR FILE NO. 
ACM 2618 
AMOUNT BALANCE 
0.00 
1.80 1.80 
1.11 2.91 
0.80 3.71 
1.48 5.19 
3.40 8.59 
1.06 9.65 
2.00 11.65 
0.87 12.52 
2.40 14.92 
0.87 15.79 
486.00 501.79 
10.00 511.79 
58.07 569.86 
26.86 596.72 
10.00 606.72 
I BALANCE DUE II $606.72 
Thank you for allowing us to represent you. As of this date we have concluded our work on your case and have closed your file. If 
you would like to have a copy ofthe file within the next 30 days you may do so at $.20 per page. If you choose to obtain your file 
at a later date there will be a $30.00 retrieval fee in addition to copying charges of $.20 per page. Your file will be destroyed two (2) 
years from the above date. 
57b 
ORIGINAL 
CONTINGENCY FEE AGREEMENT 
IN A WORKER'S COMPENSATION CASE 
This is an agreement for representation and consultation in a worker's 
compensation claim before the Idaho Industrial Commission. This agreement is 
between SEINIGER LAW OFFICES, P.A., 942 Myrtle Street, Boise, Idaho 
83702, (hereafter referred to as "Attorney") and Maria Gomez, (hereafter referred 
to as "Client"). 
ATTORNEY AND CLIENT AGREE AS FOLLOWS: 
2) For their representation of Client, Attorney will be paid a fee which will be in 
lien upon the cause of action and will be equal to a portion of all amounts 
recovered by way of settlement, or award including attorney fees, and 
including sums recovered in satisfaction thereof from any third party. That 
portion will be as follows: 
i) Twenty-five percent (25%) of all amounts obtained for Client after 
execution of this agreement if the case is settled before a hearing. If 
Client is receiving temporary disability benefits at the time of the 
execution of this agreement, Attorney will not take a percentage of that 
benefit until such time as the surety discontinues or threatens to 
discontinue payment of said benefit; if Client has received an 
impairment rating which has been admitted and is being paid, Attorney 
will not take a percentage of the balance of the impairment rating unless 
it is later disputed. 
ii) Thirty percent (30%) of such amounts after a hearing and the claim is 
resolved without the filing of an appeal by either party; 
iii) Forty percent (40%) of such amounts if the claim is resolved after an 
appeal has been filed by either party; 
Attorney will take a percentage of any benefits obtained by Client with 
respect to permanent partial impairment if a rating is given after the parties 
execute this agreement. In the event that there are attorney fees awarded against 
the defendant(s) by the commission Attorney shall be entitled to be paid those 
attorney fees or the percentage calculated above, whichever is greater. 
'7 
3) Client will not be required to pay attorney fees to Attorney if nothing is 
recovered by way of settlement or award unless Attorney withdraws due to 
lack of cooperation by Client. In the event that Attorney is required to 
withdraw due to lack of cooperation in presenting and prosecuting Client's 
claim, he will be compensated as set forth in paragraph 7 below. 
4) Actual costs required to prepare and prosecute Client's claim by Attorney, 
or to achieve a settlement, are to be paid by Client; if advanced by 
Attorney, these costs will be repaid from Client's portion of amounts 
recovered, as defined in Section 2, above; if a settlement is not reached in your 
case, you will be responsible to make payments on these costs until they are 
paid in full. These costs include fees for investigators if hired by Attorney, 
filing fees, fees for court reporters, travel expenses, costs of service of process, 
costs for medical records and reports, costs for expert witnesses and 
physicians, long distance telephone and fax charges, postage and related 
mailing costs, and all other costs associated with the prosecution of Client's 
claim. Attorney is authorized, but not obligated, to pay all medical bills 
outstanding at the time of settlement of Client's claim out of any funds received 
by Attorney to the health care provider or their designated agent. 
5) Client agrees that he will not make settlement except with Attorney's prior 
approval, which approval shall not be reasonably withheld. Should Client do 
so in violation of this Agreement, Client agrees to pay Attorney the sum and 
share indicated in Paragraph 2(ii), above; upon settlement Attorney is 
authorized to pay any outstanding medical bills of Client directly to the 
provider. Attorney shall not settle the case without Client's prior approval. 
6) Attorney makes no representations concerning the likelihood of a successful 
resolution of Client's case, and does not guarantee to obtain sufficient funds to 
reimburse Client for the costs or expenses incurred in the prosecution of the 
case; it is expressly agreed that all statements of Attorney on these matters are 
good faith statements of opinion only; 
7) Attorney may be discharged by Client at any time. If Attorney is discharged 
Attorney will be compensated for services rendered to the date of discharge, as 
well as for all costs, expenses and disbursements, as follows: 
i) If Attorney is discharged before the case is settled or tried, Attorney 
shall be paid at the rate of $150.00 per hour or a percentage calculated 
in accordance with paragraph 2 (based upon the highest settlement offer, 
if any, made by the defendants at the time of the discharge) whichever is 
greater; Attorney will furnish Client with an itemized statement of such 
services. 
ii) If Attorney is discharged after the case is settled or tried, the 
compensation of Attorney shall be computed in accordance with the 
provisions of this agreement just as if the verdict, award, determination 
or judgment had actually been collected in full for Client. 
iii) Attorney has the right to retain possession of Client's documents and 
money until Attorney's bill is paid in full by Client, and Attorney shall 
have a lien on the cause of action. 
8) Client '.vill pay to Attorney an initial retainer as an ad'vance against the costs 
referred to in Paragraph 4 above in the amount of $1 00. 
9) Client agrees that any interest earned on any of Client's funds held in trust will 
be donated to the Idaho State Bar in connection with its Interest on Lawyer 
Trust Accounts program. 
10)Both Client and Attorney have read this agreement, have a copy of it, and 
agree to its terms and conditions. There are no other oral or written 
representations between Client and Attorney. Any modifications of this 
contract shall be made in writing. 
ll)This Agreement shall be binding upon the heirs, successors, representatives 
and assigns of Client and Attorney. 
12)Client has been advised that Client may pick up a copy of the file in this case 
within 30 days after settlement or after the attorney client relationship is 
terminated by either party to this agreement. After that time, Attorney's file, 
and all documents and things in it from whatever source will be destroyed. 
13)Client has been advised that Attorney may be retained on an hourly basis of 
$150 per hour by depositing a retainer with Attorney of $2,000.00 which shall 
be replenished as Attorney charges against it. In the event that Attorney is 
retained on an hourly basis, Attorney shall not be entitled to any percentage of 
any settlement or benefits recovered by Client. Client has declined to retain 
Attorney on an hourly basis and has chosen to retain Attorney on the 
contingent basis described herein. 
I have read the foregoing and decline to retain the attorney on an hourly 
basis, this -so: day of /0 , 200..QL. 
M ria omez, Clie . 
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DISCLOSURE STATEMENT 
1. In workers' compensation matters, attorney's fe~s normally do not exceed 
twenty-five percent (25%) of the benefits your attorney obtains for you in a case in 
which no hearing on the merits has been completed. In a case in which a hearing 
on the merits has been completed, attorney's fees normally do not exceed thirty 
percent (30%) of the benefits your attorney obtains for you. 
2. Depending upon the circumstances of your case, you and your attorney may 
agree to a higher or lower percentage which would be subject to Commission 
approval. Further, if you and your attorney have a dispute regarding attorney fees, 
either of you may petition the Industrial Commission to resolve the dispute. 
I certify that I have read and understand this disclosure statement and 
Contingency Fee Agreement, and agree to the terms contained herein. 
DATED this 5th day of October, 2005. 
aria Gomez 
DATED this 5th day of October, 2005. 
Reed G. Smith 
SEINIGER LAW OFFICES, P.A. 
Attorney for Client 
Wm. Breck Seiniger, Jr. (ISB # 2387) 
Andrew C. Marsh (ISB # 6588) 
SEINIGER LAW OFFICES, P .A. 
942 W. Myrtle Street 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
Phone: (208) 345-1000 
Fax: (208) 345-4700 
Attorneys for Claimant 
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BEFORE THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
Maria Gomez, 
Claimant, 
vs. 
Nampa Lodging Investors LLC, 
Employer, 
and 
Liberty Northwest, 
Surety, 
Defendants. 
I.e. No. 05-510285 
MEMORANDUM OF LAW 
IN SUPPORT OF 
FORM 1022 
COMES NOW Claimant's Counsel and files this MEMORANDUM on the issue of 
Counsel's right to attorney fees on permanent partial impairment awards, together with the 
Affidavit of Andrew Marsh attached hereto as Exhibit A and the Exhibits attached to said 
Affidavit, all in support of his claim of attorney's fees as set forth in Counsel's Form 1022 
already on file with the Commission. 
FACTS 
Seiniger Law Offices, P.A. (hereinafter "Counsel") provided extensive legal counseling 
and advocacy services to Claimant in the above-captioned matter from 2005-2009, and has met 
SEINIGER LAW OFFICES, PA 
942 W. Myrtle Street 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
(208) 345-1000 
MEMORANDUM OF LAW 
IN SUPPORT OF FORM 1022 
PAGE 1 OF 19 
r:?z/ 
all Constitutional and legal requirements for receiving their attorney fees. See Affidavit of 
Andrew Marsh attached hereto as Exhibit A and the Exhibits attached thereto. 
DISCUSSION 
COUNSEL HAS A CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO ATTORNEY FEES 
The law governing claimants' right to be represented by an attorney in a workers' 
compensation case, and the constitutional right of that attorney to be paid an attorney's fee, was 
set forth by the Idaho Supreme Court in Curr v. Curr, 124 Idaho 686, 864 P.2d 132 (Idaho 
1993). The Court held as follows: 
• An attorney has a constitutional right to be paid for services rendered on the 
whole case, including services rendered as counselor and advocate. 
• Payment of attorney fees cannot be limited to the basis of "new money." 
• Legal representation, and compensation for same, cannot be limited to "disputed 
matters." 
Counsel has recently briefed the Commission in detail on the above Constitutional issues 
in other cases currently pending before the Commission, and in the interest of judicial economy 
will not repeat them in this brief, unless requested to do so by the Commission. 
In the instant case, the facts show that Counsel rendered services to Claimant as 
counselor and advocate, and Counsel is therefore constitutionally entitled to have his fee contract 
honored. 
THE COMMISSION IS NOT OBLIGATED TO APPLY ITS OWN IDAPA 
RULES IN A WAY THAT VIOLATES CONTITUTIONAL LAW 
In a recent telephone conference on another case that Counsel has pending before this 
Commission, the Commission expressed concerns over how to reconcile its IDAP A rules 
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defining "Available Funds" 1 and "Charging Lien" 2 with the mandates of Curro Counsel submits 
that the Commission is not obligated to apply its rules in a way that violates constitutional law, 
or the statutorily-expressed intent of the legislature, or the dictates of public policy. 
In fact, it is well-settled law that administrative regulations may not be interpreted and 
applied in ways that violate case law or the constitutional rights of a party.3 
Indeed, the Commission itself appears, at least in dicta, to be willing to recognize that a 
strict application of its "primarily or substantially,,4 rule is not always required: 
Finally, quite apart from the question of whether Attorney's efforts were 
"primarily or substantially" responsible for securing the fund from which he 
hopes to be paid, Attorney argues that he should be entitled to take a fee against 
the PPI award because he provided other services of value to Claimant, services 
which did not result in the creation of a fund of money from which he might 
otherwise expect to take a fee. However, Attorney has failed to articulate, in any 
detail, what other valuable services he provided in the instant matter. "Order 
Denying Reconsideration," Sandra Perez V. Idaho Fresh Pak, Inc. and Liberty 
Northwest Insurance Corp., IC No. 2005-530757, pages 11-12, (Sept. 18,2009) 
(emphasis added) 
Note that the Commission does not say that the law does not permit consideration of whether the 
Attorney "provided other services of value to Claimant." The fact that the Commission in the 
Perez case rejected Attorney's claim on the basis of a failure to provide sufficient supporting 
1 "Available funds" means a sum of money to which a charging lien may attach. It shall not include 
any compensation paid or not disputed to be owed prior to claimant's agreement to retain the attorney. IDAP A 
17.02.08.033.01.a. 
2 "Charging lien" means a lien, against a claimant's right to any compensation under the Workers' 
Compensation laws, which may be asserted by an attorney who is able to demonstrate that: 
i. There are compensation benefits available for distribution on equitable principles; 
ii. The services of the attorney operated primarily or substantially to secure the fund out of which the attorney seeks 
to be paid; 
iii. It was agreed that counsel anticipated payment from compensation funds rather than from the client; 
iv. The claim is limited to costs, fees, or other disbursements incurred in the case through which the fund was raised; 
and 
V. There are equitable considerations that necessitate the recognition and application of the charging lien. IDAP A 
17.02.08.033.01.c. 
3 Because this principle cannot reasonably be disputed, Counsel sees no reason to cite authority for it, but will do so 
if requested by the Commission. 
4 IDAPA 17.02.08.033.01.c.ii. 
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facts suggests that the Commission, at least on some level, recognizes that it has the power to 
refuse to strictly apply its IDAP A rules when such strict application would be unjust or unlawfuL 
In sum, Counsel submits that in regard to allowing attorney fees, the Commission's 
obligation to comply with case law and constitutional law supersedes whatever obligation it may 
have, if any, to apply its IDAP A rules in a strict and literal way. Accordingly, the Commission 
may, and constitutionally must, allow attorney fees in the instant case. 
FUNDAMENTAL FAIRNESS PROHIBITS THE COMMISSION FROM 
ENCOURAGING CLAIMANTS TO SEEK LEGAL ADVICE, AND THEN 
REFUSING TO ALLOW THE LEGAL ADVISORS TO BE PAID 
Where does the Commission stand on the issue of (to quote the Idaho Supreme Courts) 
"compensat[ing] an attorney for acting solely as a counselor and ... efforts that do not generate 
monetary awards such as obtaining permission for medical care or procuring an impairment 
rating ... "? Let us allow the Commission to answer this question in its own words, in official 
quotes taken directly from the Commission's own website:6 
There are many reasons for a dispute to arise in a claim. These disputes can 
sometimes center around complicated legal issues. The assistance of an attorney 
may be needed. 
If an injured worker (claimant) has a disagreement with the insurer/employer that 
cannot be resolved informally, the claimant can use the formal judicial process. 
Due to the complexity of the judicial process, it is recommended that you 
contact an attorney. 
After filing the complaint, the case must be prepared and presented to the Hearing 
Officer. Some typical steps are listed below but this is not a complete list. If you 
have questions, you may want to consult an attorney. 
Some costs may be incurred in preparing for and attending a hearing. If you have 
questions for [sic] concerns about costs and expenses you may want to seek legal 
counsel. 
5 Curr v. Curr, 124 Idaho at 692, 864 P.2d at 138 
6 hrtp:lliic.idaho.gov (bold emphasis added on all quotes) 
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Legal representation is not required to file a Complaint with the Industrial 
Commission. However, due to the complexity of the judicial process, you may 
wish to consider legal counsel. 
If your employer does not have workers' compensation insurance and you believe 
that you should receive workers' compensation benefits, you may contact an 
Idaho Industrial Commission Compensation Consultant by calling toll free 1-800-
950-2110 V ITDD; or consult with an attorney. 
Industrial Commission employees can assist you with many of your questions or 
concerns about workers' compensation. However, they cannot provide you with 
legal advice. If you believe that you need legal advice, you should consult an 
attorney. 
If you choose to formally contest the decision of your employer or the employer's 
insurance company, you may want to consult an attorney. 
You may obtain a copy of the Complaint Form from the Industrial Commission or 
your attorney. 
To obtain a date for your hearing, you or your attorney must file a "Request for 
Calendaring" with the Idaho Industrial Commission. 
The "Facts for Injured Workers" pamphlet, which was downloaded from the website, also 
contains many of these same recommendations for seeking legal advice. 
The "General Information on Representing Yourself in a Workers' Compensation Case" 
pamphlet, which was downloaded from the website, contains these quotes: 
1. The materials you have received are not a substitute for legal advice from an 
attorney. 
2. Workers' compensation laws and Industrial Commission rules are 
complex. 
4. It is a good idea to talk to an attorney before proceeding on your o~n. 
MY CHECKLIST 
o I understand it would help me to talk with an attorney about my case. 
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Over and over again, the Commission officially recommends that claimants seek legal advice. 
Over and over again, the Commission officially warns claimants of the complexity of the law. 
Over and over again, the Commission officially urges claimants to talk to an attorney. 
Does the Commission intend for the public to assume that legal advice is free? No, of 
course not. 
Does the Commission intend for attorneys to assume that they are required to provide 
legal advice for free? No, of course not. 
What, then, does the Commission intend by its recommendations? The only logical 
interpretation is that the Commission expects that a claimant will contract with an attorney for 
legal advice, and then pay the attorney pursuant to that contract. Under that interpretation, it must 
be presumed that the Commission intends to honor the parties' contract as required by 
constitutional law. 
But the Commission does not stop with just recommending that a claimant seek legal 
advice, it goes into detail of how and where to obtain it: 
4. It is a good idea to talk to an attorney before proceeding on your own. You 
may contact the Idaho State Bar at 208-334-4500 for a referral. Information 
about obtaining an attorney may also be found at www2.state.id.us/isb.7 
The information contained in this pamphlet is general in nature and is not 
intended as a substitute for legal advice. Changes in the law or the specific facts 
of your case may result in legal interpretations which are different than those 
presented here. 
The Idaho State Bar can provide you names of lawyers in your area 
who are familiar with workers' compensation issues and related matters. The 
Idaho State Bar is located in Boise, Idaho, and can be reached by calling 1-
208-334-4500 or toll-free at 1-800-221-3295.8 
7 "General Information on Representing Yourself in a Workers' Compensation Case" pamphlet, which was 
downloaded from the website. (emphasis added) 
8 "Facts for Injured Workers" pamphlet, which was downloaded from the website. (emphasis added) 
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Can the Industrial Commission recommend a workers' compensation attorney? 
It is not appropriate for the Commission to recommend counsel. However, 
you can call the Idaho State Bar Lawyer Referral Service at (208) 334-4500 or 
look in the Yellow Pages in the Attorneys - Workers' Compensation section.9 
The information contained in this web page is general in nature and is not 
intended as a substitute for legal advice. Changes in the law or the specific facts 
of your case may result in legal interpretations, which are different than presented 
here. 
The Idaho State Bar can provide you names of lawyers in your area 
who are familiar with workers' compensation issues. The Idaho State Bar is 
located in Boise, Idaho and can be reached by calling 1-208-334-4500. 10 
Apparently, it is so important to the Commission that injured workers consider getting legal 
advice that the Commission tells them exactly how to go about getting a lawyer. 
The Commission also makes it clear that its staff cannot give legal advice: 
Industrial Commission employees can assist you with many of your questions or 
concerns about workers' compensation. However, they cannot provide you with 
legal advice. If you believe that you need legal advice, you should consult an 
attorney.l1 
Again, the Commission makes it clear that the only way for claimants to get legal advice is from 
an attorney. 
Let us apply all of this to the instant case. The Commission, via its website and 
pamphlets, tells people like Claimant Maria Gomez to seek legal advice. Maria seeks advice 
from Seiniger Law Offices. So far, it is clear that Maria did nothing wrong, because the 
Commission says that is what it wants Claimants to do. Maria signs a contract with Seiniger Law 
Offices in which she agrees to pay them for their services, but rather than require an hourly fee, 
Seiniger agrees to take a risk and accept a contingency fee on PPJ benefits. Again, the 
9 http://iic.idaho.gov (emphasis added) 
10 http://iic.idaho.gov (emphasis added) 
11 http://iic.idaho.gov (emphasis added) 
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Commission never says that the legal advice should be free, so neither Maria nor Seiniger Law 
Offices did anything wrong by signing this contract. Maria asks her attorney for advice and he 
provides it. Again, this is exactly what the Commission says it wants. 
How is it, then, that four years later, the Commission staff is prepared to fmd that in 
retrospect, Maria should not have sought advice, Seiniger should not have provided it, and 
therefore Seiniger should not be paid? What, exactly, did Maria or Seiniger do that was different 
than what the Commission specifically said they should do? If the Commission staff is prepared 
to tell Counsel that his actions were somehow not compensable and therefore wrong, then in 
fairness the staff should inform Counsel of what he should have done instead when Maria came 
to him and asked for legal advice. 
In sum, fundamental fairness prohibits the Commission from encouraging claimants to 
seek legal advice, and then preventing their legal advisors from getting paid. 12 
COUNSEL IS AWARE OF NO LEGAL AUTHORITY THAT ALLOWS A 
TRIBUNAL TO ARBITRARILY FIND THAT AN ATTORNEY'S 
SERVICES ARE OF NO VALUE 
The facts set forth in the Affidavit of Andrew Marsh and its attached Exhibits 
demonstrate that Counsel provided extensive legal services to Claimant between the time 
Counsel was retained (October 5, 2005) and the time that the permanent partial impairment (PPI) 
rating was issued (December 19,2006). For the Commission to choose to dishonor Counsel's 
contract with Claimant and disallow attorney fees on the PPI benefit obtained would be 
12 Because this principle cannot reasonably be disputed, Counsel sees no reason to cite authority for it, but will do so 
if requested by the Commission. 
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tantamount to a finding that the services of Counsel (rendered during the fourteen months before 
a PPI rating) were of absolutely no value to Claimant. 13 
Let us consider a few of the dozens of service transactions that Counsel rendered prior to 
the PPI rating: 
• When Claimant signed up, she provided correspondence from Saltzer Medical Group that 
said the surety had denied payment on their worker's compensation medical bill; 
subsequent correspondence threatening collection on Saltzer and Mercy Medical Center; 
and correspondence from West Valley Medical Center stating they had made a credit 
rating report against her. Counsel reviewed and advised her on these issues. Was that 
service of no value to Claimant? 
• When Claimant signed up, she provided correspondence from the surety that included a 
Change of Status dated six days earlier (9/30/05) regarding changing her temporary 
wage-loss benefits, as well as correspondence dated 8/5/05 that showed that nearly six 
months after the accident, the surety still had the case under investigation. Claimant does 
not speak English, has very little formal education, and is not sophisticated in American 
legal matters. Counsel reviewed and advised her on these issues. Was that service of no 
value to Claimant? 
• On 10/24/05, Claimant's husband (who speaks some English) called and asked for legal 
advice on Claimant's concerns about not receiving wage-loss benefits and her perception 
that the employer and surety had stopped cooperating ever since she had exercised her 
right to retain legal counsel. Counsel advised her on these issues. Was that service of no 
value to Claimant? 
13 It would also be tantamount to a fmding that Counsel's exercise of professional judgment, in agreeing to accept a 
case and in providing legal advice and advocacy, was erroneous. 
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• On 11/18/05, Counsel reviewed and responded to a Work Status Report from Dr. Sant, 
sending him a letter requesting a statement of work restrictions and an impairment rating. 
Was that service of no value to Claimant? 
• On 11123/05, Claimant called14 and asked for legal advice on Claimant's concerns about 
having been fired from her job and whether to seek new employment. Counsel advised 
her on these issues. Was that service of no value to Claimant? 
The above service events occurred during the first seven weeks of counsel's representation of 
Claimant. During this same period, Counsel also provided many other service events, such as 
requesting, receiving, and reviewing medical records; contacting and/or communicating with 
the surety, medical providers, creditors, and employer; and communicating with Claimant. 
In the year that ensued after these first seven weeks (i.e. from 11123/05 to 12/19/06 when 
the PPI rating was obtained), Counsel engaged in dozens of other service transactions on 
Claimant's behalf. Were all of these services of no value to Claimant? Does the amount of 
attorney fees that Counsel is seeking for the PPI benefits obtained ($933.28) somehow 
exceed the value of the attorney time, attorney expertise, office staff time, and office 
overhead that Counsel expended on Claimant's behalf? 
In sum, it would defy logic for the Commission to fmd that the fourteen months' oflegal 
services provided to Claimant prior to a PPI rating were of no value and should not be 
compensated. IS, 16 
14 Counsel provided a Spanish translator on the call. 
15 Of course, from December 2006 until a settlement agreement was reached in 2009, Counsel engaged in many 
dozens of other service transactions on Claimant's behalf. 
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COMMISSION STAFF'S REQUEST FOR PROOF OF A "DISPUTE" IS 
CONTRARY TO CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 
As noted above, Curr prohibits the Commission from allowing attorney fees only in 
"disputed matters." Nonetheless, Counsel received a calIon 10/14/09 from Scott McDougal of 
the Commission's staff in which it was requested that Counsel provide "documents" to show 
what issues were in "dispute" when Counsel was retained, and how the services of Counsel 
operated "primarily or substantially" to secure the PPI benefit. 
Constitutionally, then, the Commission staff may not require proof of a "dispute" in 
determining whether to approve attorney fees. However, for purposes of making a record, and 
without admitting that Counsel is required to submit such documents, Counsel is submitting with 
his affidavit scores of non-privileged documents in the instant case. These documents provide all 
the proof of Counsel's entitlement to attorney fees that the law requires. 
COMMISSION STAFF'S REQUIREMENT THAT PROOF BE 
"DOCUMENTARY" MISAPPREHENDS WHAT BURDEN OF PROOF 
APPLIES 
IDAP A rule 17.02.08.033.03.d reads in pertinent part: 
The attorney shall always bear the burden of proving by a preponderance of the 
evidence his or her assertion of a charging lien and reasonableness of his or her 
fee. 
Assuming arguendo that the rule itself is constitutional, the burden of proof required of an 
attorney to establish his right to an attorney fee is "preponderance ofthe evidence." Counsel is 
aware of no legal authority that requires this evidence to be in documentary form. Indeed, it is 
16 Because there is no known legal authority for a tribunal to take the position that it may make a blanket finding that 
an attorney's services have no value to a client, there is no need for Counsel to attempt to provide citation to 
contrary legal authority. 
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well-settled that the fonns of evidence in a civil matter may also include circumstantial, 
testimonial, demonstrative, parol, etc. 17 
Nonetheless, Commission staff has taken the unyielding position that "documentation" is 
required to meet the burden of proof. Besides the call from Mr. McDougal referenced above, 
Counsel has received a letter from him dated 10122/09 regarding a similar case that Counsel has 
pending with the Commission, in which Mr. McDougal states that "Absent ... documentation 
that the specific benefit was disputed or delayed," Counsel is not entitled to attorney fees. 
Apparently, Commission staff believes that the law allows it to deny attorney fees if 
Counsel does not provide "documents" to prove (1) the existence of a PPI dispute and (2) how 
Counsel's actions were "primarily and substantially" responsible for the PPI benefit. This is not a 
correct statement of the burden of proof requirement. 
First, as seen above, the evidence need not be documentary. Second, to the extent that the 
staff is interpreting the "primarily and substantially" language to require a higher burden of proof 
than "preponderance of the evidence," this would not be a correct interpretation: 
A "preponderance of the evidence" is evidence that, when weighed with that 
opposed to it, has more convincing force and from which results a greater 
probability of truth. Harris v. Electrical Wholesale, 141 Idaho 1,3, 105 P.3d 267, 
269 (2004). 
A preponderance of evidence is evidence that is of greater weight, or is more 
convincing, than that offered in opposition to it. The tenn does not mean 
preponderance in amount. 32A C.J.S. Evidence § 1628 
Thus, "preponderance" does not require a particular quantity or "amount" of evidence. It also 
does not require that the evidence be in any particular fonn, so the Commission may consider, 
for example, circumstantial evidence. Moreover, the "probability of truth" is not just a function 
17 Because this principle cannot reasonably be disputed, Counsel sees no reason to cite authority for it, but will do so 
if requested by the Commission. 
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of the supporting evidence offered, but also of the weight of the evidence "offered in opposition 
to it." In cases where, as here, there is ample supporting evidence and no contrary evidence, the 
probabilities heavily favor Counsel's right to attorney fees, and the burden of proof has been well 
met. Again, the law does not require Counsel to provide "documentation that the specific benefit 
was disputed." 
COMMISSION STAFF'S REQUIREMENT OF "PROOF" THAT 
COUNSEL WAS "PRIMARILY AND SUBSTANTIALLY" RESPONSIBLE 
FOR PPI BENEFITS MISAPPREHENDS THE NOTION OF PROOF 
As noted above, the "primarily and substantially" language may not be interpreted to 
require a higher burden of proof than "preponderance of the evidence." Similarly, the burden of 
proof does not require Counsel to prove a causal link between his representation and the payment 
of PPI by demonstrating that without his representation, the benefits would not have been paid. 
Logically, it is impossible to "prove" that without Counsel's assistance, the surety would 
not have paid PPI. Consider this example: Can you prove that if your doctor had not given you 
that flu shot last winter, you would not have avoided the flu? Of course not, because whether you 
catch the flu depends on a host of factors such as whether you were exposed to the virus, your 
degree of pre-existing immunity, your level of stress, and how much sleep you get, as well as the 
flu shot. Does the Commission staff believe that at the end of the winter, if they did not catch the 
flu, they should not have had to pay their doctor for that flu shot? After all, in retrospect there is 
no "proof' that his service was primarily and substantially responsible for them avoiding the flu! 
1bis analogy demonstrates why the law only requires a preponderance of the evidence to 
support a claim for attorney fees, and not some kind of absolute "proof." In sum, although 
Counsel cannot absolutely "prove" that without his representation the Claimant would not have 
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received PPI benefits, the preponderance of the evidence shows that with Counsel's 
representation, the Claimant did receive benefits. 
THE PRESENCE OF A REPUTABLE CLAIMANT'S ATTORNEY IS 
LIKELY TO REDUCE THE CHANCE THAT A SURETY WILL DISPUTE 
A PPI BENEFIT 
There are other reasons why a narrow focus on the concept of "dispute" is misplaced. The 
hiring of a claimant's attorney with a reputation for strong advocacy is usually enough to prevent 
the surety from disputing a PPI benefit or other benefit that the surety might otherwise have 
disputed if the claimant were unrepresented. 
Most sureties in Idaho know the following about Claimant's Counsel, Breck Seiniger: 
• He has been practicing work comp law for thirty years. 
• He is equally respected by the plaintiffs bar and the insurance defense bar for his 
professionalism, expertise, and integrity. 
• He is AV-rated by Martindale-Hubbell. 
• He has been selected by his peers for The Best Lawyers in America and Mountain 
States SuperLawyers, both of which are rare honors. 
• He has taken dozens of claimant's cases to hearing. 
• He has appealed work comp cases, and some of his appeals have resulted in 
setting precedent in the field of work comp law. 
• He is not afraid to take difficult cases to hearing if he feels that fairness requires 
When Seiniger Law Offices represents a claimant, most ~ureties and opposing attorneys (who are 
well aware of the above facts) are more likely to comply with the law, more likely to pay 
18 Because these facts are common knowledge, Counsel requests the Commission to take judicial notice thereof. 
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benefits that are owed, and less likely to dispute PPI ratings. If the Commission staffhas any 
evidence to the contrary, Counsel will be glad to review and respond to same. Othenvise, the 
preponderance of the evidence shows that Counsel's representation of Claimant made it likely 
that the surety in the instant case would choose not to dispute the PPI benefits. 
THE COMMISSION STAFF'S APPLICATION OF THE "DISPUTE" 
RULE ENCOURAGES LITIGATION CONFLICT AND PENALIZES THE 
BEST ATTORNEYS 
First, the Commission staff s focus on "dispute" as a key factor in determining the 
reasonableness of attorney fees misapprehends the way that good plaintiff's attorneys approach 
the practice of worker's compensation law. A good plaintiff's attorney seeks to find common 
ground with the surety or opposing counsel and to develop a working relationship of mutual 
respect, recognizing that communication, cooperation, and consensus-building is usually a better 
strategy than acrimony and asperity. Properly understood, both the claimant's counsel and the 
insurance adjuster perform the function of helping the injured worker-the attorney by guiding 
her through the maze of legal issues, and the adjuster by arranging for the payment of much-
needed medical treatment and time-loss benefits. It is in no one's best interest, least of all the 
claimant's, for the Commission to apply its rules in such a way as to encourage the plaintiff's bar 
to work toward finding ways to foster, or at least to demonstrate and document, disputes between 
the two sides. 
Second, the Commission staffs insistence on a "dispute" actually penalizes the more 
reputable attorneys, because they are less likely to have benefits disputed by the surety, and 
therefore under the staff s application of IDAP A rules, less likely to receive approval for their 
attorney fees (and less likely to take on injured workers' cases in the future!). 
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Indeed, if proof of "dispute" is required, it almost puts the surety in charge of 
determining how much a claimant's attorney will be paid, because attorney fees are based more 
on the surety's decisions of what to "dispute" than on any of the factors enumerated in Rule 1.5 
of the Idaho Rules of Professional Conduct regarding the value of the attorney's services. 19 
THE COMMISSION STAFF MAY NOT SUBSTITUTE ITS HINDSIGHT-
BASED OPINION FOR THAT OF THE CLAIMANT 
On the question of whether a benefit was disputed, the Commission staff appears to be 
applying its rules in such a way as to substitute its hindsight-based opinion for that of the 
Claimant's opinion, formed at the time she chose to retain Counsel, as to what issues the 
Claimant thought were being disputed or might be disputed. Obviously, the Claimant thought 
something in her case was currently or potentially a dispute or a problem, or she would not have 
sought an attorney. In terms of evaluating the need for an attorney, why is the opinion of the 
worker who sought help while injured of less value than the Commission staffs opinion rendered 
four years later? 
When the Commission staff rules that the attorney's services were not needed (i.e., of no 
value), it is also saying that the claimant was wrong to seek legal help. Did the legislature really 
intend for the Commission to decide who does and does not need the help of an attorney? 
Moreover, under the Commission staff's current approach, an attorney trying to decide 
whether to take a case has to do the following: 
19 A clever surety will simply say "I don't dispute that PPI benefit," but then just not pay it. Eventually the 
claimant's attorney will have no choice but to make a proper motion, at which point the surety will quickly start 
making payments, claiming that they intended to do so all along. But at the end of the case, the Commission staff 
won't approve any attorney fee for the hours and expertise invested in getting the PPI benefits paid, because 
technically the surety didn't dispute it! 
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• Make a guess as to whether the injured worker will eventually have a PPI rating. (That is 
a lot to ask, given that there aren't even any doctors who are willing to make such a 
prediction in advance.) 
• Make a guess as to whether the surety will dispute the rating. (That is a lot to ask, given 
that the surety itself probably doesn't know whether it intends to dispute any eventual 
rating.) 
• Make a guess as to whether, if disputed, it will be possible to prevail at a hearing so that 
the claimant will actually receive benefits from which the attorney can take a fee. (That is 
a lot to ask, given that no one knows what will be the testimony ofthe treating physicians 
and IMEs.) 
By way of analogy, this would be like requiring a physician, at the very first appointment, to 
predict how much medical help the patient will need, what infections or other medical 
complications mayor may not crop up during treatment, how long it will take to get better, and 
what will be the end result of treatment. Does the Commission staff really believe that at the end 
of the treatment, the board of medicine should second-guess the physician's judgment and 
prevent him from getting paid for his services? 
This is why a hindsight-based approach is prohibited by the Idaho Supreme Court, which 
said that the reasonableness of an attorney fee "derives from the totality of the circumstances 
from the perspective ofthe parties at the time that the fee agreement was made." Curr v. Curr, 
124 Idaho at 690,864 P.2d at 136. 
In the instant case, the Claimant thought she needed help, and Counsel agreed to help her. 
The Commission staff may not lawfully second-guess their decisions through the denial of a 
claim for attorney fees. 
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THE COMMISSION STAFF MAY NOT CHERRY-PICK WHICH 
ATTORNEY FEES HAVE TO MEET THE STANDARD OF "PRIMARILY 
AND SUBSTANTIALLY" 
The preceding paragraph leads us to this key issue: does the law allow the Commission to 
apply the standards from its IDAP A rules differently to different types of work comp benefits? 
In recent months, the Commission staff appears to have taken the position that the 
"documentation" standard and the "primarily and substantially" standard20 may be used to deny 
attorney fees on PPI benefits. If this approach is to be permitted, there is nothing in the IDAP A 
rules to suggest that the same standard should not be applied with equal fervor to attorney fee 
requests for having obtained lump sum settlements, or TTDs, or any other benefits. 
Counsel notes that in the instant case, he possesses no "documents" in which the surety, 
prior to commencing negotiations to a lump sum settlement, stated that it "disputed" the right of 
the Claimant to receive "Consideration of lump sum settlement.,,21 Applying the Commission 
staff's approach, since Counsel has no documentary "proof' of a "dispute," how can Counsel 
possibly be entitled to attorney fees on the lump sum settlement he negotiated? 
Counsel also notes that in the instant case, he cannot "prove" (using the Commission 
staff s absolute interpretation discussed above) that his actions operated "primarily and 
substantially" to obtain the lump sum benefits?2 
Counsel submits that if the Commission applies its IDAPA rules in such a way as to 
disallow attorney fees on the PPI, it must apply the rules the exact same way to the lump sum 
agreement, and deny attorney fees on that benefit also, in the instant case and in every other 
worker's compensation case. To do otherwise would be to apply its IDAPA standards unequally 
20 17.02.0S.033.01.c.ii. 
21 Lump Sum Agreement, page S. 
22 If a surety desired to prevent a claimant's attorney from receiving a fee on the lump sum agreement, all it would 
have to do is say to the Commission, "Even if Claimant had not been represented by counsel, we still would have 
paid the lump sum amount." 
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depending on the type of benefit obtained, and there is nothing in the rules or the law to permit 
this. 
CONCLUSION 
Counsel is entitled to attorney fees as requested in the instant case. 
Dated October 23,2009. 
SEINIGER LAW OFFICES, P.A. 
Andrew Marsh 
Attorney for Claimant 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I CERTIFY that on October 23,2009, I caused a true and correct copy of the foregoing 
document to be served as follows: 
Harmon Whittier & Day 
P.O. Box 6358 
Boise ID 83707-6358 
Fax: (800) 972-3213 
[R]Fax 
SEINIGER LAW OFFICES, P.A. 
Andrew Marsh 
Attorney for Claimant 
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Wm. Breck Seiniger, Jr. (ISB # 2387) 
Andrew C. Marsh (ISB # 6588) 
SEINIGER LAW OFFICES, P.A. 
942 W. Myrtle Street 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
Phone: (208) 345-1000 
Fax: (208) 345-4700 
Attorneys for Claimant 
BEFORE THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
Maria Gomez, 
Claimant, 
vs. 
Nampa Lodging Investors LLC, 
Employer, 
and 
Liberty Northwest, 
Surety, 
Defendants. 
STATE OF IDAHO ) 
)ss 
County of Ada ) 
I.C. No. 05-510285 
AFFIDAVIT OF ANDREW C. MARSH 
IN SUPPORT OF 
MEMORANDUM OF LAW 
Andrew C. Marsh, being first duly sworn, deposes and says as follows: 
1. I am an associate attorney of the firm Seiniger Law Offices, P .A., and attorney of record 
for the Claimant in the above-entitled matter. I make this Affidavit based on personal 
knowledge. 
2. Seiniger Law Offices, P.A. was retained by Claimant in regard to the above matter on or 
about 10/5/05. A copy ofthe engagement agreement has been previously provided to the 
Commission as an attachment to my Form 1022. 
SEINIGER LAW OFFICES, P.A. 
942 W. Myrtle Street 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
(208) 345-1000 
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3. In retaining Counsel, Claimant specifically sought the services of Counsel as counselor 
and as advocate, which were then provided. 
4. In representing Claimant, this office drafted, reviewed, analyzed, and/or acted upon the 
exhibit documents attached hereto on a CD. This includes many pages of correspondence, 
damages and bills, fee and cost records, Industrial Commission records, and medical 
records. 
5. In representing Claimant, this office also engaged in many phone transactions, email 
transactions, and meeting and note transactions. 
FURTHER SA YETH YOUR AFFIANT NAUGHT. 
Dated October 23,2009. 
SEINIGER LAW OFFICES, P.A. 
Andrew Marsh 
Attorney for Claimant 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me on October 23, 2009. 
GvL V, Uc, )~ 
Notary Public for Idaho 
Residing at: NA0PA t bM-fO 
My Commission expires: 1/2,-"':>1 Z-o 11--
SEINIGER LAW OFFICES, P.A. 
942 W. Myrtle Street PAGE 20F 2 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
(208) 345-1000 
!Jlf! 
E. Scott Harmon, ISB 3183 
LAW OFFICES OF HARMON, WHITTIER & DAY 
6213 N. Cloverdale Rd., Ste. 150 ~~ .. !~! 
P.O. Box 6358 
Boise, ID 83707-6358 
Telephone (208) 327-7563 
FAX (800) 972-3213 
Employees of the Uberty Mutual Group 
Attomey for Defendants 
BEFORE THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
Maria Gomez, ) 
) 
Claimant, ) 
) I. C. No.: 2003-522535 TLC 
vs. ) -- 2005-510285 TLC 
) 2005-510286 !7V)CJ 
Nampa Lodging Investors, LLC. ) 
) STIPULATION AND AGREEMENT 
Employer, ) OF LUMP SUM DISCHARGE AND 
) ORDER OF APPROVAL AND 
and ) DISCHARGE 
) 
Uberty Northwest Ins. Corp., ) 
) 
Surety, ) 
) 
Defendants. ) 
) 
) 
In consideration of the premises and promises and covenants hereinafter set forth, 
and subject to the above-entitled Commission's approval and Order of Discharge pursuant 
thereto, and further pursuant to Idaho Code §§ 72-707 and 72-404, the above-entitled 
parties hereby stipulate and agree in favor of the Claimant, Maria Gomez, as hereinafter 
setforth. 
"1/L 
'Il 
!L.-
RECEIVED 
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BOISE LEGAL 
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I. 
It is agreed that on or about October 19, 2003, the Claimant, Maria Gomez, 
was employed by Nampa Lodging Investors. LLC, in the County of CANYON. Idaho, and 
on the same date the Claimant allegedly sustained an injury as a result of an industrial 
accident arising out of and during the course of employment which she then had with the 
Defendant, Nampa Lodging Investors, LLC. These injuries include, but are not necessarily 
limited to, right rotator cuff tear with subsequent surgery; shoulder and neck myofascial 
pain syndrome. 
It is agreed that on or about February 03, 2005, the Claimant, Maria Gomez, was 
employed by Nampa Lodging Investors, LLC, in the County of CANYON, Idaho, and on 
the same date the Claimant allegedly sustained an injury as a result of an industrial 
accident arising out of and during the course of employment which she then had with the 
Defendant, Nampa Lodging Investors, LLC. These injuries include, but are not necessarily 
limited to, right knee pain with subsequent surgery. 
It is agreed that on or about February 26,2005, the Claimant, Maria Gomez, was 
employed by Nampa Lodging Investors, LLC, in the County of CANYON. Idaho, and on 
the same date the Claimant allegedly sustained an injury as a result of an industrial 
accident arising out of and during the course of employment which she then had with the 
Defendant, Nampa Lodging Investors, LLC. These injuries include, but are not necessarily 
limited tO,neck, mid-back, right shoulder, and low back strain/pain and contusions. 
All damages, disability, loss, expense and injury, past, present and future, in any 
way resulting from or related to the alleged accidents are finally settled and discharged by 
2 -STIPULATION AND AGREEMENT OF LUMP SUM DISCHARGE AND 
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this Agreement. This is the case whether or not these damages, disability, loss or 
expense are now known, recognized or foreseen. 
II. 
At all times herein mentioned, Uberty Northwest Ins. Corp. was the Surety of said 
Employer under the Workers' Compensation Laws of the State of Idaho. 
III. 
Claimant contends, and Defendants deny, that the Defendants are liable for all of 
the medical expenses and compensation pursuant to the Workers' Compensation Laws of 
the State of Idaho as a result of injury sustained from said alleged industrial accident. It is 
Defendants' contention that disputes exist in this claim concerning the nature and extent of 
injuries, the cause and extent of Claimant's permanent impairment and disability, 
entitlement to temporary partial and total disability benefits and probable amount of future 
medical expenses. The parties hereto acknowledge that these are serious questions and 
disputes, and that all differences are compromised and settled by this Agreement. 
In consideration of this Agreement, all parties stipulate that the Comm!ssion shall, 
on and by approval hereof, be deemed to adjudicate these issues and all other issues 
ariSing out of Claimant's alleged accident and injuries, as provided by the Workers' 
Compensation Laws of the State of Idaho. 
IV. 
At the time of the alleged accident herein referred to, the Claimant was married with 
4 dependent(s), and was receiving an average weekly wage on the following dates of 
injury: 
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10119/2003 = $248.73; 
02/03/2005 = $250.00; 
02126/2005 = $250.00. 
v. 
It is agreed and stipulated that Claimant filed Notices of Injury and Claim for 
Compensation with respect to the subject claims with the Industria! Commission of the 
State of Idaho on the dates identified below; and Defendants have paid Claimant's medical 
expenses as indicated: 
DATE OF ACCIDENT 
10/19/2003 
213/2005 
2/26/2005 
NOTICE FILED 
10/28/2003 
511012005 
5/10/2005 
TOTAL MEDICALS PAID 
$ 14,998.87 
$ 21,616.09 
$ 3,594.27 
The following medical and related expenses have been incurred by Claimant 
following said accident to the present date, none of which have been paid by Defendants 
and all of which will be paid by Claimant from the proceeds of this Jump sum settlement: 
Action Collection Service $231.01 
for Nampa Radiologists, PA 
NCO Collection Agency $622.00 
for Treasure Valley ER Physician 
Bonneville Billing & Collections 
for Saltzer Medical Group 
$383.43 
TOTAL $1,236.44 
Claimant represents that the above itemization of unpaid medica! bills is complete 
and accurate, and agrees to pay any medical billing, whether indicated above or not, that 
remains unpaid as of the date of this Agreement. 
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VI. 
By way of settlement of these disputes, the parties agree to the following: 
1. Medical expenses paid by Surety: 
(a) Date of Injury - 10/19/2003: 
Physicians: 
Anesthesiology Consultants 
Idaho Physical Moo and Rehab 
Mercy Ambucare Center 
Nampa Radiologist PA 
Saltzer Medical Group PA 
Treasure Valley ER Physicians 
West Valley emergency Physician 
Hospitals: 
Mercy Medical Genter 
West Valley Medical Center 
Physical Therapists: 
Mercy Medical Center 
Miscellaneous: 
LMMNGMT 
Restat Pharmacy Contract 
Med Now Inc 
MRI Mobile 
Orthopedic Fracture 
Working RX 
Med Now Pharmacy 
Total: $11,076.75 
Total: $ 1,320.75 
Total: $ 1,574.18 
Total: $ 1,027.19 
TOTAL MEDICAL PAID: $14,998.87/ 
(Re: 10/19/03 Injury) 
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(8) Date of Injury - 02/3/2005: 
Physicians: 
Associn Family Practice 
Caldwell Radiological Assoc 
Idaho Physical Medicine Rehab 
Idaho Physical Medicine 
MRI Mobile 
Nampa Radiologists 
Orthopedic Fracture Clinic 
Hospitals: 
Idaho Surgery Center 
West Valley Medical Center 
Phl!sical Therapists: 
Idaho Elks Rehab 
Idaho Physical Therapy 
Miscellaneous: 
Maria Gomez 
Uberty Mutual Group 
LM MNGMNT 
Restat 
Medical Service Company 
Total: $ 6A10.20 
Total: $ 9,753.46 
Total: $ 4,616.89 
Total: $ 835.54 
TOTAL MEDICAL PAID: $21,616.09 j 
(Re: 2/3/2005 Injury) 
(C) Date of Injury 2-26-2005 
Physicians: 
Idaho Physical Medicine 
Nampa Radiologists 
Saltzer Medical Group PA 
Total: $ 798.88 
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Hospitals: 
Mercy Medical Center 
Total: $ 2,175.04 
Physical Therapists: 
Mercy Medical Center 
Total: $ 620.35 
TOTAL MEDICAL PAID: $ 3,594.27 ./ 
(Re: 2/26/2005 Injury) 
TOTAL MEDICAL PAID ON ALL CLAIMS: 
2. Total Temporary Disability 
Owed by Surety: 
Re: 10/19/2003 Date of Injury: 
10/19/2003 through 10/21/2003 
3 days @ $223.86 per week = 
10/27/2003 through 02/05/2004 
$ 95.94/ 
14 weeks, 4 days @ $223.86 per week = $ 3,261.96 / 
03/04/2004 through 04/0212004 
4 weeks, 3 days @ $223.86 per week = $ 991.38 j 
07/15/2004 through 08120/2004 
5 weeks, 2 days @ $223.86 per week = $ 1,183.26 
$40,209.23 
TOTAL nD OWED: $ 5,532.54 / 
(Re: 10119/03 Injury Date) 
Re: 213/2005 Date of Iniury: / 
07/31/2005 through 09/25/200fi7 
8 weeks, 1 day @ $225.00 per week = $ 1,832.14 
09/30/2005 through 08/02/2006 
43 weeks, 6 days @ $225.00 perweek= $ 9,867.86 
08/03/2006 through 12/18/2006 
19 weeks, 5 days @ $254.25 per week =$ 5,012.36 
TOTAL nD OWED: $16,712.36 
(RE: 2/3/2005 Injury Date) 
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Re: 2/26/2005 Date of Injury: 
No TID's Owed 
3. Temporary Partial Disability 
Owed by Surety: 
Re: 10/19/2003 Date of Iniury: 
10/22/2003 through 10/26/2003 = $ 66.60 / 
02/06/2004 through 03/0212004 = $ 339.14(' 
TOTAL TPD OWED: 
(Re: 10/19/03 Injury date) 
4. Permanent Partial Impairment: 
5. 
5% Whole person Assessed with 
2.5% Pre-Existing - Re: right Knee 
Assessed by Dr. Nicola 
12.5 weeks@ $298.65 per week 
TOTAL PPI OWED: 
Consideration of lump sum settlement; 
disputed compensation benefits of any 
kind, accrued and future; waiver of 
right to reconsideration and to appeal 
TOTAL: 
LESS TID PAID (10/19/03 Injury) 
LESS TID PAID (2/3/2005 Injury) 
LESS TPD PAID (10/19/03 Injury) 
LESS PPI PAID: 
TOTAL DUE CLAJMANT: 
a) Attorney fees taken prior to LSS: 
b) Costs taken prior to LSS: 
c) Additional attorney fees to be taken 
from LSS: 
d) Additional costs to be taken from LSS: 
(includes voc eval expert) 
SUBTOTAL (ADD c + d) 
Total Claimant's Fees and Costs: 
$ 405.74./ 
$ 3,733.13 
$13,442.57 
$39,826.34/ 
($ 5,532.54) 
($16,712.36) 
($ 405.74) 
($ 3,733.13) 
$ 13,442.57 
$ 933.28 
$ -0-
$ 3051.53 
$ 606.72 
$ 3658.25 
$ 4591.43 
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Itemized list of outstanding medicals 
to be paid by Claimant from LSS 
balance: 
TOTAL TO CLAIMANT: 
VII. 
$ 1236.44 
$ 8,547.88 
All parties acknowledge that the nature and extent of temporary and permanent 
disability, if any, and the amount of medical and related care and expense in this matter 
are uncertain and in dispute; that pursuant to I.C. § 72404, it.is in the best interest of the 
parties that the above-entitled claims be fully. 'finally and forever discharged upon a lump 
sum payment by Surety in the amount of $13,442.57, such settlement to discharge all /' 
rights and claims to aU permanent and temporary compensation, and all medical and 
related benefits whether or not known, herein listed, discoverable or contemplated by the 
parties. 
VIII. 
Claimant does indemnify and agree to save Defendants harmless from and against 
any further claim or loss of any and every kind arising out of or related to said alleged 
accidents and any resultant loss, damage or injury, including without limit any claim 
respecting past or future hospital, medical or like expense. 
IX. 
In making this Stipulation and Agreement of Lump Sum Settlement, all parties 
acknowledge and agree that neither Defendant admits the allegations of Claimant, this 
Agreement being solely for the purpose of adjudication and settlement of doubtful and 
disputed claims. 
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x. 
This Agreement is made at Claimant's request and is the acceptance by the 
Claimant of the offer of the Surety. By this instrument, Claimant requests settlement be 
made in accordance with the terms and conditions of this Agreement, and further petitions 
the Commission for approval hereof and Order of Discharge pursuant hereto. Employer 
and Surety herein join in said petition and stipulate that it shall be granted. 
XI. 
Claimant acknowledges that she has carefully read this Agreement and legal 
instrument in its entirety. understands its contents, and has executed the same knowing 
that this Agreement forever concludes and fully and finally disposes of any and all claim of 
every kind and character she has or may have against the Employer and Surety on 
account of the alleged accidents and injuries on October 19, 2003; February 03, 2005; and 
February 26. 2005. 
IT IS FURTHER STIPULATED AND AGREED that the Defendants shall pay the 
sum within fifteen days following their receipt of the approved and conformed copy of this 
entire agreement. Any interest allowable under the Workmen's Compensation Laws of 
the State of Idaho will not begin to accrue until after the fifteen-day period. 
Claimant further acknowledges that she is represented by Andrew Marsh, legal 
counsel, in these claims and has reviewed the contents of the Agreement with her 
attorney, who has explained the contents hereof and apprised Claimant of the 
consequences of her acceptance and execution. 
IT is UNDERSTOOD THAT IN EXECUTING THIS AGREEMENT THESE 
PROCEEDINGS ARE CONCLUDED AND FOREVER CLOSED BY REASON THEREOF, 
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SUBJECT ONLY TO COMMISSION APPROVAL AND ORDER, AND THAT CLAIMANT 
WILL NOT THEREAFTER BE ABLE TO REOPEN THE SAME FOR ANY PURPOSE. 
Notwithstanding this knowledge, Claimant and Defendants hereby petition the Industrial 
Commission for a lump;z settlement as evidenced by these presents. 
DATED this5D~ay of September, 2009 
APPROVED: 
LAW OFFICES OF HARMON, WHiniER & DAY 
h ~~,/A / 
E. Scott ~armon ;. 
Attorney for Defendants 
l '1rutli( }07C 
~ nette Yorgason U 
Liberty Northwest Ins. Corp_ 
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ORDER OF APPROVAL AND OF DISCHARGE 
UPON LUMP SUM PAYMENT 
The foregoing stipulation, agreement and petition having duly and regularly come 
before this Commission and that pursuant to I.C. § 72-404, it is in the best interests of the 
parties that approving said agreement and Order of Discharge be granted as prayed for, 
NOW, THEREFORE, said foregoing stipulation and agreement shall be, and the 
same hereby is, APPROVED; and further, 
Said petition shall be and hereby is granted and the above-entitled proceedings are 
DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. 
DATED this __ day of ~er, 2009. 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION 
By ______________ __ 
Chairman 
Member 
Member 
ATTEST: 
Assistant Secretary 
12 -STIPULATION AND AGREEMENT OF LUMP SUM DISCHARGE AND 
ORDER OF APPROVAL AND DISCHARGE 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY That on the __ day of ~temt5er, 2009, a true and 
correct copy of the STIPULATION AND AGREEMENT OF LUMP SUM DISCHARGE 
AND ORDER OF APPROVAL AND DISCHARGE, I.C. Nos. 2003-522535, 2005-510285, 
and 2005-510286 was served by first class mail, postage prepaid upon each of the 
following: 
E Scott Harmon 
Law Offices of Harmon, Whittier & Day 
6213 N. Cloverdale Rd., Ste. 150 
P.O. Box 6358 
Boise, 10 83707-6358 
Andrew Marsh 
Attorney at Law 
942 Myrtle st. 
Boise, 10 83702 
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( 
IDAHO INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION 
C.L. "'BUTCH" OTTER, GOVERNOR 
December 24, 2009 
Andrew Marsh 
Seiniger Law Offices 
942 W Myrtle Street 
Boise,ID 83702 
POBox 83720 
Boise, ID 83720-0041 
(208)334-6000 - FAX (208) 334-2321 
1-800-950-211 0 
Re: Claimant: Maria Gomez 
IC # 2005-510285 
Proposed settlement with Liberty Northwest Ins. Corp. 
Dear Mr. Marsh: 
COMMISSIONERS 
R.D. Maynard, Chainnan 
Thomas E. Limbaugh 
Thomas P. Baskin 
Mindy Montgomery, Director 
The Industrial Commission (Commission) is in receipt of the proposed settlement 
agfe~ment referenced above. In our review of the proposed settlement, the Commission 
has also considered your letters, attachments and CD-R of September 28, October 23, and 
November 11,2009, regarding your representation of the claimant and your proposed fees, 
as well as the documentation attached to the Stipulation and Agreement of Lump Sum 
Discharge and Order of Approval and Discharge received September 29, 2009. The 
Commission staff has made an initial determination that the settlement is in the best 
interests of the parties, except for the portion of the requested fees related to the Permanent 
Partial Impairment (PPI) benefit previously paid. With respect to that fee, staff lacks 
sufficient information to conclude that the requested fee is reasonable, and is therefore 
unable to recommend approval of the same to the Commission. 
Specifically, Counsel is requesting fees from the PPI, but it is unclear from the 
documentation and other evidence that you have asked us to consider, that Counsel was 
primarily or substantially responsible for obtaining those benefits. The PPI was paid in the 
amount of$3,733.13, and fees requested / previously taken amounted to $933.28 (25%). 
However, it is also noted that counsel has not requested fees from $1,236.44 of the lump 
sum consideration to be paid per the settlement document, which fees would amount to 
$309.11, and are deemed reasonable. Consequently, the net amount of fees not currently 
found to be reasonable is $624.17 ($933.28 minus $309.11). 
Please be ·aware that this is an initial determination, and, in accordance with IDAP A 
17.02.08.033.03,you may request a hearing on the matter within fourteen days. Also in 
700 So . Clearwater Ln., Boise, ID 
Equal Opportunity Employer 
accordance with this rule, the Commission will shortly be issuing a partial order releasing 
available funds, and fees and costs which have been determined to be reasonable. 
Thank you for your assistance in the review of this proposed settlement. 
Sincerely, 
Scott McDougall 
Manager, Claims and Benefits 
Cc: Liberty NW 
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IC: 2005-510285 
2005-510286 
2003-522535 
ORDER APPROVING IN PART 
STIPULATION AND AGREEMENT 
OF LUMP SUM DISCHARGE 
FI LE D 
JAN "':4 2010 
INDUSTRIAlCOMMISSION 
This matter came before the Commission on the request of the parties to approve a 
Stipulation and Agreement of Lump Sum Discharge. The Commission desires to approve the 
agreement, except for a portion relating to attorney fees. Having fully reviewed the proposed 
settlement and being fully advised, the Commission finds that the agreement is in the best 
interests ofthe parties. THEREFORE, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED That the Stipulation and Agreement of Lump Sum Discharge 
proposed by the parties is approved, with the exception of a portion of the claim for attorney fees 
submitted by Claimant's Attorney. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED That the Commission approves the request for attorney fees 
and costs as those services related to the lump sum consideration. The total lump sum amount is 
ORDER APPROVING IN PART STIPULATION AND AGREEMENT OF LUMP SUM 
DISCHARGE - 1 
~5'7 
$13,442.57. Fees from that amount at 25% are $3,360.64, which is reasonable. Fees and costs 
amount to $3,360.64 and $606.72 respectively, for a total of $3,967.36. However, Attorney has 
previously withheld $933.28 as fees from the permanent partial impairment benefit paid to 
claimant. Pursuant to IDAP A 17.02.08.033.03(a), Commission staff has previously informed 
Claimant's Attorney that staff has been unable to determine that such a fee should be 
recommended for approval. It is noted that Counsel requests from the lump sum consideration 
$309.11 less in fees than has to this point been deemed reasonable. Consequently, the amount of 
fees unawarded at this time will be $624.17 ($933.28 minus $309.11). Accordingly, Surety 
shall release to Attorney the sum of $4,270.52 ($3,967.36 minus $624.17 plus $1,236.44) as the 
total of fees and costs due, less those fees previously taken, plus proceeds allocated for 
outstanding medicals. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED That the Surety release to Attorney the sum of $624.17, 
which is the amount of the proceeds of the Stipulation and Agreement of Lump Sum Discharge 
requested for unsubstantiated attorney fees, to be held in trust pending further order of the 
Commission. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED That the Surety pay to Claimant the remaining sum of 
$8,547.88. 
Claimant's attorney has previously been advised in writing of this determination and his 
right to request a hearing on the issue of attorney fees . 
.;.1.. (\ .;)0\0 
DATED this ~day of ~~CAllA~< ,2009. 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION 
f'/J~ 
R.D. Maynard, Ch~an 
ORDER APPROVING IN PART STIPULATION AND AGREEMENT OF LUMP SUM 
DISCHARGE - 2 
Thomas P. Baskin, Commissioner 
ORDER APPROVING IN PART STIPULATION AND AGREEMENT OF LUMP SUM 
DISCHARGE - 3 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on ~CVb. L\ ,J,. D \ 0, a true and correct copy of ORDER 
APPROVING IN PART STIPU ATION AND AGREEMENT OF LUMP SUM 
DISCHARGE, IC # 2005-510285, was served upon the parties listed below as follows: 
_X_US MAIL COURIER 
E. Scott Harmon 
Laws Offices of Harmon, Whittier & Day 
PO Box 6358 
Boise, ID 83707-6358 
Andrew Marsh 
Seiniger Law Office 
942 Myrtle St 
Boise,ID 83702 
ORDER APPROVING IN PART STIPULATION AND AGREEMENT OF LUMP SUM 
DISCHARGE - 4 
Wm. Breck Seiniger, Jr. (ISB # 2387) 
Andrew C. Marsh (ISB # 6588) 
SEINIGER LAW OFFICES, P.A. 
942 W. Myrtle Street 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
Phone: (208) 345-1000 
Fax: (208) 345-4700 
Attorneys for Claimant 
L' 
I'; 
'::- ;\ 
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BEFORE THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
Maria Gomez, 
Claimant, 
vs. 
Nampa Lodging Investors LLC, 
Employer, 
and 
Liberty Nothwest, 
Surety, 
Defendants. 
I.e. No. 06-006711 
MOTION FOR STATEMENT 
OF REASONS FOR DENIAL 
OF ATTORNEY FEE 
PURSUANT TO 
IDAP A 17.02.08.033.03(a) 
COMES NO\V Claimant's counsel, and hereby files this MOTION FOR STATEMENT 
OF REASONS FOR DENIAL OF ATTORNEY FEE PURSUANT TO IDAPA 
17.02.08.033.03(a). 
The grounds for the Motion are that IDAP A 17.02.08.033.03(a) provides as follows: 
"The Commission staff will notify counsel in writing of the staff s informal determination, which 
shall state the reasons for the determination that the requested fee is not reasonable." However, 
Counsel has received no such statement. Neither the Commission's order dated January 4,2010 
nor the letter from Scott McDougall contain any reasons; they only contain the conclusion that 
the attorney fees requested in the above matter have not been found to be reasonable. 
1 The McDougal letter was received by Counsel on 12/28/09. 
SEINIGER LAW OFFICES, P.A. MOTION FOR STATEMENT OF REASONS FOR DENIAL 
942 W. Myrtle Street 
Boise, Idaho 83702 OF ATTORNEY FEE PURSUANT TO 
PAGE 1 OF 2 
(208)345-1000 IDAPA 17.02.08.033.03(A) 
The legal dictionary at http://dictionary.lp.findlaw.com defines "reason" as "an 
underlying ground, justification, purpose, motive, or inducement. Example: required to provide 
reasons for the termination in writing." In other words, a statement of reasons must include 
the underlying grounds, i.e. a factual and legal basis, neither of which has been provided to 
Counsel. 
It would be fundamentally unfair for Counsel to be denied attorney fees or to be forced to 
attend a hearing on attorney fees without receiving the statement of reasons required by the 
IDAPA rule. 
The relief sought is compliance with IDAP A 17.02.0S.033.03(a), including notification in 
writing to Counsel of the reasons for the determination that the requested attorney fee is not 
reasonable. 
Dated January 12,2010. 
SEINIGER LAW OFFICES, P.A. 
Andrew Marsh 
Attorney for Claimant 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I CERTIFY that on January 12,2010, I caused a true and correct copy ofthe foregoing document 
to be served by facsimile on: 
Harmon, Whittier and Day 
(SOO) 972-3213 
SEINIGER LAW OFFICES, P.A. 
.--:::,.., /.,< ..... t- /<~~i£,l<~.-4-
Andrew Marsh 
Attorney for Claimant 
SEINIGER LAW OFFICES, P.A. 
942 W. Myrtle Street 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
MOTION FOR STATEMENT OF REASONS FOR DENIAL 
OF ATTORNEY FEE PURSUANT TO 
(208) 345-1000 IDAPA 17.02.0B.033.03(A) 
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S1EliNliGJE1R 
AVV OFFiCES 
Professional Association 
WM. BRECK SEINIGER, JR. ANDREW C. MARsH 
Idaho, Oregon, Washington, and the District of Columbia 
JULIE MARsH SEINIGER 
Idaho, Indiana, and Missouri 
Idaho, Indiana, and the District of Columbia 
January 26,2010 
VIA HAND DELIVERY 
WITH COPIES TO THE COMMISSIONERS 
RE: Maria Gomez v. Nampa Lodging Investors, LLC & Liberty NW 
IIC Case No.: 06-006711 .. 
Dear Mr. McDougall: 
This is in response to your letter of December 24,2009, and the Commiss~Qn's Order of 
January 4,2010, regarding attorney fees in the above matter. The Order firic!s that • 
$933.28 in attorney fees for the PPI was not found to be reasonable. But on a separate 
issue, the Order finds that Counsel (Seiniger Law Offices) did not request $309.11 in 
attorney fees on the Lump Sum Agreement for which Counsel was eligible, thus directing 
that Counsel retain the difference, $624.17, in trust pending a hearing. 
Our Form 1022, filed September 28,2009, provides on page two that we are waiving our 
attorney fees of$309.11 on medical benefits we obtained for Maria in the sum of 
$1236.44. 
The reason we are waiving our right to these fees of $309.11 is as follows: 
1. In negotiating the original LSA amount, I promised Maria that I would continue 
my efforts to get the surety to go back and pay medical bills that were clearly 
related to her workplace injury and that should have been paid by the surety in the 
first place. 
2. I also promised Maria that if we succeeded in obtaining from the surety the 
additional sum of up to $1236.44, we would not charge an attorney's fee. Again, 
although we were clearly entitled to a fee, we did not want Maria to lose out just 
because the surety had failed to comply with the law regarding their responsibility 
for medical bills. 
3. I further promised Maria that since the unpaid work comp bills had been turned 
over to collection agencies, that in the event we were to recover the additional 
$1236.44 for her, we would ask the collection agencies to accept a compromise 
and settlement in a lesser amount than their claims (e.g. at least some of their 
942 W. MYRTLE STREET 
BOISE, IDAHO 83702 
(208) 345-1000 
Fax: (208) 345-4700 
Andrew@SeinigerLaw.com 
www.SeinigerLaw.com 
January 26,2010 
Page 2 of2 
claims were for interest on the bills that the surety had not paid), and that we 
would refund to Maria the amount we saved for her. 
In the ensuing months, we were able to get the surety to agree to pay Maria the $1236.44 
in addition to the LSA amount of$12.206.13 upon which we had originally reached 
agreement with the surety. Accordingly, the LSA as drafted and signed shows a total 
LSA of $13,442.57. 
In accord with the traditions of this firm, it is our desire to honor our understanding with 
our client. Therefore, we have retained in our trust account the full sum of$933.28. In the 
event that the Commission, after hearing, finds that we are not entitled to attorney fees on 
the PPI benefit, it would be our intention to refund this entire amount to Maria, and not to 
offset it against the $309.11. We consider the medical bills issue to be separate from the 
PPI issue, and we believe we should honor our understanding with Maria. 
After the Order was issued, we contacted the collection agencies listed on page 4 of the 
LSA. So far, we have heard back from Bonneville Collections, who agreed to accept 
$304.00 instead of their original charges and interest of$383.43; and Action Collections, 
who agreed to accept $138.60 instead of $231.01. We have sent a check to Maria for the 
amount we saved her in the sums of $79.43 and $92.41 respectively. Given Maria's 
difficult fmancial circumstances, even this small amount will make a positive difference 
for her. 
We assume that the Commission will have no objection to our retaining in trust a sum 
($933.28) greater than that which was ordered ($624.17). However, if the Commission 
would prefer that we file a formal motion for approval in regard to the above, we would 
be happy to do so. 
Please let me know. Thank you. 
Andrew Marsh 
Cc: Commissioner Maynard 
.5= .. Ommis. sioner L. imbaug~. 
c~oinmissioner Baskin tI"" 
Kent Day, defense counsel 
Maria Gomez, claimant 
942 W. MYRTLE STREET 
BOISE, IDAHO 83702 
(208) 345-1000 
Fax: (208) 345-4700 
Anruew@SeinigerLaw.com 
www.SeinigerLaw.com 
BEFORE THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
MARIA GOMEZ, ) 
) 
Claimant, ) 
) 
v. ) IC 2005-510285 
) 
NAMP A LODGING Il\TVESTORS, LLC , ) 
) 
Employer, ) ORDER DENYING :MOTION 
and ) RE: ATTORNEY FEES 
) 
LIBERTY NORTHWEST INSURANCE ) 
CORPORATION, ) 
) FI LE 
Surety, ) r 2010 ) 
Defendants. ) INDUSTRIAL COMMiSSION 
On January 4,2010, the Commission issued an Order Approving in Part Stipulation and 
Agreement of Lump Sum Discharge ("Order"). In the Order, the Commission declined to 
approve attorney fees in the amount of$624.17. On January 12, 2010, Claimant's counsel filed a 
motion requesting a statement of reasons why the requested fees were denied by the 
Commission. Claimant's counsel contends that IDAP A 17.02.08.033.03(a) requires such a 
statement from Commission staff and that the statement has not been provided. 
In a letter dated December 24,2009, Commission staff informed Claimant's counsel that 
staff lacks sufficient information to conclude that the requested fees are reasonable. 
Specifically, Claimant's counsel failed to provide sufficient evidence demonstrating that he acted 
primarily or substantially to secure the fund from which the fees were being requested. In order 
for the fees to be deemed reasonable, such evidence must be provided. 
The December 24, 2009 letter satisfies the requirements of IDAPA 17.02.0S.033.03(a). 
Consequently, the motion is DENIED. 
ORDER DENYING MOTION RE: ATTORNEY FEES - 1 
IT IS SO ORDERE,it 
DATED this ff day of February, 2010. 
INDUSTRlAL COMMISSION 
RD. Maynard, Chairlllan 
{ 
Thomas P. Baskin, Commissioner 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
. IJiCt--
I hereby certIfy that on the ~ day of February 2010, a true and correct copy of Order 
Denying Motion Re: Attorney Fees was served by regular United States Mail upon each ofthe 
following persons: 
ANDREW MARSH 
942 W MYRTLE ST 
BOISE ID 83702 
SCOTT HARMON 
PO BOX 6358 
BOISE ID 83707-6358 
eb/cjh 
ORDER DENYING MOTION RE: ATTORNEY FEES - 2 
ORIGr~~Al 
Wm. Breck Seiniger, Jr. (ISB # 2387) 
Andrew C. Marsh (ISB # 6588) 
SEINIGER LAW OFFICES, P.A. 
942 W. Myrtle Street 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
Phone: (208) 345-1000 
Fax: (208) 345-4700 
Attorneys for Claimant 
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Maria Gomez, 
Claimant, 
vs. 
Nampa Lodging Investors LLC, 
Employer, 
And 
Liberty Northwest, 
Surety, 
Defendants. 
I.C. No. 05-510285 
CLAIMANT'S COUNSEL'S 
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COMES NOW Claimant's Counsel and files these ADMISSIONS for purposes of the 
Attorney Fee Hearing (hereinafter "Hearing") now scheduled in this matter for April 12, 2010. 
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""1j 
;;:0 
--
...,..;) 
r,., 
c::;) 
.-
c::;) 
For purposes of these proceedings, Counsel is using the phrase "but-for test" as shorthand 
for a standard of proof that means that in order to prove the element of "primarily or 
substantially" (IDAP A 17.02.08.033.01.c.ii.), Counsel is required to prove the causal link 
between Counsel's representation and the payment of benefits by demonstrating nothing less 
than that without his representation, the benefits would not have been paid. 
Counsel makes the following admissions: 
1. For purposes of these proceedings only, and without waiving the right to raise the 
SEINIGER LAW OFFICES, P.A. 
942 W. Myrtle Street 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
(208) 345-1000 
CLAIMANT'S COUNSEL'S 
ADMISSIONS FOR A TIORNEY FEE HEARING 
PAGE 1 OF 2 
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constitutionality of the applicable IDAPA attorney fee rules on appeal, Seiniger 
Law Offices admits that it cannot prove that its attorneys were "primarily or 
substantially" responsible for securing the permanent partial impairment 
(PPI) benefit and the other benefits paid as consideration for lump sum 
settlement (LSS) if the standard of proof is the "but-for test." 
2. For purposes of these proceedings only, and without waiving the right to raise the 
constitutionality of the applicable IDAPA attorney fee rules on appeal, Seiniger 
Law Offices admits that it cannot prove that the Defendants "disputed" the 
permanent partial impairment (pPI) benefit and the other benefits paid as 
consideration for lump sum settlement (LSS) before the Defendants paid 
those benefits. 
Dated April 12, 2010. 
SEINIGER LAW OFFICES, P.A. 
Andrew Marsh 
Attorney for Claimant 
SEINIGER LAW OFFICES, PA 
942 W. Myrtle Street 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
(208) 345-1000 
CLAIMANT'S COUNSEL'S 
ADMISSIONS FOR ATTORNEY FEE HEARING 
PAGE20F 2 
